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Ethnic conflicts persist in Ghana despite the efforts of governments to resolve them. 
Governments are increasingly concerned not only about their massive human rights 
abuses and wide-scale destruction of property that characterize these conflicts, but also 
the difficulty of resolving them and restoring permanent peace.  The purpose of this 
qualitative exploratory case study was to provide a deeper understanding of the processes 
and mechanisms of transitional justice implemented in Dagbon after war broke out in 
2002 and explore the conditions under which these initiatives can be more effective in 
resolving the conflict and maintain peace. Data were collected through individual 
interviews, focus group discussions, and review of documents. Thirteen participants were 
purposively selected from communities, chiefs, and representatives of civil society 
organizations. Focus groups consisted of four men and four women. NVivo was used to 
manage and analyze the data. Data were analyzed using the theory of protracted social 
conflict as a lens and the concept of transitional justice as the conceptual foundation. The 
findings showed that a mixture of formal retributive and restorative initiatives was 
implemented. These were imposed on informal institutions and rules more deeply rooted 
in Dagbon. The institutions also suffered undue pressure from both government and elite 
of Dagbon which made peacebuilding difficult. A recommendation was made for 
government to strengthen the Dagbon Traditional Council to lead the conflict resolution 
process using traditional approaches, and identify and empower a credible civil society 
group to facilitate the process.  The results could potentially change the way the conflict 
resolution initiatives have been conceptualized and managed in future.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
Introduction 
West Africa is generally a region characterized by violent and protracted 
conflicts. Conflicts have become a recurring decimal in West Africa (Tembo, 2012; 
Annan, 2014; Tonah, 2012) with devastating effects on the economies and lives of the 
people in the sub-region (Oluwadare, 2014; Stareike, 2013). Choi and Raleigh (2015) 
have categorized conflicts into three forms: “civil wars, political militia, and riots” (p. 
158). According to Tonah (2012), whichever way we classify these conflicts and 
regardless of their causes, what is clear is that there are ethnic dimensions and undertones 
in most of them. In some parts of West Africa such as in Mali, Nigeria, and Niger, 
conflicts have had ethno-political undertones (Annan, 2014). The worrying part of the 
story of conflicts in West Africa is that countries that have been described as generally 
peaceful are masked by what Annan (2014, p.1) described as “low intensity conflicts” 
which are both ethnic and recurrent in nature (Noagah, 2013; Sulemana, 2009; Aikins, 
2009). In Ghana, the Dagbon, Konkomba-Nanumba and Kusasi-Manprusi conflicts are 
examples whilst in Senegal, the conflict in the Cassamance region is another of such low 
intensity conflicts.  
There is growing knowledge about the causes of ethnic conflicts in West Africa. 
Whereas these differ from one conflict to another, there is agreement in literature that 
ethnic rivalry introduced into the body politic of Africa is the root cause. These are then 
aggravated by other causes including conflict over land, chieftaincy succession, politics 
and disagreement over resources (Lund & Boone, 2013; Noagah, 2013; Tonah, 2012; 
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Kaye & Beland, 2009). Annan (2014, p.5) identified additional causes to include poverty, 
ethnic marginalization, corruption and human rights violations. Wherever they occur and 
in whatever nature they assume, conflicts have devastating effects on national economies 
and on the lives of citizens of such countries. Ujeke (2008) and Oluwadare (2014) for 
example reported that in 1990, Heads of State and government in Africa declared that 
conflicts are hindering the efforts of African governments to effectively deal with the 
continent’s economic development; for which reason the Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution was established in 1993.  Development effort is 
often sacrificed in favor of conflict resolution and peacebuilding.  
The response to conflict situations may take a number of forms depending on its 
nature and scope. In many countries, following violent conflicts, governments deploy 
military personnel to stop the arson and killings often associated with them. This initial 
measure is often accompanied by some arrests and detentions of those thought to be the 
perpetrators of the conflict. In some cases, Commissions of Enquiries are set up as a next 
step to investigate the causes and recommend solutions to government. Where massive 
human rights violations are involved, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission might be 
established. Whereas government strategies focus mostly on calming down the conflict 
and resolving them, civil society’s focus is on relief and peacebuilding (Kaye, 2011). 
There is evidence from literature that these measures that are often put in place by 
government and supported by civil society, do not achieve the intended peace and the 
conflict keeps recurring (Noagah, 2013; Tonah, 2012; Longi, 2014). These and other 
studies have been reviewed in chapter 2. Whereas there is increasing knowledge about 
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the causes and effects of these conflicts, not much has been done in Ghana to understand 
the conditions under which these measures might work to restore lasting peace. This 
dissertation aimed to fill this gap. 
      
Background to the Problem 
Although Ghana is known among the international community to be a peaceful 
democratic country, her relative peace is threatened by numerous violent ethnic conflicts 
which are persistent and protracted in nature (Annan, 2014; Tonah, 2012; Aikins, 2009). 
Langer (2009) and Lentz (2010) reported that Ghana’s post-colonial history is 
characterized by repeated ethnic tensions especially in the Northern part of the country. 
The Northern part of Ghana, home to about seventeen ethnic groups (Jonsson, 2009), is 
the region that has the most of these ethnic conflicts (Aikins, 2009; Kaye, 2010; Kaye & 
Beland, 2009). Some of the known conflicts in the Northern Region include the 
Nanumba-Konkomba, Nawuri-Gonja, the Dagbon (intra ethnic involving the Adanis and 
Abudus) and the Bimoba-Konkomba conflicts (Asefa, 2009; Tonah, 2012). 
Ethnic conflicts are of two kinds: inter-ethnic which occurs between two ethnic 
groups, such as the Nanumbas and the Konkombas, Kusasis and Manprusis; and intra 
ethnic which is between rival sections of the same ethnic group such as the “Abudus” and 
“Andanis” of the Dagomba ethnic group (popularly referred to as the Dagbon conflict) in 
the Dagomba traditional area. One important characteristic of ethnic conflicts in Northern 
Ghana is that they persist for a long time, recurring after the slight trigger (Aikins, 2009; 
Tonah, 2012; Annan, 2014). The Dagbon conflict for example has recurred several times 
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over the last ten years (Kaye & Beland, 2009; Tonah, 2012) but that of 2002 was the 
most violent. 
A review of literature reveals several reasons which explain the causes and 
frequent recurrence of ethnic conflicts. These include disagreements over land and other 
natural resources (Lentz, 2010; Jonsson, 2009, Langer, 2009); greed and structural 
ineptitude (Okoro, 2010, Jonsson, 2009), poverty (Kaye, 2011; Okoro, 2010; Annan, 
2014) and conflict of formal and informal institutions exacerbated by party politics 
(Aikins, 2009; Kaye & Beland, 2009; Tonah, 2012, Azuimah, 2010). A few think that the 
deliberate policy of the colonial administration to invest in the resource rich southern part 
of Ghana created horizontal inequalities, and when these coincide with cultural 
differences, it can lead to tension and provide material for conflict narratives (Langer, 
2009; Jonsson, 2009). 
The approach to conflict resolution in the region has been mixed. Governments’ 
first reaction to armed ethnic conflict has always been to send the military to enforce 
peace (Tonah, 2012, Aikins, 2009; Kaye, 2011). In some cases, the detachment of 
military men stays in the conflict area for as long as one year and is progressively 
replaced by police men. In the Bawku Traditional area for example, Noagah (2013) 
reported that there is now a permanent military base there because of the recurrent and 
violent nature that the Kusasi-Manprusi conflict has become. Whilst these strategies are 
being implemented, some of the protagonists or “ring leaders” of the conflict are arrested 
and detained in the regional capital.  
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In some cases, a Commission of Enquiry is set up to investigate the causes and make 
recommendations for action (Kaye, 2011; Kaye & Beland, 2009). For large scale 
conflicts such as the Dagbon one for example, a permanent Peace Negotiation Team was 
put in place to work out permanent peace (Kaye & Beland, 2009; Tonah, 2012).  The 
focus of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in conflict management has been on 
providing effective emergency response and peacebuilding (Kaye, 2011; Kaye & Beland, 
2009). There is a combination of retributive and restorative processes and strategies at 
play but these efforts do not yield lasting peace and before long, hostilities resume after a 
small provocation (Tonah, 2012; Aikins, 2009). The question then is why the transitional 
justice initiatives fail to achieve lasting peace? Menkel-Meadow (2004) explained that in 
states that have witnessed large scale conflicts (like Sierra Leone and Liberia), the 
conventional law, legal and restorative processes are often inadequate to meet the human 
needs and interests inherent in the conflict situations due to severely weakened and 
ineffective judicial systems. He therefore argues for the justice system to develop various 
kinds of processes and institutions which he refers to as “process pluralism” (p.8). In 
communal conflicts such as those that occur in the Northern part of Ghana often with 
massive human rights violations, why are the retributive and restorative systems and 
processes unable to resolve the conflicts and restore permanent peace? 
Research conducted so far on conflicts have focused on the causes of conflicts 
(see Aikins, 2009; Kaye & Beland, 2009; Tonah, 2012) and a few on challenges of 
reconciliation and peacebuilding (Kaye, 2010; Sowatey, 2005; Nwauche, 2010; Aikins, 
2009). To date however, with the noticeable exceptions of Noagah’s (2013) work on the 
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conflict between Manprusis and Kusasis in the Bawku traditional area in the Upper East 
Region of Ghana, there is no explanation in literature as to why these ethnic conflicts 
remain unresolved for generations. Annan (2014) argued that one reason for this may be 
that administrators fail to understand the fundamental causes of the conflicts in the first 
place. If the mechanisms for conflict resolution and restoration are effective, we should 
see the return to normal lasting peace in the warring communities after peace accords 
have been signed by both groups. A study to understand the conditions under which 
restorative and retributive mechanisms might be successful in restoring peace might offer 
some explanations why most of the conflicts persist.  This study sought to fill this gap. 
Statement of the Problem 
There is a problem with the persisting ethnic conflict in the Dagbon Traditional 
Area. Despite the measures put in place by government and non-governmental 
organizations after peace accords, the conflict has persisted for over fifty years now 
(Tonah, 2012; Aikins, 2009; Kaye & Beland, 2009). The resumption of armed conflict in 
2002 was the most violent and destructive (Anamzoyah, 2014; Tonah, 2012). In March 
2006, a peace agreement was reached between the two feuding gates (the Andanis and 
the Abudus) and a roadmap for peace signed (Tonah, 2012). Following this, several 
strategies were put in place to resolve the conflict and restore peace in Dagbon but these 
have not been successful (Tonah, 2012; Kaye, 2011) in restoring permanent peace.  
The conflict has had a negative impact on the governance of the area. The 2002 
conflict for example led to the resignation of two ministers and the National Security 
Advisor (Tonah, 2012). As Sulemana (2009) explained, conflict is development in 
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reverse and the total impact of conflicts in Northern Region cannot be quantified. The 
2002 Dagbon conflict alone claimed the life of the paramount King of Dagbon and over 
30 of his elders (Sowatey, 2005; Tonah, 2012) and over 4 billion Ghanaian cedis 
(approximately $1.25 billion) was spent in less than a year on peace enforcement 
(Sowatey, 2005 p.108). 
According to Kaye (2011) and Aikins (2009) a combination of retributive and 
restorative processes may be at play.  The central question then is what conditions might 
respond most favorably to transitional justice strategies in Dagbon? A possible cause of 
this might be that the nature of transitional justice strategies might not be appropriate.  
Jonsson (2009) explained that the peacebuilding experience in Northern Ghana in general 
has not been well studied, so a lot of questions remain unanswered. Some studies mention 
the Dagbon conflict as part of an historical account of causes of conflicts in Northern 
Ghana in general (Lentz, 2006; Sowatey, 2005; Annan, 2014) and quite a few focus on 
some aspects of the Dagbon conflict such as the nature and causes (Aikins, 2009; 
Jonsson, 2009; Tonah, 2012); whilst others focus on the impact of politics on chieftaincy 
related conflicts (Tonah, 2012) and the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
during conflict and in peacebuilding (Kaye, 2011; Kaye & Beland, 2009). Noagah’s 
(2013) study is the only one that examined the effectiveness of retributive and restorative 
strategies but its focus is on the Manprusi - Kusasi conflict in the Bawku Traditional Area 
in a different region in Ghana. The experiences in Noagah’s (2013) study is that of an 
inter-ethnic conflict, different from the Dagbon one which is intra-ethnic. Therefore, 
whereas these studies document the nature and causes of the persistent Dagbon conflict, 
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there is a gap in knowledge about the conditions that might respond appropriately to 
transitional justice strategies. Until these are known and applied, there will be continuous 
loss of lives and property due to recurring conflicts, and administrators will continue to 
invest huge sums of money into managing them at the expense of much needed 
investment in development. Perhaps a qualitative study on this could provide answers to 
help remedy the situation. 
Research Questions 
The central research question is: what conditions might respond most favorably to 
transitional justice strategies in the Dagbon Traditional Area? The sub-questions include:  
Sub-Q1. What is the nature of the strategies for transitional justice implemented after the 
2006 peace accord? 
Sub-Q2. What are the challenges associated with these strategies? 
Sub-Q3. What might help to make the strategies more responsive to peacebuilding? 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to provide a deeper understanding 
of the processes and mechanisms of transitional justice in the Dagbon Traditional Area. 
The objective was to examine the nature, effectiveness and appropriateness of the 
mechanisms for justice and peace building with the view to understanding how these 
explain the persistence of the conflict in Dagbon.  
Significance of the Study 
In their contribution to the definition of social change, Callahan et al (2012) 
explained that social change can be looked at in terms of processes and product. 
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According to them, based on their values or ethical principles, the scholar-practitioner 
identifies a problem and engages in a scholarly research to find answers to it. Through 
this process, society is engaged to think critically and in a systematic manner in 
collaboration with other actors. The process, according to Callahan et al (2012), produces 
knowledge which then becomes the basis for citizen engagement, advocacy, and 
contributes to positive social change.  
In this context, the significance of this study lies in its potential to facilitate an 
understanding of the processes and mechanisms of transitional justice and how these 
impact on the resolution of conflicts and the maintenance of peace. The knowledge that 
might be gained through this study might be helpful to administrators in their quest to 
deal with conflicts in Ghana.  
The Northern Regional Administration might be the first potential beneficiary of 
this study. Currently, the Regional Administration spends a third of their annual budget to 
maintain peace in the Dagbon Traditional Area (Sowatey, 2005). The result of this study 
could potentially be the starting point in the search for a lasting solution to the protracted 
conflict. Administrators are also always interested in value for money and policy 
effectiveness (O’Sullivan, Russel & Berner, 2008).  This study could help to identify 
what might be required to put the issue on the agenda of the Northern Regional 
Administration and the policy options to take. If the feuding gates of Dagbon, civil 
society and the administrators are well engaged to think and reflect on the issue, 





This study was guided by the concept of transitional justice, understood as “an 
attempt to build a sustainable peace after conflict, mass violence or systemic human 
rights abuse” (van Zyl, 2005 p.209). As van Zyl (2005) further explained, intra-state 
conflicts, like the Dagbon conflict, require post-conflict peacekeeping and development 
effort even though they may not have engulfed the entire nation. This is because of the 
immense human suffering; massive human rights abuses, destruction and deaths 
associated with such conflicts. These are in the domain of transitional justice.   
A theory that might help enhance our understanding of the impacts of transitional 
justice on peace is the protracted social conflict (PSC) theory by Edward Azar. Edward 
Azar’s (1978) theory of protracted social conflict (PSC) was developed to explain 
conflict situations that exhibit violent and protracted tendencies by communal groups as 
they compete for recognition, equitable and fair access to resources and power. Azar 
explained that when identity-driven groups perceive that their identity is threatened and 
hence feel vulnerable; this perceived vulnerability is exacerbated when state machinery is 
dominated by a group who deny others basic human rights and needs. Azar put forward 
four conditions as the predominant sources of protracted social conflict which include 
communal content, deprivation of basic human needs, governance and the role of the 
state, and international relations (Azar, 1978). 
The utility of PSC in this study lies in its appeal in helping to understand and explain 
prevalent patterns of the Dagbon conflict as well as its dynamics, whether overt or covert, 
violent or non-violent. These were essential in this study because it helped in 
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understanding the appropriateness of the strategies for resolving conflicts and 
maintaining peace. Interestingly, the Dagbon conflict exhibits characteristics of both 
overt and covert conflicts (Aikins, 2009; Kaye, 2011; Tonah, 2012) of PSC. 
Definition of Terms 
Transitional justice-- this is used to refer to “the set of judicial and non-judicial measures 
that have been implemented… in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights 
abuses” (International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009 p. 2). Accordingly, 
transitional justice includes the right to know the truth of what happened, a right to 
reparations and assurances of non-recurrence (Sandoval, 2014; Tietel, 2015). 
Transitional justice strategies-- include arrests, detentions and trials through courts and 
tribunals, truth and reconciliation commissions, commissions of enquiry, reparation 
programs, and amnesty among others. 
Retributive justice-- the practice of using the court system to try and punish violations of 
human rights abuses where applicable. As van Prooijen and Coffeng (2013) described it, 
the aim here is for victims to have the sense that “fair and appropriate punishment, 
commensurate with the severity of the transgression” (p.384). Arrests, trials, detentions 
and other forms of sanctions are some elements of retributive justice mechanisms. 
Conflict settlement—This study adopted the definition of Riemann (2004) that conflict 
settlement refers to “all outcome oriented strategies for achieving sustainable win-win 
solutions and/or putting an end to direct violence, without necessarily addressing the 
underlying causes of conflict” (p.8) 
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Conflict resolution—involves ways and means through which a disagreement or conflict 
among feuding parties is facilitated to a peaceful end. It therefore goes beyond settlement 
to address the root causes of the conflict and the strategies are normally non-coercive. 
Peace building—initiatives implemented aimed at preventing conflicts from getting 
started or resumed. 
Ethnic conflict—A conflict between groups of people with different or the same linguistic 
background or tribe. If it is between two different tribes, it is an inter-ethnic conflict and 
if it is between groups of people within the same tribe, it is intra-ethnic. The Dagbon 
conflict is an example of the latter. 
Assumptions, Limitations, Scope, and Delimitations 
1.  The study was limited to the transitional justice processes and tools implemented 
after the outbreak of hostilities between the Andanis and Abudus in March 2002, 
for which a peace accord was signed in 2006. 
2. The study relied on information from people/organizations with experience from 
the 2006 Dagbon conflict. Identifying such people to serve as participants in the 
study was not easy. It was necessary to seek the help of a credible organization 
that had worked in the study area to help in identifying potential participants. 
3. Identifying the truth in a post conflict situation is always challenging. For this 
reason and in keeping with the constructionist tradition, it was important to 
explore multiple sources of information and strengthen the confidentiality clause 
during interviews to make people comfortable enough to disclose information. 
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4. The results of this study are limited to the Dagbon experience only. Other ethnic 
conflicts across the region are not within this study. 
5. Data was originally planned to be collected from individuals, chiefs, 
representatives of civil society organizations who worked in the area during the 
time of the conflict, as well as representatives of security agencies who were in 
the area at the time of the conflict. However, during the survey, no member of the 
security agency passed the inclusion criteria. Therefore, no member of the 
security agencies was interviewed. 
6. Results may not be generalized to cover other conflicts in the region. This is 
because the conditions that might favour the Dagbon conflict might not be 
appropriate for others. This study focused on filling the knowledge gap about the 
conditions that might favour the successful implementation of transitional justice 
strategies. The next chapter focuses on a review of relevant literature which will 
set the theoretical foundations for the study. Chapter three outlines the design, and 
methods of the study. Chapters four and five are dedicated to presentation of 
research results, discussion and conclusion respectively.  
 
Summary of Chapter One 
West Africa is a conflict-prone region. Although Ghana is relatively 
peaceful, ethnic conflicts which are protracted in nature are threatening this peace. 
Most of these conflicts, ethnic in nature, are violent and involve loss of lives, 
property and massive human rights violations.  Although governments and civil 
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society groups invest time and resources to resolve these conflicts and maintain 
peace, their efforts have largely been unsuccessful.  
Research has shown that quite a lot of scholarly effort has gone into 
identifying the causes of conflicts but not on understanding why transitional 
justice strategies do not seem to yield lasting peace. This qualitative study sought 
to fill this knowledge gap using the Dagbon conflict in the Northern Region as a 
case study. In the next chapter, scholarly work on conflicts, and the measures 
implemented to resolve them are presented and analysed. The extent of 
knowledge on this subject is examined and the research gap established as well as 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
 
Ethnic conflicts in Ghana are both recurring and protracted in nature. According 
to Tonah (2012) and Annan (2014) these conflicts often defy the measures and resources 
that government and civil society groups invest in resolving them. As scarce resources 
continue to be spent on these conflicts, there is pressure on governments to resolve them 
permanently to free resources for much needed development work. To date, there is no 
clarity on what measures might work and the conditions under which they would achieve 
peace in post-conflict environments. The purpose of this study was to provide a deeper 
understanding of how the processes and mechanisms of transitional justice have impacted 
the Dagbon peace process after the peace accord was signed in March 2006. The main 
aim was to understand the conditions under which transitional justice might achieve their 
stated objectives of resolving the conflict and maintaining lasting peace.  
This chapter reviews the concept of transitional justice as well as the theory of 
protracted social conflict (PSC) both of which form the theoretical and conceptual 
foundations of this study. The chapter also evaluates scholarly resources on the nature, 
causes and impacts of ethnic conflicts and the associated transitional justice processes 
and mechanisms employed to resolve them. The analysis of causes and impacts of ethnic 
conflicts served as a background to understanding the various responses to these conflicts 
which are also reviewed in this chapter.  
 The chapter begins with an analysis of the research strategy employed for the 
review of literature so as to assist in any future attempts to retrieve resources used during 
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the review. The review begins with a description of conflicts and the response to 
resolving them at the level of Africa before the situation in West Africa and Ghana are 
presented and analyzed. Following this, a review of the concepts of transitional justice 
and the theory of protracted social conflict (PSC) is done to shed light on their meaning 
and relevance within the context of this study. This is followed by a presentation of 
scholarly work on the nature, causes and impacts of conflicts. The responses of 
government and civil society organizations are then analyzed, synthesized and presented. 
The chapter ends with a summary of key themes running through literature and their 
implications for this study.  
Research Strategy 
Literature was reviewed using Walden University data bases, mostly Thoreau, 
Academic Search Complete, SAGE Premier, Political Science Complete, Dissertations 
and Theses. Occasionally, I used Google Scholar to locate resources from which I sorted 
relevant articles using filters such as “Africa”, “West Africa”, “Ghana”, and “ethnic”. 
The search for scholarly work was done using the key words: “conflicts”, “transitional 
justice”, “peacebuilding”, “transformative peacebuilding”, “conflict resolution”, and 
“conflict settlement”. The Walden Dissertations were particularly used as a source of 
locating relevant resources. Using Google search engine, I managed to locate some 
relevant work but accessing most of the peer reviewed articles located through this source 
was limited as most host libraries required permission (which I did not have) to access 
their information. Therefore, the content of this literature review is limited to information 
found in Walden University data base mostly and to a limited extent, open libraries. 
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Jonsson (2009) wrote that in Ghana, the peacebuilding experience has not been properly 
studied and documented. This was found to be true as there was very little current 
scholarly work on the subject. Therefore, I decided to expand the search to include 
experiences from other African countries on conflicts and the mechanisms that were 
employed in their resolution.  The time frame within which articles were included was 
2000. The other inclusion criterion for such scholarly work was that they must have 
involved multi-country experiences. 
 
Concepts of Transitional Justice 
The concept of transitional justice became prominent in the late 1980s and 1990s 
(Tietel, 2015; Sandoval, 2014) as a response to gross human rights violations committed 
by mostly government and the security agencies in some parts of the world. Human rights 
groups and civil society organizations saw the need to fight impunity and demand 
accountability, and found an answer to this through human rights and other international 
law (Sandoval, 2014; Tietel, 2015).  Tietel (2015, p.389) traced the rise of transitional 
justice to the demand for accountability resulting from the phenomenon of 
disappearances in Latin America. Others like Clara Sandoval (2014, p.181) have 
associated the emergence of transitional justice with the need for social change in 
societies that have experienced decades of massive human rights violations. They argued 
that unless the truth about such massive violations were told, some forms of reparations 
offered to victims and guarantees given that those violations will never recur, there would 
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be no reconciliation, lasting peace and democracy (Sandoval, 2014; Mendez, 1997; 
International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009). 
 Although there are several views that explain the meaning and scope of concept 
of transitional justice, I find the definition proffered by the International Center for 
Transitional Justice (ICTJ) most appropriate for this study. ICTJ (2009) has defined 
transitional justice as: 
the set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been 
implemented by different countries in order to address the legacies 
of massive human rights abuses. These measures include criminal 
prosecutions, truth commissions, reparation programs, and various 
kinds of institutional reforms (ICTJ, 2009 p.2). 
 
From this definition, transitional justice is an approach (ICTJ, 2009; Sandoval, 2014) to 
achieving justice as society transitions from conflict to a stable and more democratic one 
where the rule of law is supreme. Accordingly, the elements of a comprehensive 
transitional policy include criminal prosecution, reparations (where society takes steps to 
recognize the harms that people have suffered and address them), institutional reform, 
truth and reconciliation commissions (ICTJ, 2009; Tietel, 2015; Okimoto, Wenzel & 
Feather, 2012).  
 The contributions of scholars like Okimoto, Wenzel and Feather (2012), Christie 
(1977) and van Prooijen and Coffeng (2013) have helped in having a clearer 
understanding of how the concept of transitional justice can be applied in post conflict 
justice processes and mechanisms to achieve the desired impact of lasting peace. 
According to Okimoto, Wenzel and Feather (2012), justice can be viewed from two 
perspectives: from the perspective of what is done to address the harm suffered by the 
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victim, or retributive justice, and from the perspective of restoration, or restorative 
justice. Okimoto, Wenzel and Feather (2012) further explained that people who hold the 
view of justice as being retributive perceive justice as “the unilateral imposition of just 
deserts against the defender” (p.255). To them, unless an equal measure of punishment is 
given to offenders, justice cannot be deemed to be served (see Forsythe, 2011; Sirleaf, 
2014). Brickhouse’s (2014, p.194) work on corrective justice espoused this view where 
he argued for the equalization of goods or evils for the parties involved. The restorative 
school of thought, on the other hand, views justice as “achieving a renewed consensus 
about shared values violated by the offender” (Okimoto, Wenzel & Feather, 2012 p. 255). 
This differentiation is important because it helps in understanding and clarifying the 
expectations and perceptions of victims about the justice system as society tries to resolve 
conflicts and build peace. As Christie (1977) demonstrated in her work, ignoring the 
expectations of victims in the transitional justice processes not only robs them of their 
rights but also jeopardizes the chances of success in such peace building processes. The 
works of Christie (1977) and Okimoto, Wenzel and Feather (2012) further showed that 
restorative mechanisms that offer both victims and offenders the opportunity discuss, 
explain and collectively resolve issues and perceived violations and arrive at middle 
grounds, with emphasis on healing and mending relationships, are generally more 
preferred by crime victims. Van Prooijen and Coffeng (2013) however sounded a caution 
which is worth considering in transitional justice processes. They posited that in the case 
where society has negatively stereotyped some ethnic groups, victims tend to expect 
more severe punishment for offenders who belong to such ethnic groups. Negatively 
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stereotyping some ethnic groups might also affect how evidence is evaluated in a post-
conflict peace process and further influence the way society and security agencies handle 
potential threats in a conflict situation as demonstrated by the work of Correll, Park, Judd 
and Wittenbrink (2002). This means that as society seeks to build peace, objectivity, 
especially in gathering evidence and punishing offenders, is important for there to be 
acceptance and lasting peace. A holistic approach to transitional justice has been 
suggested by scholars because to them, in most cases, the scale of human rights violations 
is too large and complex to be dealt with effectively by one single mechanism (Sirleaf, 
2014; Forsythe, 2011). 
 In a guidance note on transitional justice, the United Nations (2010) explained 
that the frontiers of transitional justice have been expanded and practitioners are now 
increasingly interested in issues such as those that characterize ethnic conflicts, including 
ethnic cleansing, reconciliation among communities, massive human rights violations and 
reparations among others.  Therefore, an understanding of the nature and challenges of 
transitional justice processes and mechanisms will be relevant in understanding why the 
Dagbon conflict persists despite the efforts to resolve it since the 2002 outbreak of 
hostilities. The United Nations (2008) has recommended that to understand the 
transitional justice needs of a post-conflict environment; the necessary starting point 
should be an assessment of the causes of the underlying conflict among other measures. 
The following section is therefore devoted to understanding the causes of conflicts before 







 Theories play an important role in qualitative studies. According to Creswell 
(2009), theories are used as an “overall lens” (p.62) in several ways including guiding the 
researcher in determining the issues in the study that are important, how to position 
oneself in the study, and how to organize and present the final report. In the following 
sections, Edward Azar’s (1978) theory of Protracted Social Conflict is examined as part 
of the theoretical foundations of the study. 
Protracted Social Conflict Theory 
Based on the extensive studies he conducted in Palestine, Edward Azar came up 
with the theory of protracted social conflict. Edward Azar (1978) theorized that conflicts 
that are often protracted and violent are a representation of struggles for “basic needs 
such as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and 
economic participation” (p.93). He attributed persistent conflicts mainly to the need for 
groups to preserve their identities. He argued that where, by accident of history and 
colonial policy, some groups are recognized as a source of power, and others alienated 
from it, it leads to domination and subsequently deprivation if no conscious attempts are 
made to even out power inequalities. Deprived groups begin to mobilize to not only 
preserve their identities, but also to fight to improve their collective access to basic needs 
and power within the community. To Azar, deprivation in caused by a myriad of factors 
that are related to each other in a complex way, including a weak role played by the state 
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as well as the pattern of international linkages. Azar (1990) identified three phases that 
characterize protracted social conflicts. These are the “Genesis, Process dynamics and 
Outcome analysis” (p.12) phases. The genesis stage is characterized by four variables, 
and is the stage where otherwise non-conflictual situations develop into violence. One 
characteristic of this stage is where the state is dominated by one group, with access to 
power and resources limited to this group. Azar explained that this is usually due to 
historical and other reasons, but if no attempt is made to reconcile and integrate the other 
groups in society, strains in relationships result and eventually leads to fragmentation, 
communal discontent, and protracted social conflicts. Associated with communal content 
is the need for those deprived communities to access human needs which are seldom 
evenly or equitably met in such polarized societies. Access to basic needs is both physical 
and non-physical and includes the access to political institutions and the recognition of 
existence. The last two characteristics of the first phase is a group’s use of its access to 
resources to dominate other groups, and the extent to which internal policy in a state is 
dictated by international linkages. 
Given the characteristics of protracted social conflicts mentioned in the first 
phase, only a trigger is usually enough to generate a violent conflict. Azar categorizes this 
as the process dynamics stage of PSC. He identifies communal actions and strategies or 
simple triggers of conflict (for example, a fight over cows leading to the Cow War), and 
how the state responds to the grievances of aggrieved marginalized communities (such as 
repression) as key factors in this stage.  
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The final stage in Azar’s typology of PSC is the stage of outcome analysis. At this 
stage, Azar explained that protracted social conflicts are distinguished by their result—
negative outcomes with no end of the conflict in sight, neither is there any winner nor is 
there a solution. Other distinguishing features of PSC as identified by Azar (1978) 
include the fact that no clear line can be drawn between internal and external sources and 
actors involved in the conflict; it is impossible to identify start and end times; and there 
are usually varied causes and actors. 
PSC has been applied in many studies with various levels of scholarly 
significance. Fisher (2009) for example applied this theory in a study that was aimed at 
assessing the potential of an intervention progressing from an initial peacekeeping 
posture to peacebuilding. Using the conflict in Cyprus as a case study, the author 
analyzed the conflict based on the theory of PSC to understand the root causes and 
alongside the contingency model of third party intervention, explored the context for 
peacebuilding that would achieve optimum impact on peace. The author concluded that 
peacebuilding could be an entry point for resolving protracted conflicts. Further, PSC was 
applied in a study on the conflict between Israel and the Arabs. The purpose of this study 
conducted by Bar-Tal (1998) was to understand the appropriate psychological conditions 
that societies involved in protracted conflicts develop which are conducive and enable 
them to cope with the conflict situation. Bar-Tal (1998) found that there is a set of beliefs 
that constitute a form of ideology which support the continuation of conflicts. There is 
also evidence of the theory being applied in African conflict settings. Miller (2012) 
applied PSC to the Sierra Leone conflict to test the assumption held in foundational 
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theories that conflict arises between rival identity groups, and hence to resolve such 
conflicts, measures should aim to undermine these identities in several ways. Millar’s 
(2012) study used the experience of Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
and the theory of PSC to test this assumption. Millar (2012) found that in the case of the 
Sierra Leonean conflict, there were no such clear identities as the combatants described 
themselves as brothers. Millar’s (2012) conclusion was that peacebuilding practices in 
African post-conflict situations must not necessarily stereotype groups in conflicts as 
belonging to different identity groups.  Interestingly too, PSC has been applied in the 
Dagbon conflict. The purpose of the qualitative study conducted by Issifu (2015) was to 
demonstrate the utility of the SPITCEROW model in conflict studies to gain a deeper 
understanding of their causes. The authors relied on secondary sources of information for 
the study. They found that the root cause of the Dagbon conflict was the introduction of 
the primogeniture system of inheritance to the paramountcy of Dagbon. The authors 
recommended the use of traditional conflict resolution techniques to resolve the Dagbon 
chieftaincy conflict. Although mentioned as the methodology, it is unclear in this study 
how PSC was used in the analysis.  A study in which PSC was applied thoroughly in a 
conflict situation was that conducted by Bukari Kadri Noagah (2013) to analyze and 
understand the challenges and prospects of the peace process in the Bawku inter-ethnic 
conflict in the Upper East region of Ghana. In this study, Noagah (2013) designed and 
implemented a mixed methods study and employed the theory of PSC to analyze the 
qualitative and quantitative data generated from the sample of 220 participants.  Noagah 
(2013) justified the use of PSC in his study because the Bawku inter-ethnic conflict has 
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the characteristics of a protracted conflict and the main parties involved (the Kusasis and 
the Manprusis) lay claim to values, identities and cultural contestation like what Azar 
described in his theory of PSC.  The relevance of this theory in management science was 
also demonstrated in the study of Fil, Pratt, and O’Connor (2009). The authors set out to 
develop a model for resolving intractable identity conflicts. PSC was applied alongside 
other models of conflict management and organizational identification. Their study led to 
the discovery of the Intractable Identity Conflict Resolution Model. This study 
highlighted not only the utility of PSC, but also the possibility of combining it with other 
relevant models/concepts to understand conflicts and the conditions under which 
transitional justice tools might work better. 
The PSC’s relevance in this study cannot be overemphasized. As Ramsbotham 
(2005) concluded in his evaluation of the theory in post-conflict peacebuilding, PSC 
“offers useful pointers for an understanding of the sources of major armed conflict” (p. 
110). The Dagbon intra-ethnic conflict offers enough evidence to qualify as a protracted 
conflict. According to Tonah (2012) and Sulemana (2009) the origins of the conflict can 
be traced to Ghana’s pre-independence era. It is a crisis of identity and of legitimacy and 
desire for self-preservation between two royal gates of the same ethnic group and the 
three stages of Azar’s theory can well be applied to the Dagbon conflict.  
In this study, the impact of transitional justice was analyzed in terms of how the 
processes and mechanisms address the causes of the conflict seen from the lens of PSC. 
From this theory, any settlement that does not even up the playing field for both gates in 
terms of access to resources and power but rather suppresses them or trades them for 
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other interests might not yield lasting peace. The following diagram summarizes how the 
concept of transitional justice and the theory of PSC were applied in this study as a 
















Review of Literature on Africa 
 
 In the following sections, scholarly work on the nature, causes and effects of 
conflicts are reviewed and presented. The section also includes review of literature on the 
response to African conflicts in general and the challenges therein. 
Nature, Causes and Effects of Conflicts 
 
Armed conflicts have been on the ascendancy in Africa since the end of the cold 
war contrary to general global trends. Africa has suffered and continues to suffer not only 
challenging economic conditions but also persistent conflicts (Badru, 2010; Branch, 
2014; Annan, 2014). Countries such as South Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Mali have suffered violent armed conflicts at one time 
or the other in their political history. In most cases, these conflicts have not been fully 
resolved. According to scholars like Badru (2010), Wachira (1997), Zifcak (2015) and 
Basedau, Vullers and Körner (2013) conflicts in Africa are mostly ethnic in nature and 
begin in simple ways. There is ample evidence from literature that suggests that 
colonialism, and the ethnic rivalry that it created, are the basis of most conflicts in West 
Africa. Colonialism, it is argued, strived by facilitating ethnic animosity.   
Badru’s (2010) comparative study of ethnic genocide in the Congo, Nigeria, 
Liberia and Rwanda-Burundi for example gave empirical evidence about the interplay 
between colonialism and ethnic strife in Africa. Badru’s (2010) study was on ethnic 
conflict and state formation in post-colonial Africa and sought to explain the dynamics of 
ethnicity in Africa’s state formation. Badru (2010) found that colonialism created and 
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exploited ethnic rivalry which became difficult to manage even during the pre-colonial 
era, with corruption providing the fuel needed for violent conflict. Zifcak (2015) 
confirmed this conclusion in a two- country comparative study on South Sudan and the 
Central African Republic (CAR). In this study, Zifcak (2015) investigated the nature of 
conflicts and why the international community failed to respond quickly to the massive 
human rights abuses when wars broke out in those two countries. Like Badru (2010), 
Zifcak found that the sources of conflict in both countries were due to the persistent 
rivalry between political leaders who each exploited existing ethnic tensions which is a 
colonial legacy. Jegede and Joshua (2015) also agreed on the impact of colonialism but 
made a further argument that this is usually fueled by political rivalry. Jegede and 
Joshua’s (2015) study was qualitative in nature which used the Niger-Delta conflict as a 
case study. Relying mostly on the review of documents, they gave a historical account of 
the conflict in the Niger-Delta and posited that “relational distance between the rulers and 
the ruled fomented discontent among aggrieved communities and social groups” (Jegede 
& Joshua, 2015 p.115) who felt they did not have equal access to oil resources. They 
added that this discontent grew along ethnic lines and provided fuel for armed hostilities 
in the Niger-Delta area which they characterized as “domestic terrorism” (p. 110). They 
concluded that where there seems to be a gap between national political leadership and 
the people they rule; it leads to general discontent. Other pre-existing conditions such as 
ethnic rivalry, poverty and unequal access to resources could then fuel the discontent and 
lead to violence. In many ways, these findings are in conformity with earlier ones. 
Evidence from other studies support this earlier position about the role of colonialism in 
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Africa’s conflicts but with further analysis, one finds other perspectives.  In a 22-country 
quantitative study on regional inequalities and civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa for 
example, Ostby, Nordas and Rod (2009) provided evidence on the association between 
inequality and civil war in Africa. Their study was based on Demographic and Health 
Survey results for 22 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1986-2004. They 
found that educational deprivation, horizontal or inter-group and inter-regional 
inequalities provide the basis for the onset of conflict in these countries. Further evidence 
from the work of Nancy Annan (2014) also confirmed the findings of other scholars. 
Annan’s (2014) study was on the causes and challenges of violent conflicts and civil 
strife in West Africa. In this qualitative study, Annan (2014) drew most of her 
information from secondary material to present and analyze the causes and challenges of 
conflicts. The article also went further to assess the conflict resolution efforts in West 
Africa with a view to understanding the challenges such efforts face. Like other scholars, 
Annan (2014) agreed with the broader causes of conflict in West Africa to be linked to 
the interplay historical factors such as ethnic rivalries created during colonial rule which 
were maintained thereafter in post-independent West Africa. Annan (2014) further 
posited that other factors related to this include socio-economic crisis, human rights 
violations and poverty all of which re-enforce the findings of other scholars. However, an 
additional opinion that Annan (2014) shared in this study about the causes of conflicts in 
West Africa not found in the works of earlier scholars included poor governance and the 
proliferation of small arms. These factors “act as triggers and drivers of violent conflicts” 
(Annan, 2014 p. 5) in West Africa.  Literature thus suggests that although colonialism has 
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fostered ethnic contradictions and civil strife in Africa in several ways, the immediate 
causes of armed conflicts are due to deprivation, acute inequalities in the access to and 
use of resources and power, poor governance and the proliferation of small arms.  
Other scholars have pointed to religion as the immediate cause of armed conflict 
in Africa. It is easy to tag the ongoing conflict in Northern Mali, the Boko Haram war in 
Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad, and others in Africa as religious conflicts. The 
separate works of Basedau, Vullers and Körner (2013) and of Beardsley, Gleditsch and 
Lo (2015) provide evidence that help to clarify this popular view. Basedau, Vullers and 
Körner (2013) undertook a controlled case study of three sub-Saharan countries: Nigeria, 
Cote d’Ivoire and Tanzania, where they tried to understand the drivers of inter-religious 
violence. The basis for their comparison was the common population ratios of Christians 
and Muslims as well as the existence of risk factors responsible for the onset of violence. 
Based on a comparative analysis of data from the World Bank, they found that where 
inequalities overlap with religious and ethnic boundaries, a higher level of violence is the 
likely result. Religion then tends to be the basis for mobilization and rebellion as was 
demonstrated in the study of Beardsley, Gleditsch and Lo (2015).  
Democratic processes, especially national elections, have also been cited a source 
of violence and armed conflict in Africa. In some African countries including Kenya, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Ghana, South Sudan and recently Burundi, some form of violence 
and or disagreements have followed national elections. In the cases of Nigeria, Kenya 
and Cote d’Ivoire, the disagreements degenerated into violence and destruction of 
property and even loss of lives. The study of Salehyan and Linebarger (2015) provided 
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empirical evidence about the association between elections and violence. In a quantitative 
study based on data drawn from the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD), the 
authors examined the relationship between executive elections and social conflict in 
Africa between 1990 and 2009. Their study tested three hypotheses: the association 
between election periods and political unrest; mediating factors that exacerbate the effect 
of elections; and attributes that may contribute to conflict. They found that in some cases, 
elections sometimes spark violence. However, where they are free, fair and are conducted 
in an environment with strong institutions, conflict is much less likely. 
A new wave of violence in Africa reported in literature is domestic terrorism. This 
is described as an: 
act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may 
endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death 
to, any person, any number or group of persons or cause or may cause damage to 
public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage 
and is calculated or intended to intimidate, put fear, force, coerce or induce any 
government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or 
abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to 
act according to certain principles; or disrupt any public service, the delivery of 
any essential service to the public or create a public emergency; or create general 
insurrection in a state (Agbiboa, 2013 p.432) 
 
With this understanding, Daniel Agbiboa (2013) conducted a quantitative study on the 
causes and effects of domestic terrorism in Africa. In this study, he analyzed the 
effectiveness of government response to terrorism using Nigeria as a case study. Drawing 
data from the incidents database of the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 
(MIPT), Agbiboa (2013) found that between 1997 and 2007, 73 percent of the 522 
terrorist attacks that were committed in Africa were engineered from within Africa. He 
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concluded that terrorist attacks have increased in both number and intensity in Africa 
since 1997 with severe consequences including loss of lives, destruction of property, fear 
and psychological trauma and several hundreds of internally displaced people. This 
position is confirmed by the study of Jegede and Joshua (2013) referred to earlier. 
The evidence provided in this review shows that indeed colonialism has played a 
key role in setting the conditions for social conflict in Africa. However, ethnic animosity 
alone cannot lead to violent and armed conflict. Conflict in most cases is fueled by 
poverty, deprivation, politics and political rivalry, various forms of inequalities, including 
unequal access to resources and power. In some cases, there are early warning signs but if 
society does not have the right institutions and capacity, violent conflicts are started.   
Where ever they occur, conflicts have been destructive and associated with 
massive loss of lives and human rights abuses, influx of refugees and internally displaced 
persons with associated outbreak of epidemics in such populations, and the generation of 
new conflicts. Writing on the conflict in South Sudan and Central African Republic, 
Zifcak (2015) for example reported that within two days after the conflict broke out in 
South Sudan, between 400 and 800 people lost their lives, 600-800 people were injured 
and over 1800 people were internally displaced. The United Nations Secretary General’s 
report of March 2014 on the same conflict also reported massive loss of human lives, 
destruction of major towns and over a million internally displaced persons. In the CAR, 
Zifcak (2015) also found that the period after January 2014 was characterized by 
gruesome murders, public beheadings, ethnic cleansing and massive human rights abuses. 
Further, in a qualitative study on the causes and impacts of conflicts and the challenges of 
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government and international responses to conflicts in Africa, George Wachira (1997) 
found that as of May 1996, Africa had over 8.9 million refugees with widespread 
starvation in post-conflict communities. He added that an important impact of conflict in 
Africa is the generation of new conflicts. He concluded that “the events in Rwanda in 
1994 created a whole dynamic of strained relations between Zaire and Rwanda; between 
Uganda and Zaire; between Rwanda and Kenya; and between Uganda and Kenya” 
(Wachira, 1997 p.112).  Elsewhere in Liberia, Sierra Leone and quite recently in Mali 
and Nigeria, the consequences of protracted conflict and wars are unimaginable. In a 
qualitative study that employed a combination of approaches including abstraction, 
comparison, content analysis and collation, Stareike (2013) investigated the effects of 
conflicts in Africa and how national governments in Africa respond to conflicts between 
them and community groups.  Stareike (2013) agreed with earlier scholars about the 
creation of new wars and concluded that “the conflicts emerging in Africa hamper 
economic development of the poor countries, increases the gap between rural and urban 
areas, causes humanitarian crisis, requires a vast number of human facilities, significant 
financial and military resources” (p. 634). These negative effects have compelled African 
governments and the international community to invest in conflict resolution and the 
maintenance of peace. The next section discusses the various tools and processes that 






Strategies to Resolve Africa’s Conflicts and Maintain Peace 
Resolving conflicts has been a global priority since the end of the cold war. At the 
level of the United Nations, the creation of Chapter VI Article 33 which mandates the UN 
Security Council with the maintenance of international peace is a testimony to this 
commitment. Article 33 (1) outlines a recommended approach for the resolution of 
conflicts as follows: 
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a 
resolution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means 
of their own choice (United Nations, 1945 p. 8).  
 
This declaration has arguably influenced the approaches used in resolving 
Africa’s conflicts. In 2008, Charles T. Call and Elizabeth M. Cousens conducted a 
landmark study on international responses to war-torn societies. Although the focus of 
this study was global, it provides insights which are relevant in understanding the 
challenges that African conflicts resolution efforts have had. Call and Cousens’ (2008) 
qualitative study was aimed at understanding the effectiveness of measures and 
mechanisms that were employed to resolve conflicts and maintain peace after cease-fires 
were achieved. They reviewed literature on post-war peacebuilding and followed this up 
with an analysis of the international architecture for addressing post-conflict 
peacebuilding. Among other things, they found that failed peacebuilding is expensive and 
can have dire consequences including the development of new wars; that quite a number 
of the world’s conflicts (70 percent) were resolved through negotiations, even though 
such negotiated settlements were more likely to revert to conflict situations, and also that 
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failure in conflict resolution can be off-set if a “settlement is comprehensive and if its 
implementation involves multi-dimensional peace operation” (Call & Cousens, 2008 p.6). 
They emphasized the need for “context-sensitive peacebuilding” (p.14) which they 
described as a deliberate effort to understand the context under which the conflict arose 
and to build the mechanisms for peace around such understanding. They also emphasized 
the importance of building or establishing minimally functioning institutions where they 
are found to be weak.  
A review of literature on conflict resolution in Africa shows that different but 
inter-related approaches have been used in different conflict situations. Military 
interventions have been one of the most frequently used strategies to manage Africa’s 
conflict situations. In line with Article 33(1) of the United Nations Charter, the 
Organization of African Unity, and later the African Union, and the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have played critical roles in resolving 
Africa’s conflicts. In a qualitative case study that drew data from both primary and 
secondary sources, Colonel Oluwadare (2015) assessed the effectiveness of the conflict 
resolution mechanisms of these regional institutions as employed in conflict situations. 
Although based on the Mali conflict, Oluwadare (2015) drew examples from other 
conflict resolution mechanisms that the OAU/AU and ECOWAS have employed in other 
conflicts in Africa. Citing Burundi, Darfur, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Mali as 
examples, Oluwadare (2015) noted that military interventions have been employed by 
both the AU and ECOWAS as a major mechanism to restore calm and create the 
environment for further tools of transitional justice processes and mechanisms to be used. 
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These interventions have been aimed largely at protecting civilian populations, restoring 
democratic government, and keeping peace as a prelude for the implementation of other 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding mechanisms. Oluwadare (2015) found that these 
interventions have largely been unsuccessful because the African peacekeeping forces 
have been small in numbers, ill-equipped, and inadequately funded. In the case of Mali, 
Oluwadare (2015) reported that the African-led International Support Mission to Mali 
(AFISMA) had the mandate to rebuild the Malian army after regaining and re-
establishing government control of the northern part of Mali which had fallen to the 
Tuaregs; and to help in stabilizing the country in general (Oluwadare, 2015 p.114). Like 
other African peacekeeping forces, AFISMA was ill-equipped, outnumbered and poorly 
funded. He concluded that this was the same situation in Sierra Leone, Burundi and 
Darfur. Velthuizen (2013) shared this view based on what was found in a qualitative 
study the author undertook to explore the possibility of African countries having a unique 
military doctrine to guide their involvement in multi-national military interventions. In 
this study, Velthuizen (2013) reviewed theoretical assumptions that help to explain 
military doctrines, examined the challenges of multi-national military interventions and 
then discussed African military practices that could help to serve as a basis for 
developing a military doctrine. Velthuizen (2013) supported earlier findings that African 
military interventions have been moderate in terms of achievements because they have 
been heavily dependent on foreign funding and have low capacities. The author added 
another perspective that military interventions are undermined by foreign interests. Citing 
Mali in 2013 and Libya in 2011, the author argued that Africa’s military interventions 
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can only be successful if Africans develop an African Military doctrine that can serve 
Africa and its peoples. Peen Rodt (2012) however introduced an unfamiliar perspective 
about Africa’s experience of peacekeeping through military intervention. In a qualitative 
case study conducted in 2012, Peen Rodt evaluated the African Union’s Mission in 
Burundi in 2003. The study consisted of a historical account of the African Union’s 
experience in Burundi, Comoros, Sudan and Somalia. To get a deeper understanding of 
the effectiveness of AU’s peacekeeping efforts, Peen Rodt (2012) focused on the Burundi 
experience of 2003 only, and investigated Africa’s interest, aspiration and prospects of 
providing African solutions to its numerous conflicts. The author found that the 
capability of Africa’s deployment forces and the level of understanding of the operational 
context jointly determined peacekeeping outcomes in an interrelated manner. Peen Rodt’s 
(2012) conclusion was that the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was largely successful in 
providing peace and security, in creating a favorable environment for the subsequent 
deployment of UN peacekeeping forces, and in contributing to the general stability and 
future prosperity of Burundi. The success was due to the dominant role that South Africa 
played before AMIB. However, the author acknowledged that in terms of implementing 
the Arusha Agreement which was aimed at disarmament, demobilization initiatives and 
the advice on re-integration of combatants, AMIB achieved only moderate success. It is 
however not clear why there was moderate success in this aspect of the AU’s mandate.  
The author concluded that the AU Mission in Burundi is certainly one of Africa’s biggest 
success stories of Military intervention and peacekeeping.  
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Nancy Annan’s (2014) study referred to earlier confirmed most of these positions 
held by scholars concerning the reason for moderate success in West Africa’s history of 
military interventions and peacekeeping. Whereas Annan (2014) agreed that regional 
bodies such as the AU and ECOWAS have had relative success in peacekeeping, 
especially in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, success has been moderate largely 
because of the poor understanding of the fundamental causes of these conflicts. Citing the 
Malian conflict of 2012, Annan (2014) posited that the poor understanding that Heads of 
State and governments have on the causes of the conflict have impacted on the outcomes 
so far. Annan (2014) however acknowledged the interplay of other factors such language 
barriers, weak institutional structures, lack of skill and expertise in conflict mediation and 
dialogue. It would therefore appear from literature that adequate local knowledge of the 
context within which the intervention forces are expected to operate might have an 
impact on the outcomes. An epistemological analysis of conflicts in Africa conducted by 
Boaduo (2010) came out with findings that support this. Relying solely on archival and 
other secondary sources of information, Boaduo’s (2010) qualitative study aimed to 
understand the root causes of African conflicts and what it might take to make their 
resolution effective. Boaduo (2010) posited that the successful resolution of conflicts in 
Africa should begin from looking at conflict and crisis from different perspectives and 
not stereotyping them. The author recommended a “change in the mind set of African 
leaders, a surrender of sovereignty to the UN, mediation and military intervention” 
(Boaduo, 2010 p. 178) as reliable options for the resolution of Africa’s conflicts.  
39 
 
 Once relative calm has been restored through military intervention, other 
approaches to resolve conflicts and build peace are employed. One of these has been 
power-sharing. Ian Spears (2013) studied Africa’s informal power-sharing experience 
and the prospects for peace under this approach. Spears’s (2013) reviewed experiences 
from countries where power-sharing was used as an approach to resolve conflicts and 
reported that the chances of power sharing are high in conflict environments where there 
are relatively well developed democratic institutions. Citing Burundi after the 1993 post-
election armed conflict, Angola under the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo after 2006 and 2008, Ian Spears concluded that power-sharing failed 
because of the weak nature of institutions in those countries, and that inclusion is “a 
fragile basis on which to build peace” (Spears, 2013 p.48). This view is shared by Annan 
(2014) who cited the mediation efforts of ECOWAS in Cote d’Ivoire, Mali and Guinea-
Bissau. In the study referred to earlier, Annan (2014) recounted that the authority of 
Heads of State and Government appointed His Excellency Blaise Campaore and 
Goodluck Jonathan, the Presidents of Burkina Faso and Nigeria respectively, as 
mediators in these conflicts which yielded moderate results. Annan (2014) also 
mentioned in her study the mediation role played by civil society and women’s groups in 
West African conflict resolution efforts. The West Africa Network for Peace (WANEP), 
West Africa Civil Society Institute, and the Mano River Women’s Peace Network 
(MARWOPNET) and the Women in Peacebuilding contributed in several ways through 
mediation to bring peace to Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
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Negotiation and mediation have also come strongly on the agenda of governments 
and organizations in resolving Africa’s conflicts. Richard Jackson (2000) provided a 
detailed account of these mechanisms in a study where he did a comparative assessment 
of their effectiveness in conflict situations in Africa for the period 1945 to 1995. His 
quantitative study drew data from an original data set on cases of negotiation and 
mediation. The aim in this study was to identify what works and what does not work, and 
under what conditions they could be used for the resolution of conflicts. He found that bi-
lateral negotiations are more successful than mediation, but that negotiation is difficult 
where the conflict is intense, intractable and works best in interstate conflicts. He 
concluded that since Africa’s conflicts tend to be very intense and protracted, so 
improving the effectiveness of mediation in the region should be priority to African peace 
makers. 
The context of African conflicts represents a mix of transitions. Under different 
post-conflict conditions, several transitional justice mechanisms have been employed to 
resolve these conflicts and maintain peace. Evidence from literature shows that the 
outcomes have been mixed. In a cross-national comparative study involving Ghana, 
Sierra Leone and Liberia, Sirleaf (2014) assessed how truth commissions contribute to 
achieving the objectives for which they were established. Sirleaf’s (2014) study was 
based on the author’s original data on the same countries in which the author aimed to 
provide clarity on where truth commissions function optimally. In that study, Sirleaf 
(2014) described the transitional justice mechanisms used in Ghana after authoritarian 
rule, South Africa after apartheid, Liberia and Sierra Leone after large scale civil wars. In 
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Ghana in 2002, Sirleaf (2014) reported that a truth commission alongside a blanket 
amnesty and reparations were established; in Sierra Leone after parliament passed the 
TRC-SL Act in February 2000, a truth commission with a partial amnesty, a hybrid court 
and reparations were established and in Liberia after the TRC-L Act was passed June 
2005, a truth commission, amnesty and lustration were established as part of the 
transitional justice processes (Sirleaf, 2014 p.2283). Based on the results of this study, 
Sirleaf (2014) argued that practitioners and scholars “may have misplaced their 
confidence in the ability of truth commissions and trials to contribute to restorative, 
retributive, expressive, and utilitarian goals” (Sirleaf, 2014 p. 2270). The author 
concluded that widespread use of truth commissions in post-conflict states has less utility 
than they might be in post authoritarian or non-transitional states, and recommended that 
for them to be useful, the number of goals should be limited. Sirleaf (2014) also 
concluded that “the kind of transition should determine the kind of transitional justice 
institution utilized” (p. 2269). The conditions under which truth commissions have been 
applied elsewhere in Africa have been different and the findings made by Sirleaf (2014) 
resonate with those found elsewhere by other scholars. In Sierra Leone for example, 
Gerhard Anders’ (2014) study on the performance of the dual mechanisms for transitional 
justice is interesting. Anders’ (2014) qualitative study gave a historical account of the 
mechanisms for transitional justice and how they fared in a political transition period 
which had its own challenges and contradictions. Gerhard Anders (2014) explored the 
interplay of the transitional justice mechanisms, events and processes during the period 
1999 and 2004, and found that the operation of the parallel dual justice mechanisms was 
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less complimentary to each other. On the one hand, the truth commission was established 
to create an opportunity for truth-telling and how atrocities were committed which 
hopefully will contribute to national reconciliation. On the other, a Special Court was 
established based on the believe that closure to the massive human rights abuses could 
only be achieved when appropriate punishment is meted out to those who committed the 
crimes. Aside the contradiction in principle, Gerhard Anders (2014) ascribed the modest 
achievement of the dual justice mechanisms to the lack of clarity in the roles and 
responsibilities of the two mechanisms and the fact that both competed for funds from the 
same sources. The study did not delve into the conditions under which such a dual system 
of justice could have produced successful outcomes.  
Like the Special Court established in Sierra Leone is the use of the International 
Criminal Tribunals as a means of achieving retributive justice, restorative justice and 
reconciliation in post-conflict African societies. The study by Janine Natalya Clark 
(2008) provided evidence about the contribution of this mechanism to conflict resolution 
and the maintenance of peace. Janine Natalya Clark (2008) conducted a case study of the 
experience of the International Criminal Tribunal in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The 
objective of the study was to find out whether war crimes tribunals as the dispensers of 
retributive justice can contribute to reconciliation in a post-conflict society. This was 
against a popular claim in literature that tribunals, by seeing to it that justice is done, 
establish the truth about the past and by ensuring that guilt is individualized, can foster 
reconciliation. Clark (2008) found that each of these three claims was false, and that 
although retributive justice is an essential part of the process of peacebuilding, the justice 
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it delivers is not the most effective means of promoting reconciliation. Clark (2008) 
argued for restorative justice mechanisms as a complimentary part of the peacebuilding 
process. 
The preceding section shows how African governments have responded to 
conflict situations. Led by the African Union and other regional bodies such as 
ECOWAS, one of the first and popular steps of stopping massive human rights abuses 
and wanton destruction of property is through a military intervention where the aim is to 
stop further abuses, protect lives and restore calm and the rule of law. Once this is 
achieved, other transitional justice processes and mechanisms are employed to resolve the 
conflict and maintain peace. Although these have been varied, the most used include 
power-sharing arrangements, negotiations, mediation, establishing truth and 
reconciliation commissions and the use of Special Courts/tribunals. These have always 
produced mixed results. Call and Cousens (2008) posited that these modest achievements 
in conflict resolution is partly because of the conflicting roles played by clandestine 
businesses, both local and international. In West Africa Call and Cousens (2008) 
acknowledged what they referred to as “the endurance of the Anglophone-Francophone 
divisions” (p.37) as well as the visible post-colonial presence of France in African 
conflicts which in turn affects resolution outcomes. The evidence shown in this literature 
is mostly about transitional justice after large scale post conflict peacebuilding. There is 
agreement in literature that in general, these measures do not yield the desired results. 
Annan (2014) for example concluded from her study that “despite the efforts made to 
prevent and end violent conflicts in West Africa, the region continues to experience 
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sporadic violence and security challenges” (p.11). Aside the work of Sirleaf (2014) which 
looks at the conditions under which truth commissions might work, there is no clarity 
about the conditions under which transitional justice might work in post-ethnic conflict 
situations such as those experienced in Northern Ghana. In the following sections, the 
experiences of Ghana on conflicts and their resolution efforts are discussed. 
 
Review of Literature on Conflicts in Ghana 
 
Ghana has been touted as a generally peaceful country. This tag is probably 
because Ghana finds herself within West Africa which has witnessed several crippling 
violent conflicts, some of which are still raging in varying degrees of intensity. The 
Tuareg-led rebellion which erupted in Mali in 2012 for example is still largely 
unresolved, the Boko Haram conflict which initially started in Northern Nigeria but has 
now spread to Cameroon and Chad is another, the Cassamance conflict in Senegal is also 
still not fully resolved and in Ghana, there are several ethnic conflicts which are 
unresolved. The following section is dedicated to the review of scholarly work on 
conflicts in Ghana. It includes insights on the nature and causes of conflicts, their impacts 
and the responses of governments in getting them resolved and the outcomes so far. 
The Nature, Causes and Effects of Conflicts 
Ghana’s political history has been characterized by conflicts which have 
threatened the relative peace the country has enjoyed within the sub-region. Just as was 
reported about conflicts in other African countries, conflicts in Ghana result from ethnic 
rivalries and are usually triggered by other immediate causes including disputes over 
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land, chieftaincy, party political activity and poverty. Mohammed Sulemana’s (2009) 
study for example gave an account of the causes and impacts of conflicts in the Northern 
region of Ghana like what other scholars observed in other African countries. In a 
qualitative study, Mohammed (2009) interviewed 600 individual participants and 
representatives of civil society groups. These participants were selected from seven 
districts purposively based on their previous experience of conflicts, especially those that 
occurred in 1994 in the Northern region. Through a combination of cluster sampling and 
systematic random sampling, houses were selected from which one individual in each 
house was interviewed. The representatives of civil society groups were selected through 
the same process of purposive sampling. The purpose of the interviews was to find out 
from the participants their perceptions and understanding of the causes of conflicts in the 
region. Sulemana (2009) found that across the Northern region of Ghana, there was a 
clear pattern of struggle for paramountcy and autonomy between and among rival ethnic 
groups most of which are violent. Citing the Konkomba-Dagomba wars of 1940 (dubbed 
the cow war) and 1946, the Nanumba-Konkomba war of 1981 fought over pito (a local 
drink brewed from Guinea corn), the Nawuri-Gonja war of 1989, the Gonja and 
Nawuri/Konkomba war of 1991 which was also dubbed the Guinea fowl war, Sulemana 
(2009) posited that although the immediate triggers of these wars were trivial. They were 
fought between and among ethnic groups because of struggle over land and other 
resources, perceived discrimination, marginalization and threats of extinction from other 
groups with subtle support from government. Across the region too, Sulemana (2009) 
found that conflicts persist and have the tendency of recurring with devastating impacts. 
46 
 
In another qualitative study on how perception as a social infrastructure contributes to 
escalating conflicts in divided societies, Francis Azuimah (2011) arrived at the same 
conclusion but added different perspectives and recommendations about how conflicts 
can be resolved. Using the inter-group theory as a methodological framework and data 
from both primary and secondary sources, Azuimah’s (2011) study was premised around 
the argument that “a lack of inter-group good leadership, equality, social enablers, shared 
goods and values, inter-group collaboration through networks, perception will deepen 
prejudices and biases and therefore might affect the contours of relationship within a 
select geographical area” (Azuimah, 2011 p.263). Agreeing with previous scholars, 
Azuimah (2011) described conflicts in most parts of Ghana as ethnic, perennial, violent 
and protracted. Citing several conflicts across the country, Azuimah (2011) also 
confirmed the causes of these conflicts to be related to land (for example the Gomoa-
Effutu land dispute in the Central region), chieftaincy related (the chieftaincy conflict in 
Tuobodom in the Brong Ahafo region and the Efiduase-Suhyen chieftaincy conflict in the 
Eastern region). Azuimah’s (2011) study found, and confirmed the findings of earlier 
scholars, that behind these principal causes were deep resentment based on perceptions of 
“economic and political inequalities, social and cultural prejudices and competition for 
limited resources” (Azuimah, 2011 p.265). In the case of the Bawku conflict for example, 
these resentments were found to be exacerbated by party politics which helped to sustain 
the conflict. Based on this study, Azuimah (2011) concluded that peace agreements per se 
are not enough to end hostilities between rival groups. Instead, post-conflict peace efforts 
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should include a psychological element to deal with the bitterness and grievances 
inherent in protracted conflicts.  
Another study by Aikins (2009) helps to understand why conflicts in Ghana 
persist from another perspective. Aikins’ (2009) study sought to understand and explain 
the impact of post-independent pluralist institutions on the management of confrontations 
that escalate into violent situations. The overall goal of this study was to contribute to the 
understanding why conflicts persist in Ghana. Using the Dagbon conflict as a case study, 
Aikins (2009) drew data from the 1999 and 2005 Afro barometer data set to examine the 
nature of formal and informal rules and the extent to which they tend to compete in 
Dagbon and helping to sustain the conflict. In that study, the author employed the 
Knights theory as an analytical framework to answer four research questions: 
1. Is the violence in Dagbon due to a conflict between formal and informal rules? 
2. How does the conflict between formal and informal rules translate into physical 
violence? 
3. What is the contribution of informal rules (chieftaincy) to the genesis and 
persistence of conflicts in Dagbon? 
4. If informal rules influence the creation of formal rules (the state), then which 
formal rules are included or excluded in the multi-ethnic society? (Aikins, 2009 p. 
2) 
 
Aikins (2009) tested the hypothesis that persistent conflicts in the Northern region 
result from the subjugation of informal rules and the failure of institutions to recognize 
them. Aside confirming the causes of conflicts in Ghana to be around land, chieftaincy 
disputes, and political interference, Aikins (2009) found that indeed the subjugation of 
informal rules in the Dagbon traditional area might explain the persistence of the conflict. 
Aikins (2009) also found that the use of external traditional rulers to solve what is 
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believed within Dagbon to be an internal issue was inappropriate. Rather strangely, 
another reason advanced for the persistence of the Dagbon conflict was the “lack of a 
third-party enforcer” (Aikins, 2009 p.24). Useful as this study is, it does not explain why 
the informal rules were subjugated and the conditions under which transitional justice 
processes and mechanisms might work to achieve the desired peace were also not 
explored in the study.  What, for example, was the process of peacebuilding like such that 
these informal rules got subjugated? Might there be other reasons why peace in Dagbon 
is still elusive? Aikins’ (2009) recommendation that African models of post-conflict 
reconciliation, justice and courts be considered in Dagbon is perhaps a pointer to the fact 
that a further study might help to understand the impact of transitional justice 
mechanisms and the conditions under which they might work in such large-scale 
conflicts.  
Yet another study that has helped to provide a deeper understanding of the causes of 
persistent conflicts in Ghana was the study of Julia Jonsson (2009). The main purpose of 
Jonsson’s (2009) study was to provide an explanation for inter-ethnic conflicts that were 
both devastating and persistent in Ghana’s Northern region. Data for this study was from 
interviews with members of affected ethnic groups in various parts of the region over a 
two-year period: 2005-2007. This was complimented by an analysis of archival 
information that helped to provide a historical, legal and political background to conflicts 
that culminated in the brutal inter-ethnic war of 1994-1995. Jonsson (2009) came out 
with interesting findings most of which confirm earlier ones but provided deeper insights 
and explanation to what constitute the remote and immediate causes of conflicts. To Julia 
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Jonsson (2009), conflicts in the Northern region are the product of historical, legal and 
political circumstances which started from the colonial period and maintained after 
independence. Jonsson (2009) established that the Northern region is home to not less 
than 17 different ethnic groups with clear identities, culture, history and rights and that 
these groups perceive themselves as indigenes of the region. Further, Jonsson (2009) 
claimed that when the government of General I.K Acheampong divested land control and 
administration from the state to the four chiefly ethnic groups of the Northern region, and 
hence excluded thirteen ethnic groups, the seed for further ethnic rivalry was sewn. 
Vesting land control and administration in the chiefly groups re-enforced a similar policy 
where the colonial administration categorized groups into acephalous and chiefly. The 
policy of vesting land in the institution of chieftaincy was therefore not acceptable to the 
groups that were not represented in the modern institution of chieftaincy. The minority 
saw themselves as excluded. Julia Jonsson (2009) further reported that the 1979 and 1992 
constitutions of Ghana re-enforced these policies with minor amendments. The author 
concluded that “historical, modern legal and political circumstances have contributed to 
violent conflicts being structured around chiefs and tradition” (p.517). Further, Jonsson 
(2009) added that horizontal inequalities and local rivalries provide material for conflict 
narratives which in turn interact with national party politics to give rise to violent 
conflicts at the least provocation. The importance of this study lies in the deeper 
understanding it provides about the root causes of ethnic rivalries in the region. Evidence 
so far shows that most of the conflicts that have engulfed the Northern region are ethnic 
50 
 
in nature. This understanding is important for the assessment of the adequacy of 
transitional justice processes and mechanisms.  
Other scholarly works conducted by different researchers have produced largely 
the same findings. In two separate qualitative studies that relied on data from interviews 
and the review of archival material, Langer (2009) and Lentz (2010) came to the same 
conclusions about the causes of conflicts as revolving around chieftaincy disputes, access 
to land, and that these remote causes are often aggravated by party politics and poverty.  
The Dagbon conflict is unique in the sense that it is an intra-ethnic conflict. However, 
findings from scholars support already established views about the causes of ethnic 
conflicts.  The work of Steve Tonah (2012) provided a detailed account of the Dagbon 
conflict in terms of its causes and complications (Tonah, 2012, p.2) which dates back to 
the colonial period. Steve Tonah’s (2012) study was based on data collected through key 
informant interviews in which participants were drawn from both royal gates (the 
Andanis and the Abudus), chiefs and opinion leaders from Yendi, Tamale and Savelugu. 
Data for this study also included information from the analyses of secondary material 
such as peer reviewed articles, journals, books, newspapers, party manifestos, and 
speeches of political aspirants during the 2004 and 2008 general elections. Although not 
clearly stated, the implied questions that Tonah (2012) sought answers for in his study 
were around understanding what the probable causes of the conflict might be, and 
whether and how politics plays any role in making the conflict protracted. Steve Tonah 
(2012) gave a historical account of the evolution of the Dagbon chieftaincy dispute and 
how national political and legal developments shaped and fueled the conflict until it 
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became violent. In March 2002, claiming several lives including that of the overlord of 
Dagbon, the Ya-Naa. Steve Tonah (2012) found the Dagbon conflict to be one of the 
most heavily politicized chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana’s political history. He claimed in 
this study that “local, regional and national leaders have been drawn into the conflict by 
factions, their supporters as well as the elite” (Tonah, 2012 p. 14) and concluded that the 
conflict has defied all attempts at resolution because of the tendency of losing parties in a 
judgement to wait for an alternative government to come into power for them to re-state 
their cases. Steve Tonah (2012) further explained that this tendency is due to the 
importance of Tamale as an administrative and political capital of the Northern region, 
and the associated practice of relying on the Dagomba elite (most of whom are royals 
close to the paramountcy) for leadership in the region. Implicitly, traditional authority is a 
means of getting access to political power and recognition. Tonah (2012) concluded that 
the Dagbon conflict cannot be resolved without the active involvement of the Dagbon 
elite. He argued further that on-going efforts by the Committee of Eminent Chiefs to 
resolve the conflict “exclusively through mediation” (Tonah, 2012 p.15) will not yield 
any meaningful results.  Tonah’s (2012) finding in this study about the politicization of 
chieftaincy conflicts confirmed what Sowatey (2005) had established in an earlier study.  
Conflicts have had devastating effects on the local economies and lives of the 
people where they occur. In addition to being a threat to peace and security, conflicts 
have caused massive internal displacement of people, led to loss of property and human 
lives (Sulemana, 2009; Azuimah, 2011; Noagah, 2013). According to Sulemana (2009) 
the Konkomba-Nanumba conflict which is regarded as the biggest of all conflicts in the 
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history of Ghana resulted in the murder of at least 200 people in one day, and a total of 
approximately 160,000 internally displaced people resulting from over 318 villages being 
burnt. Tonah (2012) also reported that the 2002 Dagbon conflict led to the death of the 
overlord of Dagbon, the Ya-Naa, and thirty of his elders. In addition to these, several 
houses and villages were burnt down, schools in the affected areas were closed and 
public servants deserted the area (p.8).  Sowatey (2005) claimed that the 2002 Dagbon 
conflict led to a loss of property worth more than 4 billion Ghanaian cedis (approximately 
US $1.25 billion) in less than one year. Another noticeable effect of these conflicts is the 
fact that funds otherwise meant for development are diverted to the enforcement of peace 
(Noagah, 2013; Anamzoyah, 2014; Longi, 2014). Clearly then, conflicts have a negative 
impact on the governance of the nation, the economy and involve massive human rights 
abuses. Governments, traditional rulers and civil society groups therefore are keen to 
getting them permanently resolved. These effects have led them to implementing 
strategies to resolve the conflicts and maintain peace. However, the successes of these 
mechanisms are questionable and the conflicts keep raging on. In the following section, 
literature on the various responses and the challenges associated with them are presented 
and analyzed. 
Responses to Conflict Situations and Challenges 
Successive governments of Ghana, traditional institutions and civil society groups 
have always responded in several ways to deal with conflict situations when they occur. 
There has been a mixture of strategies to suppress violence, resolve conflicts and attempt 
to achieve permanent peace.  One of the pioneering work on conflict studies in Ghana 
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was conducted by Emmanuel Addo Sowatey (2005). Sowatey’s (2005) study was 
premised around the assumption that Ghana’s peacebuilding processes and mechanisms 
might explain why the country remains relatively peaceful in a region torn apart by 
conflicts. As most of these conflicts in Ghana are chieftaincy-related, Sowatey’s (2005) 
study used chieftaincy as a case to test this popular assumption by analyzing the 
efficiency of the peacebuilding mechanisms in Ghana. Drawing mainly on the review of 
secondary, archival and legal material, Sowatey (2005) gave a historical account of 
chieftaincy and the causes of conflicts, before he undertook a detailed analysis of the 
peacebuilding mechanisms within the institution of chieftaincy. Sowatey (2005) found 
that partisan politics has provided fuel for most disputes since the colonial period. On the 
Dagbon conflict, Sowatey (2005) posited that it “has strong political undercurrents” (p. 
112). Other factors identified by Sowatey (2005) as contributing to conflicts include 
access to land and other natural resources to which the institution has strong links; abuse 
of the traditional system of checks and balances; negative role played by the media in 
modern democracies and youth unemployment. Sowatey’s (2005) understanding of 
peacebuilding as used in the article was conflict “prevention, management, resolution and 
peacebuilding” (p.109). Based on this understanding, Sowatey (2005) identified three 
block of structures which in his view help to explain the nature of peacebuilding within 
the chieftaincy institution. These included informal, semi-formal and formal structures. 
In terms of informal structures, Sowatey (2005) explained that the chieftaincy 
institution has a strong potential role to play in keeping peace and order, especially in the 
rural areas where formal structures are either lacking or are inadequate. Explaining 
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further, Sowatey (2005) argued that the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
mechanism which is part of this re-enforces the informal role of the chief and institution. 
The author however thought that success in this area is limited because in some instances, 
the chiefs themselves are deeply involved in the conflicts that they are expected to 
resolve or prevent. This makes them ineligible candidates for the resolution of conflicts in 
their respective areas. Sowatey (2005) also thought that the role of the chief, formerly 
shrouded in the secrecy of tradition, is no longer so due to education. The influence that 
chiefs wielded is therefore now waning. 
Sowatey (2005) identified semi-formal structures to include the work that civil 
society organizations can play in conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding. He 
argued that there is growing interest and space for civil society to participate in 
governance and democracy and to contribute to building the capacity of the chieftaincy 
institution to play its role in peacebuilding. However, except for a few of these 
organizations such as WANEP, this potential has not been utilized due to lack of capacity 
to intervene in the chieftaincy institution which is very technical. 
Formal structures identified by Sowatey (2005) include constitutional and legal 
provisions and structures for peacebuilding, including the Presidential Advisory 
Committee on Chieftaincy Affairs, the National Commission for Civil Education 
(NCCE), and the judiciary. According to Sowatey (2005), articles 272 and 274; the 
Chieftaincy Act of 1971 Act 370 (42) and (43) together established a three-tier structure 
for peacebuilding within the chieftaincy institution. These include National, Regional and 
local Traditional councils which have the mandate to “hear and determine any case or 
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matter affecting chieftaincy” (Sowatey, 2005 p. 123). To facilitate this, each tier has a 
judicial Council, a Research Committee and lawyers of not less than five years standing 
to support in the adjudication of cases. Sowatey (2005) however claimed that despite 
these, the structures are ineffective due to lack of adequate funds, delays in dealing with 
cases/issues before them, lack of full-time researchers to help in legal research to 
strengthen decision making/judgment processes. Further, Sowatey (2005) analyzed the 
role of Security and Intelligence institutions created under the Security and Intelligence 
Act of 1996, Act 526. Like the traditional councils, these also exist at the national, 
regional and District levels: National, Regional and District Security Councils. Their 
main mandate is to provide early warning on security at their respective levels for 
redress. In addition to these security- related institutions, the National Commission for 
Civil Education and the judiciary in their various capacities can help to avoid conflicts or 
resolve them before they become protracted. Sowatey (2005) concluded that both the 
chieftaincy institutions and the Supreme Court are saddled with too many cases and 
hence might be ineffective in achieving permanent peace. He reported that by 2003, 
“there were almost 100 chieftaincy disputes pending before two Regional Houses of 
Chiefs and 60,000 land cases before the Supreme Court” (p. 131). Further, Sowatey 
(2005) also concluded that Ghana’s peacebuilding mechanisms are weak and 
recommended that traditional structures and mechanisms for peacebuilding should be 
identified and strengthened, and that the constitution of Ghana should be amended to give 




The effectiveness or otherwise of these institutions in a conflict needs to be 
examined in detail to understand their strengths and weaknesses and their impact on 
peacebuilding. Some studies that give an indication of the effectiveness of these 
mechanisms include the work of Kaye and Beland (2009) and that of Steve Tonah 
(2012). The contribution of Julie Kaye and Daniel Beland (2009) on conflict resolution in 
Ghana is in post-conflict reconstruction. Kaye and Beland (2009) premised their study 
around the understanding that ethnic identities in Ghana were constructed and politicized 
during the colonial period and this continued even after independence. The central thesis 
of their work therefore was that “post-conflict reconstruction in ethnically fragmented 
areas is largely about the problem of de-politicizing essentialist discourse of historically 
constructed ethnic identities” (Kaye & Beland, 2009 p. 177). The authors therefore set 
out to explore this using the 1994-95 case of inter-ethnic conflict and reconstruction. Data 
for this study was drawn from 21 participants representing NGOs, religious leaders, 
traditional leaders, opinion leaders and the state. Their study confirmed the earlier 
findings of other scholars that colonialism created and maintained structural inequalities 
and that settlement narratives are highly politicized along ethnic identities, where each 
group lays claim to be indigenous settlers on the land. These claims correspond to the 
demands for representation to chiefly structures created and recognized by the colonial 
policy of indirect rule. Kaye and Beland (2009) claimed that the 1994-95 war was fought 
along such clear lines of ethnic identities: the acephalous, non-chiefly groups (Nawuri, 
Nchumburu, and Basare) against the chiefly groups (Gonja, Nanumba and Dagomba). 
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 Kaye and Beland (2009) described the response of government and civil society 
groups to this conflict to be a combination of conflict settlement and resolution efforts, 
but that the effort of government was more towards settlement. The settlement initiatives 
included peacekeeping; setting up of a Permanent Peace Negotiation Team (PPNT) in 
April 1994 to identify the root causes of the conflict and recommend solutions to 
government; and the distribution of relief items. As part of the effort to resolve the 
conflict, the government conducted a needs assessment and tasked the PPNT to work 
towards permanent peace. However, Kaye and Beland (2009) concluded that the 
initiatives failed to achieve lasting peace because they were largely focused on the 
suppression of violence and achieving a cease fire. The process of engagement also 
mirrored a conflict settlement approach, where the PPNT targeted only specific opinion 
leaders. In the process, the PPNT failed to establish legitimacy at the local level and to 
de-politicize identities. Finally, Kaye and Beland (2009) posited that the slow and late 
intervention of the peacekeeping force in the conflict situation of 1994-95 and the general 
lack of an institutional mechanism to proactively deal with conflict situations heightens 
the politicization of conflict narratives and hampers peacebuilding strategies and 
processes. Questions remain about the set of interventions necessary and sufficient for 
such a conflict situation, and the conditions they require to make them effective in 
achieving lasting peace. 
Another contribution to understanding the effectiveness of the processes and 
mechanisms employed in resolving Ghana’s conflicts is the work of Steve Tonah (2012) 
Tonah (2012) conducted a qualitative study on the Dagbon conflict and discussed the 
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various measures implemented to resolve it. As in other African contexts, the 
government’s first response to the conflict in March 2002 was to send military and police 
personnel to enforce peace. When things calmed down, the government appointed a 
Commission of Inquiry led by Justice Wuaku. The Commission later became known and 
referred to as the Wuaku Commission. The mandate of this Commission of Inquiry was 
to investigate and determine the causes of the conflict, identify the perpetrators of war 
and the various human rights abuses, and to recommend action to government for 
implementation. Tonah (2012) reported further that this Commission identified 15 people 
as suspects in line with their mandate. These were later tried and discharged by the 
courts. Another significant measure undertaken to resolve the conflict was the 
appointment of a Committee of four Eminent Chiefs charged with the responsibility of 
finding a solution to the conflict in Dagbon. This committee, upon several sittings and 
deliberations, drew up a roadmap for peace which was presented to government in March 
2006. Tonah (2012) again reported in his study that eight years after this roadmap was 
presented, only a few of these proposals were implemented because of disagreements 
between the factions. Tonah’s (2012) study did not assess the adequacy and effectiveness 
of these measures. We are not told what led to disagreement between the two rival gates 
which resulted in the non-implementation of the roadmap in its entirety. Questions 
therefore remain about the adequacy of these measures, the processes through which they 
were implemented or meant to be implemented, and the conditions under which they 
were implemented which led to only moderate success.  The study by Bukari Kadri 
Noagah (2013) on the prospects and challenges of the peace process in the Bawku 
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conflict is arguably the most recent and relevant account of the effectiveness of 
transitional justice processes and mechanisms in resolving ethnic conflicts. In a mixed 
methods case study of the conflict in the Bawku Traditional Area (BTA) in the Upper 
East region, Noagah (2013) set out to answer three research questions: 
1. Why is the Bawku conflict unresolved despite the various approaches that have 
been used at finding lasting peace? 
2. What is militating against the peace process? 
3.  What alternative measures can be used to bring lasting peace to Bawku? 
(Noagah, 2013 p. 1) 
 
Data for this study was collected from a total of 220 participants who were 
purposively selected based on their lived experiences of the Bawku conflict. The 
participants were made up of individuals from identifiable groups and organizations such 
as chiefs, opinion leaders, and security agencies, NGOs who played a part in the 
resolution of the conflict, assembly members and representatives of the Municipal 
Assembly. Out of the total 220 participants, 110 of them were selected randomly from 14 
communities. These communities were in turn purposively selected because they were 
locations where conflict had occurred. Data from these respondents were collected 
through focus group discussions, structured and unstructured interviews. Through these, 
both qualitative and quantitative data were generated. Data was analyzed under the lens 
of the theory of protracted social conflict (PSC) because the Bawku conflict had the 
characteristics of a protracted conflict. Also, the parties involved, the Kusasis and the 
Manprusis, lay claims to separate identities and cultural orientations as spelt out in the 
PSC theory. Noagah (2013) found that the main approaches for the resolution of the 
conflict included peacekeeping (including the imposition of curfews as and when 
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necessary), mediation, arbitration and reconciliation. The prominent intervention was 
reported to be mediation. Noagah (2013) recounted mediation teams in the Bawku 
conflict to include government functionaries, civil society groups who mediated in the 
conflict at various times. Some of these included former President Kufuor who mediated 
in 2008, a sitting President and his Vice, JEA Mills and John Mahama respectively, a 
host of NGOs including World Vision, Action Aid, WANEP, the Inter-Faith Dialogue 
and the National Peace Council. These are by no means powerful organizations and 
individuals who have the respect of society and should have been able to make a 
difference in a conflict situation in Bawku.  Although this achieved some success because 
it helped to calm down tensions, it was not successful in providing lasting peace (Noagah, 
2013 p. 6). Noagah (2013) also found that at the Community level, an Inter-ethnic peace 
committee (BIEPC) was formed to monitor the implementation of peace and provide 
early warning to higher authorities for redress before they because serious problems. 
 The outcome of these measures can be described as mixed. In terms of the overall 
objective of achieving lasting peace in Bawku, it was a failure. Noagah (2013) found the 
factors that militated against these mechanisms to include ethnic marginalization and lack 
of trust in the processes, proliferation of arms into the area, thereby encouraging tension 
and further conflict, lack of neutrality of the security agencies, lack of political will to 
implement the peace accord and mistrust in the mediation efforts. Consequently, Noagah 
(2013) recommended the strengthening of security systems, the need to adopt a 
traditional culturally-sensitive approach since the conflict is a traditional one, the need to 
set aside a budget for implementing the peace accord, the need to de-emphasize the court 
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system of arbitration and adjudication, and finally to consider power-sharing between the 
two principal ethnic groups. The importance of this study to the current one lies in the 
fact that it sheds some light on the processes and mechanisms of transitional justice 
which were applied in the Bawku conflict. The study also gives a fair idea of why they 
did not yield the required results. Some questions however remain to be answered. Could 
the failure to achieve lasting peace be due to the type of processes and mechanisms and 
conditions under which they were implemented? What success might the same measures 
achieve in an intra-ethnic conflict like the Dagbon one? Would these recommendations 
be valid for the resolution of an intra-ethnic conflict in a different region of Ghana? The 
Dagbon case is an example of a protracted intra-ethnic conflict and in a different region 
of Ghana. This study will build on Noagah’s (2013) one and provide evidence from a 
different type of conflict and cultural environment.   
 
Synthesis, Analysis and Implications for this Study 
The review of literature showed that the predominant study design used has been 
the qualitative case study approach. The authors used mostly key informant interviews to 
supplement information obtained through archival research to explore the causes of 
conflicts. Sampling techniques were also predominantly purposive and limited to 
individuals, communities and organizations that lived the experiences of conflicts that the 
authors were interested in.  Several conceptual and analytical approaches were used but 
the most appealing to this study is the protracted social conflict theory. This was applied 
in the work of Bukari Kadri Noagah (2013). 
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 The review of literature also showed that indeed the scale of the conflicts in the 
Northern region in general and Dagbon was massive with huge human rights abuses.  A 
summary of the measures which came through the review is presented below. 
Conflict Settlement Initiatives 
When conflicts break out, the first response of government is to send military and 
policemen to enforce peace. The immediate need is to restore order and minimize 
mayhem. Sulemana (2009) reported that in the 1940 Konkomba-Dagomba conflict, the 
Konkomba-Nanumba conflict of 1981 and the Nanumba-Konkomba conflict of 1994, 
military and army personnel were deployed to calm down the warring factions. Similarly, 
Noagah (2013) and Longi (2014) reported that in the Bawku Traditional Area, the same 
strategy was deployed by the then government. In this case, the conflict between the 
Manprusis and the Kusasis became both recurrent and violent that there is now a 
permanent military detachment in Bawku. In other parts of the Northern, Volta and 
Brong Ahafo regions, this has been the first option. A related strategy is to impose curfew 
in the parts affected by the conflict in support of the need to restore order. Tonah (2012) 
and Kaye and Beland (2009) reported that in the 2002 outbreak of war between the 
Andanis and Abudus, a dusk-to dawn curfew was imposed on the Dagbon Traditional 
Area. Similar measures were put in place in the Nawuri and Gonja areas after the 1991 
outbreak of conflict, the Nanumba and Konkomba areas after the conflict of 1991, and 
the Gonja, Nawuri and Konkomba areas after the 1994 conflict (Sulemana, 2009). The 
conditions and timing of curfews over the years are progressively relaxed based on gains 
made in restoring peace in the area.  
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Provision of relief. 
 Conflicts often involve massive deaths and internally displaced people who either 
flee from war or are rendered homeless because their houses have been burnt down. 
There is therefore the need for various forms of support. Governments, supported by civil 
society organizations, have always responded in most cases but in different intensity and 
impact. In their respective works, Kaye (2011), Kaye and Beland (2009), Sulemana 
(2009) and Tonah (2012) recounted how government and civil society groups provided 
relief to people fleeing conflict or rendered homeless in Dagomba Traditional Area, 
Nanumba, and Konkomba areas respectively. Relief has been in the form of blankets, 
food, construction of temporary shelter for internally displaced persons, and in some 
cases roofing materials (Tonah, 2012; Aikins, 2009; Sulemana, 2009). Just like the 
imposition of curfews, the impact of this is to bring immediate but temporary relief to 
victims but does not resolve the main issue for which the conflict broke out in the first 
place. 
Commissions of enquiry.  
Another strategy that cuts across all the conflicts in governments’ attempt to resolve 
them is the establishment of Commissions of Enquiry to investigate the causes and make 
recommendations for the resolution of the conflict to government (Longi, 2014; Noagah, 
2013; Tonah, 2012; Kaye & Beland, 2009; Sulemana, 2009). When war broke out 
between the Andanis and the Abudus in March 2002, the government instituted a 
commission to investigate, identify perpetrators of the conflict and make 
recommendations for the resolution of the conflict (Tonah, 2012).  
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Arrests, detention and prosecution of perpetrators of violence. 
As Sandoval (2014) has explained, an essential aspect of transitional justice 
includes an obligation to investigate and prosecute those who are likely perpetrators of 
various forms of human rights abuses. This is done with the aim of serving justice to 
those whose rights have been abused, ensure that the truth is known with adequate 
reparations for past human rights violations and guarantees that what happened will not 
recur.  Literature relating to this on Ghana shows little evidence of this having happened 
in most of the conflicts except for a few of the conflicts. In the 2002 conflict in Dagbon, 
the Justice Wuaku Commission identified and recommended 15 people who were later 
charged with murder of the Ya-Naa (Tonah, 2012). Noagah (2013) also reported that this 
was unsuccessful in the Bawku conflict. Most scholars recommend that this be de-
emphasized (Tonah, 2012; Noagah, 2013; Issifu and Asante, 2015) 
Conflict Resolution and Peace-building Initiatives 
According to Tschirgi (2004), peace-building mechanisms are prevention, 
stabilization and reconstruction measures that aim to consolidate peace in a post-conflict 
environment. This is done knowing that there is always the possibility of relapse into 
violence, no matter what might have happened in the initial resolution of the conflict. A 
review of literature shows that some strategies have included mediation by traditional 
rulers, use of semi-formal institutions such as civil society organizations, and the use of 





Mediation by traditional rulers. 
According to Aikins (2009) and Tonah (2012), Ghanaians have a high regard for 
their chiefs. There is agreement in literature that in the Northern part of Ghana, a more 
favored strategy for conflict resolution might be to use of the chieftaincy institution 
(Sowatey, 2005; Aikins, 2009; Tonah, 2012; Issifu & Asante, 2015). Given that most 
conflicts in the Northern region are chieftaincy- related, this view might appeal to most 
people. In several cases, the chief’s court is an avenue for settling disputes and restoring 
peace. Governments have over the years recognized and used this institution a lot, 
although with variation in some cases. In the Dagbon conflict for example, the 
government appointed a Committee of Eminent Chiefs led by the King of Ashanti and 
charged them to work at achieving durable peace in the Dagomba Traditional Area after 
the outbreak of war in March 2002. Also, after some calm was restored during the war of 
1994 between the Nanumbas-Konkombas, government on 30th May appointed a 
committee known as the Permanent Peace Negotiation Team (PPNT) to negotiate a cease 
fire and work at permanent peace in the area. Sulemana (2009) reported that this 
committee was made up of chiefs, the police, army and other opinion leaders. They 
successfully got the feuding parties to sign a peace accord but could not achieve 
permanent peace. 
Formal structures/ mechanisms.  
The 1992 constitution of Ghana recognizes the role of the chieftaincy institution 
in peacebuilding. Accordingly, it established chieftaincy structures at district, regional 
and national levels to deal with chieftaincy-related matters. A related constitutional 
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mechanism is the security set-up made up of National, Regional and District Security 
Councils, just like the chieftaincy structures. Their mandate is drawn from the Security 
and Intelligence Agencies Act (526) of 1996. Their role includes providing early warning 
as a means of either preventing the outbreak of violence or preventing relapse into 
conflict situations where some level of peace and calm has been achieved. Given the 
spread of these institutions across the country, it is unclear from literature why conflicts 
break out even though the needed early warning may have been provided. The interplay 
of roles between and among these institution during a conflict setting has not been clearly 
documented.  
Civil society efforts. 
The role played by some civil society organizations like the West Africa Network 
for Peace (WANEP) and religious bodies has also been recognized as an important way 
through which conflicts are resolved and peace-built (Kaye, 2011; Kaye & Beland, 2009; 
Noagah, 2013). Civil society groups have been active in providing relief and 
psychosocial support to victims during conflict situations. In addition, they provide useful 
peacebuilding support to government through serving on committees, facilitating cease 
fires and restoring peace (Noagah, 2013; Kaye & Beland; Tonah, 2012). 
The preceding section shows the depth of strategies that have been employed by 
government, civil society and other stakeholders over the years in response to conflict 
situations. There is agreement that these measures largely do not result in lasting peace 
(Aikins, 2009; Tonah, 2012; Noagah, 2013; Annan, 2014). Whereas Tonah (2012) and 
Sowatey (2005) point to the politicization of these conflicts thereby making their 
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resolution complex and difficult, there is no evidence of any work done to understand the 
conditions that might favor the successful implementation of these strategies. Noagah’s 
(2013) and Longi’s (2014) separate works on the Bawku conflict provided insights into 
the challenges of the strategies. However, neither Noagah (2013) nor Longi (2014) 
delved into the conditions that might make transitional justice achieve lasting peace. 
Also, being an inter-ethnic conflict in a different region, the findings might not be 
appropriate for an intra-ethnic conflict such as the Dagbon one. As the United Nations 
(2010) explained, there is no one-size fits-all solutions because each transitional justice 
programme should be designed and implemented uniquely within a specific context. This 
study seeks to fill this knowledge gap with respect to an intra-ethnic conflict. 
Chapter three outlines the methods that were employed to carry out the qualitative 













Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of the previous two chapters was to review, analyze and present 
literature on conflicts in Africa and in Ghana and the responses of government and civil 
society groups to conflict situations. This was done with the view to understanding what 
is known about the impact of transitional justice on the resolution of conflicts and the 
maintenance of peace in Ghana and where the research gaps are. The synthesis from the 
scholarly work was also intended to inform the design and methodology of this study. 
Evidence from literature demonstrated that whereas a lot of work has been done to 
understand the causes of conflicts, there is inadequate knowledge to explain the 
conditions under which the processes and mechanisms of transitional justice might yield 
lasting peace. In all the studies reviewed, qualitative research approaches were used 
except the work of Noagah (2013) which employed mixed methods.   
The works of Fisher (2009), Bar-Tall (1998), Millar (2012) and Noagah (2013) 
among others demonstrated the utility of the theory of Protracted Social Conflict in 
analyzing and understanding conflicts that are protracted in nature. As the Dagbon 
conflict is one of such protracted conflicts, and the research questions required an 
exploration to understand what the impacts of transitional justice mechanisms might be, a 
qualitative study was designed with the Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) theory and the 
concepts of transitional justice as its theoretical foundation. This helped in understanding 
the mix of conditions that might make transitional justice processes and mechanisms to 
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work in a post-conflict situation. This chapter describes the qualitative research 
methodology and how it was employed to understand the conditions under which 
transitional justice mechanisms might work to yield lasting peace. 
This chapter outlines the research methodology employed including a description 
of the key concepts and variables used in the study. It also describes the research design, 
the participants of the study, the instruments used to collect data to answer the research 
questions and the steps that were employed to protect participants. The chapter ends with 
a clarification of how other ethical issues were handled and how data and information 
generated were verified to make them trustworthy.  
 
Research Design and Rationale 
The qualitative exploratory study was chosen to help in gaining a deeper 
understanding of the conditions that might respond most favorably to transitional justice 
strategies in Dagbon. The guiding questions for this research included: 
Q1. What is the nature of the strategies for transitional justice implemented after the 2006 
peace accord? 
Q2. What are the challenges associated with these strategies? 
Q3. What might help to make the strategies more responsive to peacebuilding? 
The study was aimed at gaining a deeper understanding of the various transitional 
justice mechanisms that were implemented in Dagbon, their nature, characteristics, and 
impact on the three broad elements of the protracted conflict theory (the genesis, process 
and outcome stages) and why lasting peace has not been achieved. Specifically, at the 
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genesis stage, the set of conditions that were responsible for the eruption of violence in 
Dagbon in March 2002 were explored with the view to understanding the situation of 
communal content, human needs, and the role of the state during and after the peace 
accord of 2006 and the linkages in all these variables. At the process stage, the processes 
of engagement and implementation of the various strategies for conflict resolution and 
maintenance of peace and how these initiatives and processes targeted and addressed 
initial grievances of communities and individuals identified in the earlier stage was 
investigated. The last stage, is the outcome analysis, where the outcomes were explored 
to understand the results that were attained and why, the factors/conditions which led to 
those outcomes, and what strategies and/or conditions would have worked better to 
achieve lasting peace. This stage also included an analysis of the impacts of the 
transitional justice mechanisms on local leadership, institutions and governance, 
perception and individual as well as communal satisfaction and improved physical 
security.  As the individual participants of the study were empowered to tell their stories 
about what worked or did not work and why, it led me to further understand and 
clarifying the conditions under which transitional justice strategies could be more 
responsive to peace-building. 
The way key concepts are understood is important in explaining what is learnt 
from the stories that participants shared. In this study, “transitional justice” was used to 
refer to the combination of judicial and non-judicial processes and tools implemented 
since the outbreak of hostilities in Dagbon in March 2002, with the aim of addressing the 
human rights abuses and to restore peace (ICTJ, 2009). It included the measures and 
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processes that were undertaken to investigate wrong-doing and punish perpetrators of 
human rights violations (retributive justice) and those that focused on healing, 
relationship and long-lasting peace-building (restorative peace). 
The study was a qualitative exploratory one based on the constructivist paradigm 
to allow for a deeper understanding of the types and nature of transitional justice 
strategies (Creswell, 2013; Guba &Lincoln, 1994; O’ Sullivan, Russel & Berner, 2008) 
that were implemented when the conflict broke out in 2002, and after the peace accord 
was signed in 2006. As the view is held by social constructivists, I understand that 
answers to research questions can be derived from a variety of sources (Creswell, 2013) 
so the study was guided by this world view. Yin (1981) and Creswell (2013) have 
advised that for researches that require a detailed exploration of a phenomenon and 
drawing information from multiple sources, a qualitative case study research is 
recommended.  Drawing information from multiple sources helped to provide a complete 
picture of the issue under investigation and improved the quality of research outcomes 
(O’ Sullivan, Russel & Berner, 2008). This study required that individuals were given the 
space to share their experiences and views about the transitional justice processes and 
tools that were implemented in Dagbon. Further, the Dagbon traditional area is a 
“bounded system” (Creswell, 2013 p.97) where a real case was studied. Stake (2005) and 
Yin (2009) explained that under such conditions, a case study research is recommended. 
According to O’ Sullivan, Russel and Berner (2008), a key strength of the qualitative case 
study approach is its ability to provide detailed information that meets the needs of the 
administrator. The contemporary administrator will need trustworthy information on why 
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the strategies are not achieving the desired peace or why the achievement has only been 
modest and what can be done differently to ensure that there is lasting peace. The case 
study approach was deemed to be the only way to generate such information. Some other 
methods, including narrative, grounded theory, phenomenology, and ethnography, have 
been put forward by scholars as suitable for approaches for qualitative enquiries 
(Creswell, 2013; Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994). These approaches were however not suitable 
for this study. A narrative approach for example focuses on the experience of a few 
people. This study required more than the experience of one person or a few people. The 
intention was to focus on two identity groups and explore the impact of transitional 
justice strategies on the conflict resolution outcomes. A narrative will also not provide the 
level of analysis and deeper understanding of the problem under investigation. Creswell 
(2013 p.70) has explained that in a narrative, the focus is on the lived experience of one 
or two individuals about a phenomenon or where the researcher tries to make connections 
in a chronological manner. This study looked at the perceptions of thirteen individuals 
and two focus groups (men and women) of four each about the impacts of transitional 
justice mechanisms.  The analysis and conclusions were made by drawing from these 
varied sources of information which would not have been possible under the narrative 
approach. Also, although the generation of theory was not ruled out in this study, this was 
not the main purpose. This study aimed to have an in-depth exploration and 
understanding of the conditions under which transitional justice processes and 
mechanisms might work. Therefore, ethnography was not suitable in this case because 
the focus was not on an “intact culture-sharing group” (Creswell, 2013 p. 123). A 
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phenomenology was not suitable either because the focus of the research went beyond 
individuals who lived the 2002 Dagbon conflict (Anderson & Spencer, 2002). The 
enquiry involved interviewing representatives of organizations and institutions that were 
involved in implementing the transitional justice strategies during and after the peace 
accord was signed in 2006 as well as making use of varied information from secondary 
sources.  
 
The Role of the Researcher 
Creswell (2013) has explained that in a qualitative study, researchers “have a 
personal history that situates them as enquirers” (p.51). As an observer and interviewer in 
this study, I brought to bear my constructivist world view about research and deep 
experience about conflicts. Having lived through three different ethnic conflicts in a 
different part of Ghana, I brought to bear this lived experience. From my experience, I 
know the value of using multiple sources of information as well as triangulation to be 
able to arrive at the truth on an issue in a post-conflict environment. My knowledge about 
conflicts and the key actors involved in one way or the other was helpful in selecting 
participants for the study, in the design of interview guides and during interviews. As a 
development worker and change agent, I am passionate about ending conflicts because of 
their negative impacts on development, society and humanity. These values, beliefs and 
experiences were brought to bear on the research. 
To manage bias, the case study was chosen outside my own area. Using my 
neutrality, careful selection and training of an interpreter, I ensured a collaborative 
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interview process as suggested by Kvale and Brinkmann (2009).  To allow participants to 
share information freely without fear, the identity of participants was never a requirement 
and hence they were protected.  
Research Methodology 
This section outlines the methods employed in this study. It includes a description 
of the study population, sample size and sampling strategy, the data collection 
instruments, how the data was collected, managed and analyzed. It also includes how data 
was treated (to ensure that the results are trustworthy) as well as how ethical issues were 
handled. 
 
Study Population and Participants 
 A clear definition of the bounded area is important in every qualitative case study 
(Creswell, 2013; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). This study was about the conflict between the 
Andanis and the Abudus in the Dagbon Traditional Area (DTA). These are the two main 
gates of the Dagbon ethnic group who both lay claim to the paramountcy of the Dagomba 
Traditional Area or “Dagbon” as it is traditionally referred to. With an estimated 
population of more than one million inhabitants (Tonah, 2012), the DTA is home to 
several ethnic groups dominated by the Dagomba but includes others such as Gonja, 
Manprusi and Akan (Tonah, 2012).  However, as this study concerned an intra-ethnic 
conflict, information was drawn from only the Dagomba ethnic group. Also, although 
there are many conflicts in that same area, data for this study was drawn from individuals 
from these two rival gates as well as representatives of organizations and security 
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agencies that played a role on the conflict of 2002. The scope of the study was limited to 
the conflict which occurred in 2002 and the measures that were put in place to resolve it 
and restore lasting peace after the peace accord was signed in 2006.  
The participants of this study were individuals from both the Andani and Abudu 
gates, as well as representatives of non-state actors who were involved in resolving the 
conflict in one way or the other. Participants were purposively selected based on their 
knowledge, experience and involvement in implementing or benefiting from the 
transitional justice strategies between 2006 and 2015 (Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994; Creswell, 
2013).   The rationale behind the use of purposive sampling was to ensure that only 
individuals, communities and organizations who had information relating to the conflict, 
and the processes and mechanisms to restore peace were considered for sampling 
(Creswell, 2013 p.156). Further, as advised by Asmussen and Creswell (1995), I ensured 
that there was maximum variation, where within the purposive sample population, all 
likely sources of data variation were identified and considered in the final sample for 
interview. This ensured that all possible perspectives concerning the research questions 
were reflected. 
Sample Size  
 Creswell (1995, 2013), Pinnegar and Daynes (2007), and Wertz (2005) have 
provided useful guidelines about sample size in qualitative research which guided this 
study. According to them, the sample size in a qualitative study should be small enough 
to allow for extensive and detailed investigation of the phenomenon from the individual 
or site. The intention in this study was not to generalize the findings for all intra ethnic 
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conflicts but to limit it to Dagbon and to the experiences during the 2002 conflict. 
Therefore, interviews were conducted within this purposively selected sample, ensuring 
maximum variation as much as possible. After interviewing thirteen individuals, a focus 
group of four men and four women, I reached data saturation and stopped the process.  
 
Data Collection Procedures and Instruments 
  Creswell (2013) has cautioned that data collection in qualitative studies goes 
beyond consideration around the types of data and the procedures involved in collecting 
them, to include “gaining permissions, conducting a good sampling strategy, developing 
means for recording information, …storing the data, and anticipating the ethical issues 
that may arise” (p. 145). This sub-section of the study describes how the sites and 
individuals were located including gaining access to both the individuals and the site, 
how data was collected and stored, and the ethical issues that arose and how these were 
handled. 
Site selection and sampling strategy.  
The sites for this study as well as the first set of potential lists of individuals were 
identified with the help of a representative of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding 
(WANEP). Subsequently, other participants were identified and selected through 
snowball sampling techniques.  This is a non-probability sampling technique which relies 
on referrals from an initial primary respondent or participant until the number of 
participants required for the study is reached. According to Flint and Atkinson (2004), 
this technique is useful in studies where the identification of research participants is 
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difficult for one reason or the other. The technique takes advantage of the social network 
and experience of the primary contact to locate other potential participants. Therefore, the 
snowball technique was employed in this study because it was not easy to identify the 
victims and communities that were worst hit by the war. In the same way, some of the 
organizations, (including WANEP itself), had changed management or moved out of the 
area so identifying them was not easy. The West African Network for Peace (WANEP) 
was used as the primary contact. WANEP is one of the most credible non-governmental 
organizations in Ghana that has been at the forefront of peacebuilding in Dagbon since 
2002 (Tonah, 2012). WANEP supported in community entry and identification of the 
first set of participants for individual interviews and focus group discussions. The 
insights of WANEP also facilitated the classification of potential participants as key 
informants (Goulding, 2002) in such a way that the experiences of participants who are 
eventually enrolled for the interview represented their sub-populations.   
 It was equally important to pre-determine the communities/skins from which 
individuals will be drawn. These communities were determined based on the advice of 
WANEP. A deliberate attempt was made to cross-check this with other credible non-
governmental organizations that operated in the DTA. Just like individuals, communities 
were listed based on their experience during the 2002 conflict and the subsequent post-
conflict processes and mechanisms put in place during and after the peace accord in 
2006. Once a list of potential communities had been drawn, final selection was informed 
by the population size and status of the chiefs that ruled those communities. The purpose 
of this was to ensure that there was a fair representation of perspectives from all 
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communities and to “maximize differences” (Creswell, 2013 p. 157). Individual 
participants were then selected (this time independently from the influence of WANEP) 
from these communities and interviews conducted until data saturation point was 
reached.  
Once identified, an initial check by phone was done with potential participants to 
ascertain their availability, their preliminary consent, location and interview preference 
before they were physically contacted to give their preliminary consent to participate in 
the study. Preliminary consent here helped to draw up a tentative list of participants from 
whom information could be solicited and to help determine interpretation needs during 
field work. 
The participants in this study were adults above the age of 18. No one below this 
age was contacted for information relating to this study. Each participant was required to 
voluntarily participate after signing a consent form or consenting verbally. However, 
during the interview, if people felt they could not continue for any reason, they were free 
to withdraw. To protect the confidentiality of participants, the interpreter was made to 
complete confidentiality form. Spouses of females who participated in individual 
interviews and focus group discussions were also contacted to provide their consent 
before such women took part.  Further, as Creswell (2013) and Lipson (1994) have 
advised, to protect the anonymity of participants, the information collected did not bear 
any names of the participants. Numbers were used rather than names for identification, 
storage and retrieval purposes and only the researcher knew and had access to 
information collected from the field. A description of how other ethical issues were 
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addressed is discussed in the subsequent sections. Copies of all forms and tools used can 
be found in the appendix. 
Gaining access. 
The process of gaining access to communities and individuals started after 
obtaining approval form the Institutional Review Board of Walden University. This was 
necessary to build rapport with these individuals before data collection commenced. I 
relied on the help of the community partner, WANEP, an organization with long standing 
relationship with the chiefs and opinion leaders in the Dagbon Traditional Area. Through 
their help, the gatekeepers were identified and used to help in entering the communities. 
With each community chief, elder or individual participant, the purpose of the study was 
explained to them, why their community was chosen, exactly what the study entailed, 
participant selection criteria as well as the duration of the entire research. They were also 
educated about their roles, the usefulness of the study to them as individuals and 
members of their community, and how the results of the study will be utilized. They were 
informed about the voluntary nature of the study and their liberty to choose to accept to 
participate or opt out.  
Recruiting and training an interpreter. 
 As I was not totally conversant with the local language, an interpreter was 
recruited. This person was trained for three days prior to the commencement of filed 
work. The training covered the meanings of terminologies used in the study, 
understanding the tools, the need for confidentiality, and the importance of saying what 
the participants said accurately. The dos and don’ts of the research process including the 
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importance of him not contacting any participant about the research when the investigator 
is not physically present. The training also covered the following broad areas: 
1. Ethical principles in research involving human subjects 
2. Walden University’s regulations and Ghana’s laws and requirements on the 
protection of human subjects in research 
3. The role and importance of informed consent, privacy and confidentiality 
4. Anticipated problems in research and reporting requirements 
To reduce biases, this person was purposively selected based on his thorough 
understanding of both the language and study area. I also made sure he was not from the 
ethnic group under study. After training, the interpreter went through the agreement and 
confidentiality forms and signed. This agreement form is attached in Appendix C 
Data collection procedures and tools. 
John Creswell (2013 p.160) and Quinn Patton (2015 p.432) have put forward 
many approaches for collecting data in qualitative studies. These include observation, 
review of documents, interviews, and focus group discussions. This study employed a 
mix of these methods. Observation was used to gather field notes and physical evidence 
of restorative measures that were put in place after 2002. Also, as some of the 
information was available in various forms of documents and archival material, a review 
of these documents was done. In addition to the journals that were kept each day during 
field work, available public documents on the conflict were collected and analyzed later. 
Primary data was collected mainly through face-to-face interviews using individual 
interview guides (Appendix K). This was aimed at ensuring uniformity of enquiry across 
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all the individuals interviewed and to ensure that during each interview, all possible areas 
relevant to the study are exhausted (Patton, 2015 p.438). However, conversational 
techniques of interviewing were used to enable a deeper exploration and probing based 
on the responses that participants gave (Conrad, 2011; Patton, 2015). The use of 
interview guides also helped in managing the researcher’s time, whilst allowing the 
participants the flexibility to explain themselves within the limits of the issues.  There 
were no disagreements with time or venues so the alternative option of using Skype did 
not arise. 
The interview process was in two stages. The first part was to build a good 
rapport with the participant and to get their consent (verbal or written). At this stage, the 
purpose of the research, uses, relevance to the research participants and the community 
and how they will be protected from being identified subsequently were explained. If 
they are happy to participate and sign the consent form or consent verbally, then the 
interview began. The second part of the interview delved into the questions structured 
along the objectives of the study using the interview guide in Appendix K.  
The interviews were conducted at locations decided by the participants 
themselves. This was to make them feel as comfortable as possible.  As the DTA is 
predominantly Muslim, the consent of the husbands of female participants was sought, in 
line with Muslim practice, before the interview proceeded. To create trust, if there was 
the need for an additional person to stay with the women during the process of the 
interview, this was permitted but the participant (in this case the spouse) had to sign a 
confidentiality form. The spousal confidentiality forms for men sitting in interviews of 
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their spouses during both individual interviews and focus group discussions are 
respectively found Appendices I and J. Their corresponding spousal consent forms are 
found in the appendix as G and F for individual interviews and focus group discussions 
respectively.  
In addition to individual interviews, information about the perceptions of groups 
of men and women regarding the adequacy of interventions or engagements in 
peacebuilding initiatives, were collected in two separate focus group discussions: one for 
men and another for women. It was thought that the views of men about the adequacy or 
otherwise of interventions might differ from those of women based on differences in 
gender roles. Each group numbered four and were asked questions from an interview 
guide as found in Appendix L. Like for individual interviews, all participants were 
informed about their rights to participate or opt out, pull out during the process of the 
discussion if they felt so and were also assured about the confidentiality and use of the 
data for only academic purposes. The participant consent forms that were administered 
for individual interviews and focus group discussions are found in the appendix as D and 
E respectively. 
To ensure that all participants understand clearly what is required of them in 
terms of both the questions as well as their rights during the interviews, the relevant tools 
were translated into the local language, Dagbani. These are found in Appendices N to U. 





Field data storage and management. 
  All field data was hand-written and later typed out and stored on two different 
laptops which were password protected and in OneDrive as well as Dropbox to ensure 
that there are multiple copies. However, the main working file was stored in NVivo. All 
these copies are password protected to ensure that no one can access them easily. Hard 
copy documents have been stored in files. These have been organized by how relevant 
they are to specific objectives and by date. Any relevant information such as the location 
and contact persons necessary for retrieval purposes were added before analysis started. 
Data analysis. 
Creswell (2013) has explained that data analysis in qualitative research involves 
preparing and organizing data, reducing the data into themes through coding, and 
representing the data into figures, tables or a discussion. Miles, Huberman and Saldana 
(2014) also advised that data analysis should go on concurrently with data collection if 
the researcher is to avoid being frustrated and overwhelmed in the process of analysis. 
With these in mind, a four-stage process of data analysis was employed with on-site 
analysis central to my plans for analysis. On-site analysis involved preparing journals on 
all aspects of the data collected including observations. As I gathered documents too, I 
made notes on each document so that once I revisit them, I can re-collect the information 
associated with the documents. This phase also involved building a preliminary coding 
frame which was developed as the interviews are conducted. 
The second phase involved organizing the information collected in such a way as 
to permit storage. All hard copies were stored in well labelled files. Typed out-scripts 
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were exported into NVivo ready for the next stage of the analysis. The third stage 
involved reading through the entire data set thoroughly to get a sense of how the big 
picture of the data is like. At this stage, the information was re-organized according to 
research objectives with notes and comments written on the margins of hard copies. This 
helped in getting an understanding of the level of completeness of information required 
per objective and in identifying information gaps. Data gaps were immediately addressed 
through follow-up visits and additional interviews.  
 The fourth phase of the data analysis process dealt with describing the data. At 
this phase, the codes that were developed during the data collection process were revised 
based on the patterns that had started emerging from the data. In addition to this, I 
reviewed the analytical framework and research questions to refine the codes. This final 
phase also involved the actual coding of the data generated from the surveys and 
transforming the codes into themes using NVivo. Once these were done, the patterns that 
emerged from the data then became the basis for reporting results under each research 
question. As part of this process, the observed patterns also formed the basis for 
triangulation from literature as a means of ensuring trustworthiness and reducing bias. 
 
 
Dealing with Reliability, Trustworthiness and Ethical Issues 
According to Vogt (2005 p.74) one limitation of the case study design is the fact 
that it is cross-sectional. Data for this study was collected over a two-week period. The 
reliability of information depended on the ability of participants to recall all the events 
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that happened after the peace accord was signed in 2006. It is also likely that people’s 
perceptions about the impact of these interventions and processes may have changed over 
time but this cannot be captured in a cross-sectional study such as this one. It therefore 
has the potential of reducing the trustworthiness of the results. To deal with these I 
ensured that detailed field notes were kept of each day of field visit. Also, an effort was 
made to remind participants of critical milestone events that happened around the same 
time to help them recall. As already stated too, only blind coding was used throughout the 
study. To ensure consistency of coding and interpretation, only the researcher developed 
and used codes and coding frames. As no other person was involved in the analysis of 
data, disagreements over multiple uses and meanings of codes did not arise. 
 Another relevant issue is the threat to quality. This can arise mainly through 
interpretation and transcription of data. This is because of my own limitation of the local 
language; hence I depended on the quality of interpretation. To minimize this, I ensured 
that the interpreter was well trained in all aspects of the research including ethics. This 
ensured that all the issues were covered and that he understood what was expected of him 
as well as how his actions and inactions can affect the quality of the research.  
Creswell (2013) and Lincoln and Guba (1985) have recommended a set of 
strategies to improve the trustworthiness in qualitative research. The most relevant of 
these strategies which was employed in this study included triangulation, persistent 
observation, and member-checking and external audits. In line with constructivist 
tradition, the study relied on information drawn from multiple sources and these were 
used to support or contradict findings and conclusions of the study.  As Yin (1994) has 
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explained, if researchers use the rigor of natural sciences in their research processes, there 
is the likelihood that their results will be trustworthy.  
Throughout the process, a conscious effort was made to use peers for reviews of 
mostly the protocols and draft findings and conclusions as an external check on the 
process. Once the first draft was ready, another external audit in the form of using a 
leading scholar to review the report was employed. Finally, to improve trustworthiness of 
the research, I identified some participants who had the capacity and were willing to 
serve as “member-checkers” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985 p.314).  
 I was also mindful of other ethical issues in the study. These relate mainly to 
privacy risks, fairness in the selection of participants, issues of informed consent and 
what Creswell (2013) referred to as “deception or covert activities” (p.174). Being a 
conflict prone area, individuals who agreed to participate in the study were protected in 
such a way that their participation did not negatively affect them in any way in society. 
Also, those selected for the survey were not based on reasons of their vulnerability status 
or ease of contact, and all participants were engaged willingly and on their own volition. 
To prevent deception, I ensured that the purpose of the research was well and accurately 
reported to participants always before the interviews started. These were also written on 
all protocols as a reminder. All these ethical issues and my plan to address them were 
articulated in my application to the Walden University Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
and approval obtained before field work commenced.  
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Summary of Chapter Three 
This chapter described the methods that were employed to conduct the study and 
included a detailed explanation of the rationale for using the qualitative case study 
approach. The chapter also included a description of the study population, participants, 
data collection procedures and tools that were used in the study. Data were managed and 
analysed with the aid of NVivo software. The chapter ended with a description of how 
ethical issues in the study were handled. In the following chapter, the results of the study 
are presented and analysed.  
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Chapter 4. Results 
 
Introduction 
There is a problem with persisting ethnic conflicts in Ghana. A review of 
literature showed that most of them involve wide scale destruction of property and 
massive human rights violations. Governments and civil society groups have over the 
years implemented several transitional justice mechanisms but these have largely been 
ineffective in resolving them and restoring peace. Rather, they persist and are protracted 
in nature. The Dagbon intra-ethnic conflict is one of these protracted persistent conflicts. 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to provide a deeper understanding 
of the processes and mechanisms of transitional justice implemented in the Dagbon 
Traditional Area after war broke out between the Andanis and the Abudus in 2002. The 
study was conducted with the view to examining the nature, effectiveness and 
appropriateness of the tools for transitional justice and to understand the conditions under 
which they can respond most appropriately to resolve conflicts maintain peace in 
Dagbon. The central research question which guided the study was: what conditions 
might respond most favorably to the transitional justice strategies in Dagbon? Three sub-
questions were asked: 
1. What is the nature of the strategies for transitional justice implemented after the 
2006 peace accord? 
2. What are the challenges associated with these strategies? 
3. What might help to make the strategies more responsive to peacebuilding? 
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This chapter presents the results of the study. It begins with an introduction, describes 
the research setting followed by a description of the demographics of research 
participants and how the data were collected. The chapter also describes how the data 
were analyzed in response to the research questions, and includes a description of how 
issues of trustworthiness were handled. It ends with a summary of the entire chapter. 
Setting 
Data collection for this study was done three months after national parliamentary 
and presidential elections were held (December 7th) and a new government inaugurated 
on January 7th, 2017. A review of literature had pointed to political influence in the 
Dagbon dispute (Aikins, 2009; Tonah, 2012). Owing to this and bearing in mind that the 
election experience would still be fresh in people’s minds, the responses of some 
participants may have been influenced by the immediate past elections and it is important 
to note this.   
Demographics 
Data for this study were collected from three broad categories of participants: 
representatives of civil society groups who were involved in one way or the other in the 
peace process after 2002, chiefs and individual members of the communities who were 
affected by the conflict. Individuals, representatives of civil society groups and chiefs 
were interviewed through key informant interviews using open-ended questions. To make 
the data representative, three chiefs each were interviewed from each gate. Only 
representatives of civil society groups who were present in 2002 and participated in the 
peace process were interviewed. In all, the combined number of chiefs, opinion leaders 
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and civil society representatives numbered thirteen (eight chiefs and opinion leaders and 
five representatives of civil society groups). Some individual members of affected 
communities were also interviewed through focus group discussions of four men and four 
women. Both men and women were selected from a list of men and women who were 
affected by the war and were involved in the community peace processes. This list, 
comprising 23 men and 19 women, was provided the community partner (WANEP). The 
final list of four men and four women was selected without the knowledge and influence 
of the community partner. Therefore, the total number of people interviewed was twenty-
one (21). The number of participants from each location is shown in table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Number of Participants by Source, Location and Frequency 
Individual Interviews Source Location  Number of 
Participants 
 Chiefs and Opinion 
Leaders 
Baanvim 1 
  Yendi  3 
  Tolon  1 
  Mion  1 
  Tamale 2 
 Civil Society Tamale 3 
  Accra  2 













Data Collection Process 
Data were collected through key informant interviews, focus group discussions 
and review of documents. Before field work started, I sought for and obtained the 
approval of the Walden University Institutional Review Board (IRB) with approval 
number 01-19-17-0466118. The notice of approval was deposited at the Navrongo 
Institutional Review Board for their information as required. I then identified an 
interpreter and trained him for one week before I entered the community with the help of 
my community partner, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, WANEP). 
The community partner introduced me to the communities and helped in 
identifying the first set of potential participants. The potential participants were contacted 
by phone and those who agreed to participate in the study were listed and appointments 
made for interviews. The community partner did not know the eventual participants as 
some others were determined through snowball sampling technique. For focus group 
discussions, the same method was employed. The community partner helped by 
providing a list of forty-two (42) men and women. From this list, four men and four 
women were identified and enrolled for the discussions. This final list was purposively 
selected based on their knowledge of what happened during the conflict of 2002. A 
further attempt was made to ensure a balance of representation between the two gates. 
The final participants (four men and four women) were selected without the knowledge 
and influence of the community partner. In all cases, the consent of each person was 
obtained (verbally or in writing) before interviews proceeded. All those husbands who 
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wanted to sign or thumbprint and keep a copy of the consent form for themselves were 
given the opportunity to do so. Each of them was given copies of the signed consent 
forms. On the other hand, those husbands who preferred to simply give a verbal consent 
could do so. It was explained to them that both verbal and signed consent had the same 
effect and that it was for them to choose how they wanted to express their consent. 
Before the commencement of interviews, interview dates, venues and time were 
confirmed in advance before the actual interviews. All participants were told the purpose 
and benefits of the research and the fact that it was voluntary and their participation or 
non-participation would not affect them in any way. I emphasized throughout that the 
research was for purely academic purposes and the results will not be used for any other 
purpose other than what was stated. I assured each of them that their names were not 
required and would not be linked to any information they provided. In the case of female 
respondents, their spouses consented for their wives’ participation before the interviews 
proceeded. In Dagbon custom, a woman is not allowed to speak to a “stranger” without 
the consent of their husbands. In the absence of their husband, his immediate relative 
must consent before she can engage the stranger in such a conversation. Therefore, 
seeking the consent of husbands before an interview is conducted with women is in 
keeping with Dagbon customary practices. All interviews were conducted face to face in 
the houses of the respondents. Focus group discussions were held in the house of a chief 
were they usually met. Once these individuals agreed to participate and gave their 
consent, the interviews commenced.  Individual interviews took an average of one hour 
thirty minutes for each participant, while focus group discussions took an hour each for 
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men and women. In addition to interviews and focus group discussions, I observed the 
principal streets of Yendi for evidence of any monuments or memorials that might have 
been built in honor of victims 
Besides individual interviews and focus group discussions, further work was done 
reviewing archives as a means of getting details on some references that were made and 
to triangulate information obtained through interviews and focus group discussions. 
During the interviews, reference was made to some legislative instruments and specific 
Supreme Court rulings on the dispute. These were all verified and information available 
in hard copies were photocopied and stored separately in files. 
All data was recorded in a field note book and later typed and imported into 
NVivo. Daily journals were also kept for every day of the interview. Through this, all the 
observations, notes and key issues found were recorded. Some of these included sources 
of material given by the participants, links to other key informants and appointments.  
As a result of frequent changes in police and army personnel stationed in Yendi, 
none of those present met the inclusion criteria. Therefore, no one from security 
personnel was interviewed. The data collection process was smooth and no incidence was 
recorded throughout the two weeks that the interviews lasted. In the following sub-







In line with the advice of Miles, Huberman and Saldana (2014), I started data 
analysis on the field by ensuring that the data collected were prepared and organized. 
This involved ensuring that the information was carefully typed and the interview 
transcripts for those interviews that the participants agreed to proof-read (member-
checking) were proof read and corrected where necessary. The set of interview scripts 
were then organized according to research question to ensure that there were no data 
gaps. As data collection was going on too, recurring codes were noted in the daily journal 
such that by the end of the interview, the first set of codes had already been generated. 
Once the data was imported into NVivo, further codes were generated and later 
transformed into categories. The codes and categories generated from individual 
interviews and focus group discussions are discussed in the following sections.  
Data Analysis from Interviews 
Question 1. What is the nature of the strategies for transitional justice implemented 
after the 2006 peace accord? 
This question aimed to explore the experience of participants about the initiatives 
implemented to compensate victims of human rights abuses and to restore peace. 
Specifically, it sought to know whether there were any trials, punishments and if there 
were, whether these were deterrent enough to prevent future occurrences? It also sought 
to find out from participants whether anything was done to restore the dignity of victims, 
address their needs and create space for perpetrators to make confessions and seek 
forgiveness, and finally whether anything was done to build confidence in the chieftaincy 
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institution? The answers to these questions were meant to lead naturally to the next 
question about challenges of these initiatives. 
The codes that emerged were descriptions of various retributive and restorative 
mechanisms including:  “curfew imposed”, “arrests and detentions made”, “false trials”, 
“trial for the sake of trial”, “no punishments”, “no deterrent”, “committee established”, 
“rehabilitation farms established”, “no relief”, “no rehabilitation”, “killers not identified”, 
“no true killers”, “accused acquitted and discharged”, “commission established”, “regent 
enskinned”, “NGO consortium formed”, “illegal release of accused persons”, “poor trial”, 
“ineffective investigation of complaints”, “biased security agencies”, “release of accused 
persons on remand” and “failure of the army”. Most of these responses meant the same 
thing although they were said differently, similar codes were brought together under one 
category. A common category that explained other codes was identified to stand for the 
others. For example: “false trial” and “trial for the sake of trial”, and “fake trial”, were 
taken to mean the same thing. In this case, the category “false trial” was used to represent 
“fake trial” and “trial for the sake of trial” codes. Codes that were repeated by several 
other participants, (for example, “committee of eminent chiefs formed”, “no relief or 
rehabilitation”, “arrests and detention”, and “no show of remorse”) were taken forward 
unchanged according to the number of people who mentioned them in their responses.  
Responses which were outliers (for example, “Biased Security” and “failure of the 
army”) were transformed into categories as they were given. Table 2 provides a summary 






An example of how categories and their frequencies were identified for Question 1 
 
Codes Category Frequency 






Fake trial (2) 
Trial for the 
sake of trial (1) 

















No deterrent (8) 
 
Failure of the 
army 
 
Biased Security  
No deterrent 
 























Summary of Categories from Responses to Research Question 1 
Research Question Category Frequency 
Q1. What is the nature of the 
strategies for transitional 
justice implemented after the 
2006 peace accord? 
Curfew imposed 
Arrests and detention 
False trials 
No honor done to victims 
No true killers identified 
Committee of Eminent Chiefs formed 
Commission of Enquiry established 
Rehabilitation farms established 
NGO Consortium formed 
Reconciliation of families 
No relief or rehabilitation 
Community farms established 
Inappropriate truth telling  
Release of accused persons on remand 
No deterrent 
Regent enskinned 
Perpetrators not punished 
No show of remorse 























From the responses, all the participants agreed that a curfew was imposed on 
Yendi. This was necessary to help calm down tension. All the participants also agreed 
that some people were arrested and detained by the law enforcement agencies. However, 
the outcomes of these arrests and detentions were mixed from the perspective of the 
participants. Six of the participants were not happy with the trial and investigation 
processes. Another six (6) of the participants claimed that the trial process was faulty to 
the extent that some of the accused persons were illegally released from custody (6 
participants) others felt that the security agencies even failed in their duty (2). Eight (8) 
felt that the true killers of the Ya-Naa were not identified and punished and hence no 
deterrent can be said to have been served. All thirteen (13) participants also identified the 
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fact that a Committee of Eminent Chiefs and the Justice Wuaku Commission which were 
set up. A review of documents helped to shed more light on both institutions. The Wuaku 
Commission was set up on 25th April 2002 by President John Kufuor through a 
constitutional instrument C.136 of 2002. The Commission was to investigate the Yendi 
disturbances, identify perpetrators and make recommendations to the President. The 
Committee of Eminent Chiefs (CEC) took over from the Wuaku Commission and was 
charged to find a traditional solution to the conflict. The Justice Wuaku Commission was 
therefore a truth-seeking instrument whilst the Committee of Eminent Chiefs was a 
mechanism for mediation and conflict resolution. 
From the responses to question one, one sees a mix of both retributive and 
restorative strategies which included criminal prosecution, truth seeking, mediation, 
reparation initiatives, and institutional strengthening. The tools and processes were 
mostly formal in nature. Apart from the Committee of Eminent Chiefs which was 
mandated to find traditional solutions to the conflict, the rest of the processes used by law 
enforcement agencies, the truth-seeking process of the Wuaku Commission were based 
on formal rules. These initiatives produced mixed outcomes. Eight (8) felt that no true 
killers were identified and hence justice was not served to the victims. Six (6) participants 
felt that the perpetrators failed to show remorse and hence there can be no forgiveness.  
The challenges associated with these initiatives are discussed in question 2. 
 
 
Question 2:  What were the challenges associated with these strategies? 
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The purpose of this question was to further understand the challenges that were 
associated with the strategies. In the previous question, participants gave indications that 
there were issues with the various initiatives. In this question, they were given the 
opportunity to explain further, what these challenges were which made the achievement 
of the anticipated results difficult.  
The process of identifying categories was the same as was done for question 1. 
Where some of the codes were similar, a category which represented the rest was chosen 
and a combined frequency for all similar codes assigned to the emerging category as 
demonstrated in table 4.  
Table 4.  
Identification of categories from codes to question 2  
Codes Category Frequency 
Ineffective investigation (3) 
Failure to accept evidence (3) 
Poor investigation (1) 
 
 
Interference from elite (8) 
Influence on the committee 
Government pressure (5) 
 
Inadequate role of civil society 
(13) 
 
No interest from government 
(6) 







Influence on the committee 
 
 




















Some of the codes generated from the responses included: “ineffective investigation”, 
“failure to accept evidence in court”, “poor handling of some delegates”, “weak role 
assigned to civil society”, “hasty trials”, “weakened institution of chieftaincy”, 
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“interference from elite”. Other codes included “inadequate knowledge of Dagbon 
traditions”, “abandonment of traditional conflict resolution and peacebuilding 
approaches”, “inappropriate process leadership” and “conflict between traditional 
institutions and formal structures”. In all, thirty-one (31) codes were identified for this 
question. These were re-grouped into twelve (12) categories as presented in table 5. 
Table 5 
Summary of Categories from Responses to Research Question 2 
Research Question Category Frequency 
Q2. What are the challenges 
associated with these 
strategies? 
 
Poor investigation  
Lack of political will                                              
Influence on the work of the committee          
Inappropriate selection of delegates for 
committees               
Poor handling of some delegates                       
Inadequate role of civil society                        
Weak traditional institutions                             
Dependence on elite                                          
Poor consultation and inclusion                       
Role conflict: formal and informal institutions  
Inadequate knowledge of Dagbon culture         















 From the responses, the challenges related mostly to the processes of conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding, the credibility of the institutions as well as the leadership 
and ownership of the entire process. Participants from both sides (13) complained of 
influence on the work of both the Wuaku Commission and that of the Committee of 
Eminent Chiefs (CEC).  Some of the participants (7) complained about the exclusion of 
some prominent chiefs in the peace process and the inability of the remaining chiefs to 
make meaningful contribution to the process. Related to this was the feeling of others that 
the poor treatment/handling of some of the delegates (the older ones) made their 
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continued active participation impossible. This meant that those delegates could not 
effectively contribute to the process. In like manner, seven (7) of the participants felt that 
there wasn’t enough consultation and inclusion. All (13) participants particularly felt that 
civil society groups were not given the right roles to play in the peace process. Therefore, 
this affected the credibility and independence that was required to make the process 
successful. Finally, the fact that the process was not led by the Dagbon traditional council 
affected the fortunes of the process. Some participants (9) mentioned that the CEC lacked 
adequate knowledge of Dagbon culture and traditions and this, in addition to the 
inappropriate truth-seeking approaches employed by the Wuaku Commission, made the 
effective and fast resolution of the conflict difficult. Ten (10) participants cited role 
conflict between formal and informal rules as the main challenge which affected the 
outcome of the peace process. The participants explained that some of the practices 
adopted by both the Wuaku Commission and the CEC (for example truth telling, decision 
making in times of disagreements, and indeed the entire conflict resolution procedures) 
conflicted with what they know, believe in and practice in Dagbon. A few (3) of the 
participants thought that the fact that most skins are occupied by regents makes them lack 








 The purpose of this question was to explore the conditions under which the 
strategies for transitional justice might be more effective in achieving the required 
outcomes.  Codes for this question included: “reduce influence of government”, “no 
sitting in camera”, “employ traditional methods of truth seeking”, “courage to implement 
court rulings”, “re-visit traditional approaches of conflict resolution”, “greater 
involvement of community members”, “ignore chieftaincy contractors”, “avoid delays in 
performing funerals of chiefs”, “ensure inclusive peacebuilding”, “respect custodians of 
Dagbon culture”, “enforce peace”, “increase civil society involvement”, “return 
leadership to Dagbon”, “meet community needs”, “strengthen Dagbon traditional Council 
first” and “recognize and integrate all efforts” 
As was done for previous responses/codes, the similar ones were put together and 
a common category that most appropriately defines the like codes identified. A summary 












Summary of how categories were identified for similar codes to question 3 
Codes Category 
Reduce government influence 
(10) 
Reduce influence of 
chieftaincy contractors (3) 
 
Use traditional methods of 
truth-seeking (9) 
Re-visit traditional methods of 
resolving conflicts in within 
the DTC (12) 
Respect Dagbon traditions and 
customs 
 
Give greater representation to 
community leaders (7) 
Ensure inclusive peacebuilding 
(3) 
 
Return process leadership to 
DTC (7) 





































Summary of Categories and their Frequencies for Question 3 
Research Question Category Frequency 
What might help to make the 
strategies more responsive to 
peacebuilding? 
Reduce role of government and chieftaincy 
contractors 
No sitting in camera (11) 
Employ traditional approaches (21) 
Ensure inclusion of all stakeholders (13) 
Restore leadership role of DTC (13) 
Strengthen and support DTC 
Avoid delays in performing funerals of chiefs 
Meet community needs 
Greater facilitating role for civil society 
Commitment to enforcing court decisions. 















From the responses, one important condition under which transitional justice 
initiatives might have a greater chance of achieving peace in Dagbon is where there is 
reduced influence of government and other stakeholders such as the elite. All the 
participants were very clear that the role of successive governments in this chieftaincy 
succession dispute has not helped in resolving the dispute. Another important condition 
that run through the responses is the need for the initiatives and processes for resolving 
the conflict and building peace to be grounded in Dagbon culture and traditions. This was 
given twenty-one (21) times by the participants. Related to this, all thirteen (13) 
participants felt that the entire process ought to be led by the Dagbon Traditional Council. 
For this to work, twelve (12) participants suggested that the DTC must be strengthened 
and civil society given a much stronger role as process facilitators. Part of the reason why 
the initiatives were less successful was due to delays in performing the funerals of late 
chiefs. An important condition identified by three (3) participants for the success of 
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transitional justice was that funerals must be performed promptly to allow the souls of the 
departed to rest in peace so that the living will have the needed peace to work out how 
disputes can be settled. The importance of getting everyone involved in the peace process 
was mentioned by thirteen (13) participants. A final condition that was identified (7 
participants) as a potential for the success of the transitional justice initiatives was the 
need for proper recognition to be given to the complementary initiatives that were 
implemented by other stakeholders, especially civil society. These they explained should 
be coordinated and integrated into the entire peace process. 
Data Analysis from Focus Group Discussions 
The purpose of having focus group discussions was to provide an opportunity to 
triangulate information on three questions collected through individual interviews. Also, 
the focus group discussions enabled participants to collectively recall events, their 
challenges and share opinions on the interventions that were implemented over the period 
and arrive at conclusions (as much as possible) on these three questions. Three questions 
were asked during the focus group discussions (FGDs): 
1. Looking back, can you mention the strategies of transitional justice that were 
implemented in Dagbon after the peace accord was signed in March 2006?  
2. In your opinion, were these successful in resolving the conflict and restoring 
peace? Please explain your answer. 
3. If these were not successful, what might help to make the strategies more 
responsive to conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives? 
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In the following sub-sections, the data are presented and analyzed according to these 
three questions. 
1. Question 1. Looking back, can you mention the strategies of transitional 
justice that were implemented in Dagbon after the peace accord was signed 
in March 2006?  
The purpose of this question was to explore from participants what they knew about 
the initiatives that were implemented to resolve the conflict and restore lasting peace in 
Dagbon. The codes generated from the responses to this question  included: “dusk to 
dawn curfew imposed”, “arrests”, “peacekeeping force established”, “reconciliation of 
families’ initiative”, “assessment of relief needs”, “state of emergency”, “provision of 
emergency food and clothing)”, “Gbewa Palace rehabilitated”,  “murdered Ya-Naa 
buried”, “two regents enskinned”,  “commission of enquiry instituted”, “Committee of 
Eminent Chiefs formed”, “trial of some perpetrators”, “no punishment”, “and no 
remorse”. During discussions, as participants shared their views to the questions, the 
other participants showed their agreements by saying yes to them. Once there was a “yes” 
to a point made, it was recorded. In some cases, some views were shared but because 
they were outside the scope of the research, they were dropped. For example, some 
participants referred to “houses rehabilitated by some NGOs”. These were however found 
to be related to a different conflict within the DTA.  As a result of this process of 
harmonization and agreement, there was consensus on the responses and categories. All 
resulting categories that emerged from the discussions of both men and women are 
presented in table 8. If anyone group member disagreed with any point mentioned, the 
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frequency was reduced by one and if there was consensus, the maximum response of 4 
was entered.  
 
Table 8 
Summary of categories and Frequencies for FGDs on Question 1: Men and Women 
Men Women 
Categories Frequency Categories Frequency 
Curfew imposed 
Arrests 
Peacekeeping force established 
State of emergency declared 
Provision of emergency relief 
Wuaku Commission formed  
Otumfuo Committee Formed 
Trial of some perpetrators 
No punishment 
Gbewa palace rehabilitated 















Some Arrests made 
Peacekeeping force 
established 
Reconciliation of families’ 
initiative 
Provision of emergency relief 
Commission of enquiry  
Committee of Eminent 
Chiefs  

















The responses for both groups were a combination of initiatives that were aimed 
at restoring calm, keeping peace and ensuring that some form of reparations are given to 
victims. The group of men identified two categories that the women did not mention. 
These were the burial of the murdered King and the enskinment of regents to the 
contested Yendi paramountcy. The women on the other hand identified a community 
initiative that was implemented to reconcile families of both gates which the men did not 
talk about. Both groups mentioned the Wuaku Commission of Enquiry and the CEC 
which were respectively set up to seek truth and mediate peace. Again, both groups were 
emphatic that no punishments were meted out to perpetrators of human rights abuses. The 
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women concluded that no deterrent was therefore served. Like the individual interviews, 
a set of initiatives around criminal prosecution, peacekeeping, truth-seeking, mediation 
and reparations were identified by both groups. 
Question 2: In your opinion, were these successful in resolving the conflict and 
restoring peace? Please explain your answer 
 The purpose of this question was to let participants give a more detailed 
explanation about the outcomes of the initiatives earlier mentioned. Like was done for 
question 1 before, the categories were reasonably smaller in number. Therefore, there 
was no need transforming them again. The number of people who agreed as the points 
were mentioned was noted as frequencies for that category. As to whether the initiatives 
were successful in yielding peace in Dagbon, all the participants were unanimous in their 
response: “no” (all participants). The reasons for the lack of success were: “lack of 
commitment”, “government influence”, “none involvement of key opinion leaders”, 
“poor consultation with community”, “greed on the part of some chiefs”, “hi-jack of 
peace process by “foreigners”, “lack of respect for custom and tradition”, “committees 
did not respect Dagbon traditions”, “inadequate attention to justice”, “disregard for 
community views” and “ineffective Dagbon Traditional Council due to too many 











Summary of categories and Frequencies for FGDs on Question 2: Men and Women 
Men Women 
Categories Frequency Categories Frequency 
Lack of commitment  
Government and politics  
Poor consultation with 
community 
Greed on the part of some 
chiefs 
Hi-jack of peace process by 
“foreigners” 
Lack of respect for custom and 
tradition 












Disregard for community 
views 
Undue influence on 
committees 
Weak DTC 
Poor knowledge of Dagbon 
culture and traditions 
Inadequate attention to 
justice 











 From the responses, the men focused on process issues which made the 
attainment of peace challenging. They explained that influence of government and 
politicians on the institutions, poor consultation with communities, lack of commitment 
of various stakeholders and putting “foreigners” in charge of the peace process affected 
the outcomes of the transitional justice initiatives. Whereas both men and women agree 
that the institutions put in charge of the peace process lacked adequate knowledge of 
Dagbon customs and traditions, they (the women) were of the view that the institutions 
did not give adequate attention to the delivery of justice. Like the men, they also agreed 
that undue influence on the work of the institutions made the resolution of the conflict 
challenging. There was less consensus on the issues among men than in women. The 
disagreement among men was around leadership of the peace process, integrity of chiefs 
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and respect of Dagbon customs and traditions. Some of the women disagreed that not 
enough attention was given to justice. 
Question 3: If these were not successful, what might help to make the strategies 
more responsive to conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives? 
 This question sought to ascertain the views of participants about the conditions 
that might help to make the initiatives more responsive to resolve the conflict and restore 
peace in Dagbon. As with other questions on FGDs, there few responses from both 
groups and these were tallied according to the number of people who agreed with them. 
All the conditions/categories were listed as shown in table 10.  
Table 10 
Summary of categories and Frequencies for FGDs on Question 3: Men and Women 
Men Women 
Categories Frequency Categories Frequency 
Return case to DTC 
Build on civil society initiatives 
Use traditional ways of 
resolving disputes 
Enforce Court rulings 
Stronger role for civil society 











Make room for confessions and 
forgiveness 
Build on civil society initiatives 
Be committed to the administration 
of justice 
Stronger role for civil society 
DTC to lead the process 
Focus on measures that truly 
compensate victims 
Ensure the true independence of the 













All the eight men and women agreed that the initiatives were no successful. On 
the conditions which will make them more successful, there was a sharp difference in 
opinion between men and women except in a few areas: if the DTC is restored as the 
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process lead, a stronger role of civil society, and when there is genuine commitment to 
ensuring that justice is served. The women wanted more. All of them agreed that an 
important condition for success is where there is room for people to confess and seek 
forgiveness. All four female participants also felt that if the institutions involved in the 
peace process are free from all forms of interference, then the chances of the initiatives 
succeeding will be higher. There was more consensus among women than among men. 
The men agreed on only the role of civil society but not on all other points mentioned.   
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
In line with the guidance of Silverman (2005) about ensuring that information 
recorded is credible and reliable, I took notes as participants were sharing their 
experiences. Further, I kept daily journals which included the learning and key 
observations made during the day. These were all aimed at not losing any information. 
Also, to ensure that people were free to share information, no names were required during 
the interviews and all information was blind coded. Consistency of coding and 
interpretation were guaranteed by the fact that I was the only one who developed and 
used codes and coding frames.  
 To deal with threats to data quality arising from interpretation and transcription of 
data, I ensured that a well-trained interpreter was used. As part of his training, the need to 
say exactly what the participant said was emphasized. The training also ensured that the 
interpreter understood what was expected of him as well as how his actions and inactions 
can affect the quality of the research.  
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In line with constructivist tradition, I relied on information drawn from multiple 
sources. In addition to information collected through individual interviews, I also 
conducted focus group discussions, based on a separate set of participants, in which some 
questions were repeated. In addition, I reviewed documentary sources to get more 
detailed information and check on facts pertaining to some claims that participants made 
during interviews. For example, reference was made to court rulings, mandate of the 
Commission of Enquiry, composition and mandate of the CEC and to specific 
legislations as well as claims of government interference. All these were checked against 
what participants said before conclusions were made.  
During the data collection process too, I consciously looked for participants who 
were willing to serve as member-checkers. All those who agreed were given the scripts 
for their interviews to confirm that indeed, what was written was a true reflection of what 
they said and meant to say. Once the first draft was ready, I used a colleague to read 
through the results and confirm that what was written reflected what was in the data set.    
 
Results 
This study sought to provide a deeper understanding of the processes and 
mechanisms for transitional justice implemented in the Dagbon Traditional Area after 
war broke out between the Andanis and the Abudus in 2002. The study employed the 
definition of transitional justice given by the International Centre for Transitional Justice 
(2009) to include “criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparation programs, and 
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various kinds of institutional reforms” (p.2). The results were analyzed along these main 
themes. 
The study also examined the nature, effectiveness and appropriateness of the tools 
for transitional justice and explored the conditions under which they might respond most 
appropriately to resolve conflicts maintain peace in Dagbon. In this section, I discuss the 
categories of data that emerged from individual interviews and focus group discussions 
under the lens of the concepts of transitional justice (as themes) and under each research 
question. Finally, I present the results against the conditions that Edward Azar (1978) 
identified as the sources of protracted social conflicts (PSC). This was done with the view 
to understanding the appropriateness of the strategies for resolving the Dagbon conflict. 
Question 1. What is the nature of the strategies for transitional justice implemented 
after the 2006 peace accord? 
This question aimed to understand the nature of retributive and restorative 
strategies that were implemented in Dagbon after the peace accord was signed. After 
analyzing data from individual interviews and focus group discussions and triangulating 
this with information from archival studies, the categories that emerged are discussed 
under the various themes of transitional justice.  
Criminal Prosecution  
The works of scholars like Okimoto, Wenzel and Feather (2012) and Christie 
(1977) have helped us to understand the contribution of criminal prosecution or 
retributive justice, to the outcomes of transitional justice endeavors. To some people, 
unless an equal measure of punishment is given to offenders, justice cannot be deemed to 
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be served (see also Forsythe, 2011; Sirleaf, 2014). The analysis of data revealed that the 
measures under this theme were aimed at calming down tensions to prevent further 
human rights abuses, and to investigate, identify, prosecute and punish perpetrators of 
such abuses. Accordingly, the categories that emerged from both individual interviews 
and focus group discussions included: “curfew imposed” (21 participants), “state of 
emergency imposed” (8 participants), “peacekeeping force established” (8 participants), 
“trial/prosecution” (14) and “no punishment” (21participants). There was agreement 
among the participants about these measures and their outcomes—the measures to calm 
down tension worked relatively well but the supporting measures were less successful— 
“no punishment”, “no justice served”, “no deterrent”. They queried the process in which 
these measures were initiated and implemented. The participants explained that a dusk-
to-dawn curfew was imposed over Yendi immediately after the conflict broke out and 
claimed the lives of the overlord of Dagbon and his elders. According to the final report 
of the Wuaku Commission of Enquiry recommended for 15 people to be arrested and 
prosecuted for various crimes. Some of the participants (6) claimed that when the accused 
persons were arrested and detained, one of them was allowed, without the permission of 
the courts, to go home and write his exams. Other participants claimed that the 
investigation was poorly done (7 participants), the trial was false (6 participants) and 
because of these process weaknesses, no true killers were identified (8 participants), “no 
punishment (21) and therefore no deterrent (8 participants) and that justice can be 




Although there were arrests, detentions and trials, the process was faulty. The 
investigation was delayed, rushed when it got started and not well done. During 
the hearings of the Justice Wuaku Commission for example, some of the 
delegates made inflammatory statements and bragged about the atrocities they 
committed and threatened to do the same if they had the opportunity again. Those 
people were never arrested nor sanctioned in anyway. Instead they were left to go 
free. Cleary, there was no political will to carry out justice. 
A community participant had this to say about how evidence was handled by the same 
Justice Wuaku Commission: 
People had photographs and video recordings which they were ready to share with 
the commission. Others who were involved in the fighting and got injured as a 
result, were also ready to share their experience in court but all these people were 
not allowed to do so for no reason. This made fact finding difficult. 
To them therefore, the commitment to fair trial was absent. A review of documents and 
records of the civil society groups involved in managing the conflict confirms most of the 
claims. The arrest and detention of perpetrators took place several months after the 
conflict broke out and claimed the lives of the King of Dagbon and thirty (30) of his 
elders. Under such circumstances, both the evidence and witnesses would have either 
been blurred or destroyed. A claim was further made that the commission set up to 
investigate the causes “failed to accept evidence” (6 participants). This was one of the 
reasons why one of the gates (Andanis) declared their lack of confidence in the 
commission. Eventually too, all the 15-accused people who were arrested were 
discharged and acquitted on the grounds of lack of evidence. Clearly then, the 
expectations of people were not met. As Christie (1977) has advised, ignoring the 




Truth Seeking Initiatives 
It is widely believed that the first casualty of any conflict is the truth. Actively 
seeking the truth is therefore central to any peacebuilding endeavor. According to 
Schreiter (2006), peacebuilding essentially involves two related activities: “undoing the 
mistruths about the past and laying the foundation for a renewed society” (p.49).  An 
analysis of the data showed that two initiatives were established to seek the truth and to 
recommend actions for the resolution of the conflict. Participants identified “the 
establishment of the Wuaku Commission of Enquiry” (21 participants) and “setting up a 
Committee of Eminent Chiefs” (8 participants) to work out permanent peace in Dagbon. 
The Wuaku Commission of Enquiry was the first to be established on 25th April 2002 and 
its mandate was to investigate, identify the perpetrators and make recommendations for 
the consideration of government (Republic of Ghana, 2003).  According to the 
government white paper on the work of the commission, the commission relied on public 
testimonies, visited burial grounds, and held daily briefings in camera. They also visited 
Yendi, the capital of Dagbon where the King and his elders were murdered. The 
commission began sitting on 29th May, 2002 and presented its report to government on 
6th November 2002.  
Following the completion of the work of the Wuaku Commission, government 
appointed a Committee of Eminent Chiefs to find traditional ways of resolving the 





The role of reparations in any conflict resolution process cannot be over 
emphasized. Initiatives under this category aim to address the suffering of those who 
were deemed to have suffered from the conflict in one way or the other. This suffering 
can be in terms of human rights abuses and loss of property. Reparations are then used to 
support such victims in ways such as rehabilitation, public confession, apologies, 
forgiveness and memorials. Participants were asked to describe any initiatives that were 
implemented which were aimed at mitigating the impact of the conflict on those who 
were affected. To some extent, through the Justice Wuaku Commission of Enquiry, there 
was an opportunity for public confessions and hence forgiveness. However, according to 
some of the participants, “hearing was in camera” (9). In addition, other participants (6) 
claimed that there were some witnesses who were ready to give evidence and to confess 
but they were not allowed.  Further analysis of data from interviews and review of 
documents identified “no dignified burial of victims” (9 participants). Participants 
explained that except the Ya-Naa who was buried in the palace after a prolonged period 
of negotiation, the rest of the victims who were mostly the elders of the king, were buried 
in a mass grave in Sambu, a village near Yendi.  This to such participants was not 
dignifying enough. Five (5) participants said that after the conflict, a Consortium of 
NGOs was formed and through this consortium, people were assisted to rehabilitate their 
houses. All twenty-one (21) participants mentioned the “reconstruction of Chief’s 
palace”. This was a pre-requisite for the performance of the funeral of the Ya-Naa. Aside 
the destruction of properties and loss of lives, families broke down. Five (5) participants 
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also explained the “family reconciliation initiative” implemented after the war. Wives of 
the Andanis who were Abudus and vice versa left their matrimonial homes. Led by the 
NGO Consortium, the youth from both gates were mobilized to talk peace and through 
this initiative, over 60 families were reconciled through a community-community 
initiative. Other participants (3) explained that of the seventy-four (74) people who died 
in the conflict, only 3 were elders of the Ya-Naa. The rest were “foreigners”. Under such 
circumstances, there was no need for any form of reparations for such people. Because of 
this claim too, members of the Abudu gate did not accept for them to be buried in Yendi, 
the traditional capital. One (1) participant mentioned the establishment of community 
farms to support victims with food.   
Memories and Memorials 
Memories and memorials help to preserve the memories of people and include 
anything done to honor or respect victims, commemoration activities, monuments and 
statues. Participants were asked whether anything within this category was done. Nine 
(19) participants said, “No honor done” victims in any form. Two (2) participants said the 
family of the murdered king remember the Wednesday he was killed. They claim that the 
best way to have remembered the murdered king would have been to perform his funeral 
and enskin a new Ya-Naa. This has not been done yet. 
Institutional Strengthening 
 The work of Menkel-Meadow (2004) on conflicts has brought to the fore, the 
importance of strong institutions in preventing large scale conflicts and violations of 
human rights. Two institutions, the security forces and the chieftaincy institution, were 
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the key institutions that could have prevented the conflict or managed it better. A review 
of documents and interview data showed significant institutional weaknesses and 
contradictions which made prevention difficult. Acting on intelligence, the Minister for 
the Interior imposed a curfew on Yendi and a ban on the celebration of the fire festival on 
23rd March 2002 upon receiving intelligence. However, both were revoked by the 
Regional Minister on 24th March based on alleged “assurances from the Ya-Naa” (13 
participants). As observed by almost all the participants (20) and confirmed by the Justice 
Wuaku Commission report, another indication of institutional weakness was 
demonstrated by the fact that exchange of gunfire was started in the morning of 25th 
March and continued for three days without any intervention from the security forces. In 
the event, thirty-six (36) houses including the Gbewa Palace (the palace of the King of 
Dagbon) were burnt. It was during this three-day period of intense fighting that the King 
of Dagbon and 30 of his elders were murdered (21 participants). The Wuaku Commission 
recommended some measures to strengthen these institutions including: reprimanding all 
members of the security forces (armed forces and police serve) in command positions in 
Yendi during that period, upgrading the armed forces stationed in Yendi into a garrison, 
and resourcing the Yendi Police Station with men and logistics (Republic of Ghana, 
2003). For the chieftaincy institution, the commission further recommended that no 
parallel office holders, apart from those enskinned by the Ya-Naa, must be allowed to 
exist and that serious steps should be undertaken to revive the Dagomba Traditional 
Council (DTC). Interestingly, the observations and recommendations of the Wuaku 
Commission aligned with what some of the participants observed about the nature of the 
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DTC: “too many regents made the DTC ineffective” (4 participants), “weak traditional 
institutions” (3 participants) while others maintained that government “deliberately 
fueled the conflict and prevented the army from intervening” (11 participants). 
Summary of Findings for Q1. 
 A mix of transitional justice measures were implemented in Dagbon after the 
conflict broke out in 2002.  Key transitional justice initiatives implemented included 
peace-keeping/enforcement, criminal prosecution, truth seeking through the Wuaku 
Commission, reparations, mediation by the Committee of Eminent Chiefs and limited 
institutional reforms. These mechanisms and their associated processes were all based on 
formal rules. Civil society focused on providing relief and on supporting families to 
rehabilitate their houses and families. However, these initiatives were not coordinated 
and recognized as part of the same peace process.  In the next sub-section, I present data 
on the challenges of these measures and why they were not effective in resolving the 
conflict and restore peace in Dagbon. 
Question 2:  What are the challenges associated with these strategies? 
The purpose of this question was to give participants the opportunity to further 
explain their responses to question one and to have a deeper understanding why the 
strategies did not achieve the intended results. The question was asked during individual 
interviews and in focus group discussions. The responses are discussed according to the 




Influence on the work of both the Wuaku Commission and the Committee of 
Eminent Chiefs 
All twenty-one (21) participants agreed that there was undue influence from 
government and prominent elite on the work of the commission and committee which 
limited the success that the two institutions achieved. Thirteen (13) participants further 
explained that it was due to the influence of government that for the three days that the 
war was fought, no soldiers were released to enforce peace. In the same way, although it 
was government who set up the commission, it was not interested in finding the truth. 
This explains the attitude of the Commission in its willingness to accept evidence and 
confessions from people (7 participants). Some participants (3) argued that when the 
government of the National Democratic Congress came into power in 2004, the course of 
decisions within the Committee of Eminent chiefs changed. One clear influence was 
government’s influence on the Committee of Eminent Chiefs never to allow two parallel 
regents to exist in Dagbon. This claim was cross-checked and found to be linked to the 
recommendation of the Justice Wuaku Commission never to allow such a situation to 
ever arise. Another participant traced the influence of government and politics to the 
government of General Acheampong when the then Ya-Naa Mahamadu was destooled 
and in his place, Yakubu Abdulai was enskinned the Ya-Naa. It was this intervention that 
also led to the appointment of several other king makers, most of whom are Andanis (out 
of the total 230 kingmakers, only 7 are Abudus). Again, three (3) participants claimed 
that the Chair of the Committee of Eminent Chiefs, the Asantehene, had earlier given a 
data for the regent of the murdered Ya-Naa to vacate the palace to pave the way for the 
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funeral of Naa Mahamadu to be performed. However, due to political influence, the Chair 
of the Committee changed his mind and this never happened. 
Lack of Political Will 
Nineteen (19) participants explained that the conflict remains unresolved till today 
because of lack of political will. They explained that since the early 1960s, successive 
governments have always meddled in the Dagbon succession conflict. Some examples 
given by one of the participants was that the first President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, 
threatened to destool the then Ya-Naa and he had to cross carpet to join Nkrumah’s party 
(the Convention People’s Party) before the threats stopped. The government of General 
Acheampong also enskinned Naa Mahamadu but this was later over ruled by the 
Supreme Court. Again, the participants argued that the rulings of the Supreme Court are 
not enforced because of lack of political will. A review of documents found the claim of 
government influence in the Dagbon case to be quite credible. On 29th June 2009 for 
example, the Vice President of Ghana visited the Asantehene, the Chair of the Committee 
of Eminent Chiefs (CEC) to announce to him government intension to support the 
committee to resume the mediation effort which had been suspended because of national 
elections in 2008. Graphic Online (June 29, 2009) reported that before they went into 
closed door consultations, the Chair (of the CEC) called on politicians to stay out of the 
conflict and allow the chiefs to deal with it as it is a chieftaincy succession dispute. He 
(the Asantehene) lamented the perceived alliance of both gates to the two dominant 
parties in Ghana: the Andanis to the National Democratic Congress and the Abudus to the 
New Patriotic Party. Each time a new government came into power, the dynamics of the 
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conflict changed. In the same way, governments do not have the will to enforce any 
previous decisions or rulings made under the other government if it was not their party in 
power. 
Inappropriate Selection and Treatment of Delegates 
For the Committee of Eminent Chiefs to do its work, some chiefs from both gates 
were selected to as delegates. Some of the participants (9 participants) felt that some 
important chiefs of Dagbon: Karaga Naa and Sunson Naa were not part of the delegates. 
However, these are without doubt very influential chiefs whose opinions matter a lot in 
Dagbon. 
Related to the above was the feeling by some of the participants (9) that the way 
the Wuaku Commission and the Committee of Eminent Chiefs treated some of the 
elderly chiefs was unacceptable. They explained that some of the chiefs were quite old 
and could not withstand the long travels and sittings. This therefore made their active 
participation difficult. A strong exception was taken by thirteen (13) participants to the 
request for the Kuga-Naa should travel to Kumasi to attend committee sittings. This was 
thought to be both inappropriate and disrespectful to the custom and traditions of 
Dagbon.  
Weak Traditional Institution (Dagomba Traditional Council) 
 The Dagbon Traditional Council has lost some of its paramount chiefs who have 
not yet been enskinned (for example, the skins of Gukpegu, Tolon, Kworli, Guli, 
Kpahigu, Male and Mba Dugu are occupied by regents). Therefore, these vacant skins are 
occupied by regents who act as chiefs. Naturally, their influence and ability to deal 
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decisively with cases is limited. Some participants (7) mentioned this as one of the 
reasons for lack of effective decision making on the conflict. This trend of having regents 
led to “dependence on the elite” (mentioned by 5 participants) for solutions to the 
conflict.  
 
Role Conflicts in the Peace Process: Formal vs Informal Rules 
In Dagbon, chiefs (or the institution of chieftaincy) are held in very high esteem. 
This has long been recognized by previous researchers. Aikins (2009) for example noted 
that “commitment to informal rules in the northern region appears to be relatively high” 
(p.22). In a study on the causes and institutional remedies for recurring conflicts in the 
Northern Region of Ghana with the Dagbon conflict as case study, Aikins concluded that: 
Any resolution of the conflict would have to be spearheaded by self-enforcing 
mechanisms within the traditional system, rather than third party influences, 
despite the co-existence of the traditional system and the imposed Western-style 
democracy (Aikins, 2009 p.22). 
Data from this study confirmed this claim. In answer to the question “What are 
the challenges associated with the strategies for transitional justice initiatives”, some 
participants complained of “conflict of roles between formal and informal institutions” 
(10 participants). The participants explained that the Gbewa family has always had a 
procedure for resolving conflicts. Although the use of the Committee of Eminent Chiefs 
and the accompanying instruction to them to find traditional ways of resolving the 
conflict was all good, it failed to consider, the long-tested methods of resolving conflicts 
in Dagbon. The participants who complained about the peace process as being “hi-jacked 
by strangers” expected the Kuga-Naa, the one recognized as the custodian of Dagbon 
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culture, to have led the peace process.  From the onset, therefore, there was a conflict in 
the role of the CEC vs. the Dagbon Traditional Council. Other process issues also came 
up in the explanation of participants (13). Truth-seeking in Dagbon culture, whether 
during investigation or during the process of interrogating witnesses (which the Wuaku 
Commission had a responsibility to do), is ineffective if formal rules are used. For 
instance, asking people to swear by the Quran or Bible, to compel them to speak the 
truth, is alien in Dagbon. One participant, a traditional ruler, put it clearly that: 
When you give a Dagomba man a Quran to swear that what he is going to say is 
the truth and nothing but the truth, he will swear but after that, he will tell lies 
with his eyes open. However, if you were to ask him to swear by his late father or 
ancestors that if he lies, they should come for him, he will think twice before he 
opens his mouth to speak. 
 
One of the custodians of Dagbon culture (from Yendi) further explained that informal 
rules in Dagbon are dangerous to break because they have life-long consequences. When 
an individual breaks informal rules, he is shunned, deprived of certain privileges which 
might have effects beyond him as a person to include his entire family and descendants. 
Indeed, another chief asked: “even for you as an outsider, can you understand why some 
people who were accused of having played some roles in the conflict are suddenly losing 
their lives? Unless people come back to their senses, some families risk losing access to 
the Yendi skin”. This group of informal rules was what Aikins (2009) referred to as “self-
enforcing mechanisms within the traditional system” (p.22). Similar approaches are used 
in the selection of chiefs. Through the process of consulting with the oracles 
(soothsaying) a chief is found and enskinned. Never has Dagbon ever resorted to formal 
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rules to decide cases or appoint chiefs except in 1948 when the selection of the Ya-Naa 
was done by a selection committee.  
 Related to process hi-jack and role conflict, other participants (9 participants) 
complained of “Inadequate knowledge of Dagbon culture”. In addition to truth-seeking 
which was done based on formal rules, other things were done which were at variance 
with Dagbon traditions and culture. For example, the Committee of Eminent Chiefs 
required the Kuga-Naa to travel to Kumasi to attend mediation meetings. In Dagbon 
culture however, if the Ya-Naa is dead, until another is enskinned, the Kuga Naa cannot 
travel beyond a certain kilometer radius from Yendi, the traditional capital. Therefore, to 
require him to travel to Kumasi amounted to violating and disrespecting Dagbon culture 
and traditions (4 participants).  
Failure to Sustain Civil Society Initiatives 
 Immediately the war calmed down, civil society groups mobilized the Andani and 
Abudu youth to talk peace. This also included some opinion leaders who were voices of 
reason. Through this community initiative, over sixty (60) families were re-united. The 
consortium of civil society groups therefore had a strong contact with the community and 
those who were worse affected by the conflict. Unfortunately, this contact with the 
community was not maintained in the ensuing processes in terms of representation and 
taking their needs into consideration. Civil Society was weakly represented (13 
participants said so) and the need to continue the on-going community-to community 
reconciliation stopped. This alienated the communities from the chiefs and the few 
opinion leaders who were involved in the peace processes. The needs of communities 
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(such as personal security to go about their daily chores, having a secure general 
environment) were hence not taken care of. Nine (9) participants explained that this led to 
NGOs like GTZ and Action Aid to leave the area. 
 
Summary of Findings for Q2 
From the foregone, the conflict of formal and informal rules weighed heavily on 
the outcomes of the initiatives. As the people of Dagbon have a high trust and 
dependence on informal rules and in the chieftaincy institution, the weakened position of 
the Dagbon Traditional Council, seen through the number of regents who have occupied 
the skins for decades (in some cases), therefore created a leadership and decision making 
vacuum. In addition to these, the role assigned to civil society could have been better. 
Earlier in the process, this group had contributed significantly in providing relief and 
reconciliation at the community level. They were therefore seen as the mouth piece and 
representatives of the people. To have relegated their role to the background in the 
process therefore helped only to stall it and alienate the people from the entire process. 
Finally, the will of government to religiously and impartially support the process, 
including leading on the implementation of recommendations, was low. Unlike informal 
rules, formal institutions and their rules require a third-party enforcer—the state. 





Question 3. What might help to make the strategies more responsive to 
peacebuilding? 
Based on the responses participants gave to question 2, they were asked this 
question to help understand the conditions under which the mechanisms and tools for 
transitional justice might be more effective in resolving the conflict and restore peace. 
The same question was posed during individual interviews and in focus group 
discussions. The responses are discussed under the themes that emerged. 
Return the Case to the Custodians of Dagbon Customs 
 Naturally, one of the areas where most of the participants (17) agreed was for the 
case to be returned to the Kuga-Naa to lead the process of resolving the conflict and 
building peace. Others put it in a different way by asking for “traditional ways to be used 
to resolve the conflict” (8 participants). Yet another group of participants claimed that an 
important condition for success will be when the “Gbewa family is allowed to lead the 
process” (4 participants). The participants believe that the Kuga-Naa knows what to do 
but will require support from government and civil society in terms of managing and 
securing the process and enforcing the decisions of the DTC.  
 
Strengthen Local Conflict Response Capacity among Key Institutions 
Participants referred to two key institutions here: The Dagbon Traditional Council 
and the Security Agencies in Yendi. Participants (12) lamented about the current state of 
the DTC and asked for immediate support to be given to the Kuga-Naa to enskin and fill 
out the vacant positions. Perhaps a starting point might be to explore a traditional way of 
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strengthening the group of king makers of Dagbon since this is a point of controversy. 
Once this is sorted out, the rest of the skins can be filled with chiefs. A review of 
documents, especially the Wuaku Commission report, makes an important 
recommendation that the security agencies (the Police Service and the Army) should be 
strengthened.  Seven (7) participants referred to these recommendations as important in 
ensuring that there is lasting peace in Dagbon. An improved capacity of the security 
agencies, they explained, would also be an important source of support to the DTA when 
they are taking decisions. 
Reduce Role and Influence of Government and Chieftaincy Contractors 
Put in different ways, all the participants made a strong point about the need for 
government to step back and only support the process as required by the 1992 republican 
constitution of Ghana. Twenty-one (21) participants called for the “reduced role of 
government”, nine (9) participants argued for the role of government to be reduced to 
“supporting the Kuga-Naa to lead the process” and others requested government to 
“resource the process only” (5). Participants explained that it is only the Kuga-Naa who 
understands what is required to be done. However, he needs the support and commitment 
of government through improved security presence in the area and to the DTC during the 
process, helping to document the process and financing it where necessary. They believe 
that if these conditions are met, all that is required to resolve the conflict will be done and 





Strengthen the Role of Civil Society in the Process 
 Whilst majority of the participants recognize the DTC and the Kuga-Naa as those 
responsible for leading the process, all (23) the participants were convinced that if the 
role of civil society started during the early days of the conflict was recognized and 
sustained, the outcomes might have been different. The works of the West Africa 
Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), Business Advisory Centre (BADEC), Action Aid, 
Oxfam and Rural Media Network were specifically mentioned as having played 
important roles during the initial days of the conflict. This was however not sustained. 
They felt that if Civil Society had the lead facilitating role with all the resources it 
required, it would have helped to move the feuding gates together faster. Again, civil 
society is better positioned to manage the process to avoid the situation where the work 
of the CEC being suspended because of a change in government as happened after the 
2008 general elections. Such an improved role of civil society could also include the 
coordination of the various initiatives of transitional justice to ensure that they achieve 
the anticipated combined impacts. 
Ensure Better Alignment of the Initiatives and Mechanisms 
Civil society participants (5) were quite critical about how the initiatives and 
mechanisms were neither coordinated nor aligned. The explained that different 
institutions played separate roles, some of which contradicted each other. For example, 
the intelligence agencies warned of danger if the fire festival was performed. Based on 
this intelligence, the Ministry of Interior imposed a dusk to dawn curfew on Yendi as 
well as a ban on the celebration of the fire festival. In less than twenty-four (24) hours, 
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the Regional Minister lifted the ban on the festival and this was the beginning of 
confusion and fighting. Again, the initiatives of civil society groups were not seen as part 
of the entire effort of restoring peace. Therefore, this run parallel to government’s own 
initiatives. Related to this, the grassroots initiative of reconciling families and 
communities started by civil society groups was not linked to the other related processes. 
They explained that if government timed the interventions well, and ensured that all 
actions were integrated, the outcomes would have been different than what was recorded. 
Create Opportunities for Justice, Confessions, Forgiveness and Reconciliation 
 Nine (9) of the participants reported that there were people who took part in the 
fighting, got injured in the process but were lucky to have survived. These people were 
alleged to have been ready to make confessions and seek forgiveness. However, the 
Commission of Enquiry failed to grant this request. In addition to this was the fact that 
the same participants (6) claimed people had video recordings which they wanted to 
share with the Wuaku Commission of enquiry but which was denied. Again, one of the 
early disputes regarding the work of the Wuaku Commission related to the commission’s 
specific role and whether it should include investigating to determine the causes of the 
conflict. Civil Society participants (5) reported that from the onset, if the terms of 
reference of the Commission was clear enough and sufficient provisions made to allow 
for confessions, perhaps the outcomes would have been different. For example, what was 
the rationale behind the Commission sitting in camera? Related to this is the inability of 
the security agencies and indeed the commission to undertake proper investigations. The 
result of these combined lapses is that to date, the killers of the Ya-Naa and other 
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perpetrators have not been identified and those who suffered loss of relatives and 
property are justifiably unsatisfied. It is important for government to have designed the 
process with very clear milestones and anticipated outcomes. This was however left to 
the Commission to decide.  
 
Summary of Findings for Q 3. 
To ensure that transitional justice initiatives have a better chance of resolving the 
conflict and restoring peace in Dagbon, participants were strong and united that a reduced 
role and influence of government on the process will yield better outcomes. They argued 
that government should only provide the necessary resources (financial and institutional 
capacity) and allow the DTC to lead the process. They therefore advocated for the return 
of the process to Dagbon Traditional Council. This should go alongside the strengthening 
of institutions responsible for response and conflict management. Formal rules and 
institutions should only support, and not take over, from informal rules. Participants also 
made a case for a stronger role of Civil Society to include facilitation and process 
management. One condition that participants thought might help was for the complete set 
of initiatives and mechanisms to be aligned, timed and better coordinated.  
 
Summary of Chapter Four 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide a deeper understanding of the 
processes and mechanisms of transitional justice mechanisms implemented in Dagbon 
after the outbreak of hostilities in 2002. The study was based on data collected through 
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individual interviews, focus group discussions and document reviews. In all, twenty-one 
(21 participants) were interviewed. An analysis of data showed that transitional justice 
initiatives implemented included criminal prosecutions, truth-seeking, mediation, 
reparations and institutional reforms. These were however not coordinated and integrated. 
Several factors including influence on the work of truth-seeking commission and the 
committee of eminent chiefs, conflict of formal and informal rules, inappropriate 
selection and treatment of delegates as well as the weak nature of the DTC all negatively 
affected the outcomes of the initiatives. Participants argued that for the initiatives to have 
a greater chance of success in resolving the conflict and restoring peace to Dagbon, 
government and other stakeholder influences on peace building institutions must stop, the 
DTC allowed to lead and manage the peace process within the context of Dagomba 
traditions and customs with civil society playing a facilitating role among other 
conditions. 
In the following chapter, the summary of key findings is presented and 
interpreted. Then a further examination of the findings in relation to Edward Azar’s 









Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions and Recommendations 
Introduction 
Transitional justice strategies have always been employed in post conflict 
situations in Ghana but these have not been successful in fully resolving the conflicts and 
in restoring peace. This study examined the nature, effectiveness and appropriateness of 
the strategies for transitional justice which were implemented in Dagbon when war broke 
out in 2002. It explored the conditions under which transitional justice strategies might 
respond most appropriately to resolve the Dagbon chieftaincy succession conflict and 
restore peace. The study was designed to answer three questions around the nature of 
transitional justice strategies which were implemented, the challenges associated with 
their implementation and what could have been done differently to ensure that they 
succeeded. Data was collected through interviews with key informants using open ended 
questions, focus group discussions and through archival research. In the following sub-
section, the key findings are discussed under each research objective. 
Summary of Key Findings 
Research Question1: What is the nature of the strategies for transitional justice 
implemented after the 2006 peace accord? 
The key findings that respond to this question include: 
1. A mix of transitional justice measures were implemented including: peace-
keeping/enforcement, criminal prosecution, truth seeking through the Wuaku 
Commission, some reparations, mediation by the Committee of Eminent Chiefs 
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and limited institutional reforms. Civil society focused on providing relief and on 
supporting families to rehabilitate their houses and families.  
2. The criminal prosecution, truth-seeking and other mechanisms and their 
associated processes were based on formal rules. The only exception was the 
mediation process which was done through the CEC. The mandate of this 
institution was for them to use traditional approaches to find a solution to the 
dispute.  
3. These initiatives were not coordinated and recognized as part of the same peace 
process.   
Research Question 2. What are the challenges associated with these strategies? 
The challenges associated with the strategies included: 
1. Political influence on the institutions and peace processes. Participants explained 
that government and powerful individuals exerted undue influence on the 
institutions and rendered them ineffective.     
2. The key role of civil society in the peace process was not given appropriate 
recognition and hence they were not effectively coordinated and integrated into 
the entire peace process. 
3. Weak Dagomba Traditional Council. Participants complained that at least seven 
important skins are occupied by regents. As regents only occupy the throne 
temporarily, their decision-making powers are limited. The process required 
stronger decision-making powers which the regents do not have. 
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4. Failure to sustain civil society initiatives. Civil society led in providing relief 
items to victims of war. Through a coalition of NGOs too, a community level 
peacebuilding was initiated to reconcile families. Participants explained that about 
60 families were reconciled through this initiative. However, this was not 
sustained and integrated into the processes. 
5. Conflict of formal vs. informal rules. The strategies were led by formal 
institutions using rules that are alien to Dagbon. Formal rules subjugated informal 
rules and this affected the outcomes of the transitional justice strategies, 
particularly truth-seeking and mediation work done by the Committee of Eminent 
Chiefs. 
Research Question 3: What might help to make the strategies more responsive to 
peacebuilding? 
1. When the peace process is led by the custodians of the Dagbon culture and 
initiatives implemented within the context of Dagbon customs and traditions.  
Participants argued for the return of the case to the custodian of Dagbon culture as 
one important pre-condition for the initiatives to work. 
2. When the local response capacity of key institutions is strengthened, and support 
the DTC in the peace process. The institutions referred to here are the Dagbon 
Traditional Council and the security agencies in Yendi. Whereas the process lead 
is recognized to be the Kuga-Naa and DTC, they require the support of the 
security agencies throughout the process. 
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3. When the role and influence of government and other political office holders on 
the peace process is drastically reduced and the process allowed to operate 
independently. 
4. When the role of civil society is strengthened to facilitate the process as an 
independent peace broker. 




Interpretation of the Findings 
Sir Leaf’s (2014) cross-national comparative study involving Ghana, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone is perhaps one of the exhaustive studies about the conditions under which 
truth commissions contribute to achieving their stated goals. In this study, Sir Leaf (2014) 
contended that truth commissions have less utility in post-conflict situations than they 
might have in post authoritarian non-transitional situations, and that for them to be useful, 
the number of goals must be limited. The finding in this study does not support this 
conclusion. The Wuaku Commission functioned more like a truth commission and its 
mandate was to find the truth about the causes of the conflict and recommend measures 
for its resolution. The goals were quite limited and precisely because of this, the 
Commission was unable to utilize opportunities for public confessions, forgiveness and 
reconciliation. We know from literature that actively seeking the truth is central to any 
peacebuilding endeavor. According to Schreiter (2006), peacebuilding involves two 
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related activities: “undoing the mistruths about the past and laying the foundation for a 
renewed society” (p.49). What this study found, which appears to be relatively unknown 
in literature, is the impact of a well-coordinated transitional justice programme that limits 
the operation of parallel initiatives might have on peace outcomes. 
Scholars have assumed a linear relationship between retributive justice and peace 
outcomes. The works of scholars like Okimoto, Wenzel and Feather (2012), Christie 
(1977), Forsythe (2011) and Sir Leaf (2014) suggest that unless an equal measure of 
punishment is given to offenders, justice cannot be deemed to be served. However, the 
recent work of Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2016) suggests otherwise. In a three-country study of 
cases in Morocco, Iraq and Algeria, Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2016) found that retributive 
mechanisms appear to have negative effects on transitional justice outcomes, especially 
under conditions where real political transition has not taken place. The results of this 
study support the former position. Participants in this felt that unless the perpetrators of 
the human rights abuses are punished, there can be no forgiveness. 
The finding of this study about the conflict between formal and informal 
institutions corroborates that of an earlier work by Aikins (2009).  In the Dagbon 
Traditional Area, commitment to formal rules is high as noted by Aikins (2009).  In a 
study on the causes and institutional remedies for recurring conflicts in the Northern 
Region of Ghana with the Dagbon conflict as case study, Aikins concluded that the 
subjugation of informal rules by formal rules partly explains the persistence of the 
Dagbon chieftaincy conflict. 
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The position of literature on political influence on the outcomes of transitional 
justice mechanisms is clear from the works of Aikins (2009), Tonah (2012) and 
Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2016). In all these, political influence plays a de-stabilizing role and 
renders the work of the institutions suspicious and ineffective. Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2016) 
concluded that in Iraq, “because of political manipulation, transitional justice has 
fomented further tension rather than promoting peace” (p.398). Again, in this study, all 
the participants bemoaned the negative role successive governments and political office 
holders have played on the peace process. They felt that for the conflict to be resolved, 
there must be reduced role and influence of government. 
 Finally, the finding about the key role of civil society organizations in the peace 
process, and how in the Dagbon peace process this potential was not properly tapped and 
hence partially accounts for the limited impact of transitional justice strategies, 
particularly the mediation role played by the CEC), is supported by the findings of study. 
Ateng and Abazaami (2016), in a very recent mixed methods study on the role of civil 
society organizations in peacebuilding in the Northern Region of Ghana, found that “the 
neutrality and impartiality of CSOs have made conflicting parties to trust their work” 
(p.8). This was the potential that could have been tapped better in the Dagbon conflict. 
What was required was a strong impartial organization to facilitate the process and ensure 
that every initiative was properly coordinated and integrated into the entire process to 
avoid duplication and functional gaps. 
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The results under the lens of the theory of Protracted Social Conflict 
In this section, I present the results of the study to explain the extent to which the 
conditions which led to the outbreak of violence were addressed through the transitional 
justice processes. Edward Azar (1978) argued that conflicts that are violent and 
protracted, like the Dagbon conflict, are often a response to the need for groups to 
preserve their identities. Azar theorized that protracted violent conflicts are struggles for 
“basic needs such as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political 
institutions and economic participation” (p.93). In the following section, I present the 
categories that emerged from the data and document reviews under the three stages of 
Azar’s theory of protracted social conflicts (PSC)—genesis, process and outcome stages. 
This is done with the view to understanding the outcomes of the transitional justice 
initiatives in Dagbon. 
Genesis Stage 
Azar describes this stage as one where a set of conditions make the outbreak of 
violence possible. Conditions such as the formation of multi-communal identities 
possibly created through colonial rule and the subsequent domination of one identity 
group over the other, without a corresponding attempt of meeting the needs of the group 
so dominated, sets the stage for violent conflict. A review of literature showed that the 
British colonial government extended its policy of Indirect Rule to the Dagomba 
Kingdom in the 1930s (Odetei &Awedoba, 2006; Aikins, 2009). This was done through 
the Ya-Naa, the paramount chief of the Dagomba Traditional Area with Yendi as the 
capital. The Yendi paramountcy, with time, then became the source of state power and 
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influence and each of the two gates (the Andanis and the Abudus) vied for ascension to 
that throne. Although successive British governments attempted to manipulate succession 
rules (Aikins, 2009 p.8), the Dagomba elite have tried several times (in 1948, 1954, 1969 
and 2002) to circumvent and influence succession rules to the Yendi paramountcy. This 
marks the struggle for identity and domination that Azar referred to. In this study, the 
chieftaincy succession dispute that has raged over the years and recurred in 2002 is a 
struggle for identity between two gates: The Andanis and the Abudus. These have 
struggled over the years for ascension to the Yendi paramountcy.  
In terms of communal needs, participants in this study referred to lack of personal 
safety because the participants explained that the killers of the Ya-Naa had not been 
identified (8 participants), no punishments were meted out to perpetrators (21 
participants), and that some people keep making inflammatory statements (5 participants) 
without being punished and hence there is no guarantee that the violence will not break 
out again.  Therefore, the conditions that led to the outbreak of hostilities in 2002 are still 
very much present. Unfortunately, the state appears not to be a trusted partner in terms of 
its ability to prevent the outbreak of conflict. The recommendations of the Wuaku 
Commission for the strengthening of the Security Agencies in Yendi have not yet been 
implemented. The Dagbon Traditional Council itself still has a lot of regents who act as 
chiefs. As a result of this, the strength and capacity of the DTC at this stage is admittedly 




 Here, Azar refers to the presence of possible triggers for the onset of violence and 
the ability of institutions to respond to communal grievances. As demonstrated already, 
most participants (21) are not comfortable that the initial causes of the conflict have not 
been addressed. As it is now, it might take only a careless remark from someone to ignite 
the conflict. Both the Andanis and Abudus have had issues with the CEC at one time or 
the other. If tension heightens, the DTC as it is currently composed cannot effectively 
deal with it and prevent further escalation. This is because currently, there are two sitting 
regents in Dagbon representing two former Ya-Naa. There are other skins that are 
occupied by regents and this further weakens the position of the DTC to react in the event 
of any conflict. The situation in Dagbon therefore remains fluid and violence can erupt 
anytime with the slightest trigger. 
Outcome Analysis 
From the analysis of data, the conflict did not result in the enskinment of a Ya-
Naa. In the place of the murdered Ya-Naa, there are now two regents each representing 
their gates and the funeral of their fathers remain outstanding. There have been 
difficulties in enskinning chiefs to fill vacant paramountcy’s because the funeral of the 
Ya-Naa has not been performed. The DTC is therefore even weaker than it was before the 
conflict broke out in 2002. There continuous to be uneasy calm because of continuous 
inflammatory remarks and the situation gets even more blurred and confused with 
changes in governments. A better summary of the situation of the Dagbon conflict can be 
made by how Azar (1978) described the outcome stage of a protracted social conflict as 
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one which “reinforces and strengthens pessimism throughout the society, demoralizes 
leaders and immobilizes the search for peaceful solutions” (p.16).   
From the analysis, therefore, the impact of transitional justice initiatives on the 
background causes of the conflict which constitutes stage one of the PSC was minimal. 
The conditions for a possible trigger to an explosive recurrence of the conflict also 
remain unchanged despite the interventions. In terms of outcomes, there was no clear 
winner and the conflict persists, although currently dormant. 
Limitations of the Study 
One of the limitations envisaged in chapter 1 was that access to some information 
might be difficult due to the sensitive nature of the study. This was not the case, thanks to 
the influence of the community partner who made access to the community easy and 
provided most of the reference material that was needed.  
It would have been great to have the views of the security agencies but this was 
not possible. Those who were around during the conflict had been transferred and it was 
difficult to trace them. This was an important limitation as none of the security personnel 
present passed the inclusion criteria. 
To improve internal validity, I used triangulation and member-checking. 
However, member-checking was limited to only reviewing the interview scripts for those 
who agreed to serve as member-checkers. In chapter one, it was envisaged that one 
person would review the entire field data. However, for ethical reasons and on the 
recommendation of the Walden University IRB, this was changed and limited to only 
what was covered during the interview of the member-checkers.  
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Finally, the study was limited to only the Dagbon chieftaincy succession conflict. 
Field work was conducted only two months after a general election had been conducted. 
Therefore, the responses of most participants may have been influenced by the outcomes 
of the election.  
Recommendations 
Studying the impact of transitional justice strategies on conflict resolution and the 
maintenance of peace is so important for the country, given the nature and number of 
protracted social conflicts in the country. However, the focus of this study was on an 
intra-ethnic conflict. Literature on conflicts in Ghana indicates that majority of the 
conflicts are inter-ethnic in nature. Based on the findings of this research, the following 
recommendations are made: 
1. Government to review of the leadership and mandate of the CEC. The influential 
role that the CEC is playing cannot be over emphasized. However, the data shows 
that representatives of both gates and the people have greater trust and respect for 
their own customs and traditions which the CEC might not have adequate 
knowledge of. Therefore, it is recommended that government considers reviewing 
the leadership and mandate of the CEC by recognizing the Kuga-Naa as the 
process lead. The rest of the members of CEC can then support the Kuga-Naa and 
the DTC in resolving the succession dispute.  
2. Another recommendation for the consideration of government is the need to 
strengthen the security agencies in Yendi. This recommendation was already 
made by the Wuaku Commission. Government should implement this and 
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resource them such that they will be able to support the DTC and CEC to carry 
out the remaining processes. 
3. Finally, there is the need for an independent arbiter and process facilitator. As this 
research showed, there is concern about government and other stakeholder 
influence on the peace process, as well as an expectation of a greater role by civil 
society organizations. As part of the review of the mandate of the CEC, 
government should, in consultation with the DTC, identify, resource and 
empower a civil society organization as the process lead and facilitator. This will 
ensure some independence in the work of institutions responsible for mediation 
and peacebuilding. 
4. In terms of recommendations for future research, it would be good for a similar 
study to be conducted using an inter-ethnic conflict as case study. This study was 
based on an intra-ethnic conflict. It will be interesting to see the impact of 
transitional justice strategies might have in resolving an inter-ethnic conflict.  
Such a study will enable comparison of results with this one and hopefully 
improve our understanding of how best conflicts can be resolved.  
5. In addition, it will be important to replicate the same study in a different conflict 
environment to see how the results compare. It would be interesting to find out 
how formal rules interact with informal rules and what the outcomes of this might 
be on conflict resolution outcomes. This study also underscored the need for 
coordination and proper timing of initiatives, possibly facilitated by a strong civil 




Positive Social Change 
From the results, I concluded that for transitional justice strategies to respond 
most effectively to resolve the Dagbon chieftaincy succession conflict, the full set of 
initiatives implemented by both government and civil society must be well coordinated, 
well timed and integrated such that they are part and parcel of the entire process. Further, 
the Dagomba Traditional Council must take the lead in the conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding process which should be based on the customs and traditions of Dagbon. 
Government and other interest groups must distance themselves from the process. If civil 
society plays a more proactive role as process facilitators and coordinators organizations 
as process facilitators, the outcomes might be better. 
Potentially these may have implications at both the community level where the 
chiefs exist. As observed in this study, the first potential implication might be to ensure 
that the DTC is strengthened to be able to provide the required leadership. This could be 
through providing a conducive environment for the enskinment of chiefs where currently 
regents are acting. This should pave the way for the performance of the funeral of the Ya-
Naa and the eventual enskinment of a new one.  
At the regional and national level, the potential impact might be the generation of 
further research interests to fill the knowledge gap highlighted in this study. I also likely 
as this study confirms the findings of earlier works on the impact of formal rules on 
informal ones, it might have an impact on the mandates of future truth and reconciliation 
commissions and the role of government in peace processes. 
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Conceptual, Methodological Implications 
This study was conducted with the assumption that transitional justice strategies 
will be relevant in the context of the Dagbon chieftaincy succession conflict. The massive 
destruction and abuse of human rights were assumed to be enough for the implementation 
of transitional justice mechanisms and processes. The findings of this study showed that 
indeed transitional justice strategies were implemented to resolve the conflict and restore 
peace. Also, the conditions of the conflict had all the characteristics of a protracted 
conflict. Therefore, the use of transitional justice as the conceptual framework was 
appropriate. 
The qualitative case study approach using data drawn from multiple sources was 
also assumed to be suitable for this kind of study where the issues of transitional justice 
required to be explored. It was not possible to have stayed on the field for a long time and 
study all the ethnic conflicts in the Dagbon Traditional Area. Under such circumstances, 
a case study approach was the most feasible to do.  The results of the study confirm that 
this approach was indeed the right thing to do. The open-ended method of questioning 
allowed participants to express their opinions without any constraints.   
The recommendations made in this study are drawn from the analysis of data. 
Although this was a purposive sample and cannot be said to be representative of the 
entire Dagbon residents nor the conflicts in Dagbon, nevertheless, they constitute a useful 
starting point for further research. The recommendations also might be a useful basis for 






Ethnic conflicts in Ghana blur the country’s internationally acclaimed peaceful 
nature. These conflicts are protracted in nature and defy all conflict resolution strategies. 
This qualitative case study was conducted to examine the nature, effectiveness and 
appropriateness of the strategies for transitional justice implemented in Dagbon when war 
broke out in 2002. It explored the conditions under which transitional justice strategies 
might respond most appropriately to resolve the Dagbon chieftaincy succession conflict 
and restore peace. The study answered three research questions around the nature of 
transitional justice strategies, the challenges associated with the implementation of these 
strategies, and the conditions under which these strategies could have responded more 
effectively to the transitional justice mechanisms.   
Using key informant interviews, focus group discussions and review of archival 
information, it was revealed that a mixture of retributive and restorative strategies was 
implemented after the war broke out in 2002. These were implemented by different actors 
and not properly coordinated and integrated. Also, the process was led and managed by 
formal institutions which conflicted with informal rules in which most of the people 
involved in the conflict believe. The subsequent subjugation of informal rules had a 
negative impact on the peace process and its current outcomes. The role of civil society in 




Based on the results, the study made some recommendations on the conditions 
which might respond more favorably to transitional justice strategies. Some of these 
include the need to review the leadership and mandate of the CEC to recognize the DTC 
(led by the Kuga Naa) as the process lead, the need to strengthen the security agencies so 
that they can effectively support the DTC in the conflict resolution process, and the need 
for an independent process facilitator to manage the process and reduce the influence of 
government. In this way, the DTA can employ the traditional methods of resolving the 
conflict. The DTC will need support both financial and security throughout the process. 
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Appendix A: Letter of Cooperation from West Africa Network for Peacebuilding 
(WANEP): Research Partner. 01-19-17-0466118 
 
The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding 
National Head Office 
Tamale, Northern Region 
Date… 
Dear Joe Lambongang,  
Based on my review of your research proposal, I give permission for you to conduct the 
study entitled “The Impact of Transitional Justice on Conflict Resolution and the 
Maintenance of Peace. A Case Study of the Dagbon Conflict in the Northern Region” 
within the WANEP operational area in the Dagbon Traditional Council.  As part of this 
study, I authorize you to work with our staff to: 
• Identify potential participants for both individual interviews and focus group 
discussions. 
• Support in entering the research community by introducing you to the Chief of the 
King Makers of Dagbon who is the custodian of Dagbon culture. 
• Disseminate final research results in the research community. 
Individuals’ participation will be voluntary and at their own discretion.  
 
We understand that our organization’s responsibilities include:  
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• Allocating one member who will serve as your main contact and support to 
achieve the tasks listed above and 
• Make an office vehicle available (at a cost to the researcher) for the days required 
• We reserve the right to withdraw from the study at any time if our circumstances 
change.  
I confirm that I am authorized to approve research in this setting and that this plan 
complies with the organization’s policies. 
I understand that the data collected will remain entirely confidential and may not be 
provided to anyone outside of the student’s supervising faculty/staff without permission 
from the Walden University IRB.   
Sincerely, 
 
Director of Operations 
Head Office 
Walden University policy on electronic signatures: An electronic signature is just as valid 
as a written signature if both parties have agreed to conduct the transaction electronically. 
Electronic signatures are regulated by the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act. 
Electronic signatures are only valid when the signer is either (a) the sender of the email, 
or (b) copied on the email containing the signed document. Legally an "electronic 
signature" can be the person’s typed name, their email address, or any other identifying 
marker. Walden University staff verify any electronic signatures that do not originate 
from a password-protected source (i.e., an email address officially on file with Walden). 
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Appendix B: Data Use Agreement with West Africa Network for Peacebuilding 
(WANEP) and Joe Lambongang. 01-19-17-0466118 
 
This Data Use Agreement (“Agreement”), effective as of November 6th, 2016 (“Effective 
Date”), is entered into by and between Joe Lambongang (“Data Recipient”) and The 
West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) (“Data Provider”).  The purpose of 
this Agreement is to provide Data Recipient with access to a Limited Data Set (“LDS”) 
for use in scholarship/research in accord with laws and regulations of the governing 
bodies associated with the Data Provider, Data Recipient, and Data Recipient’s 
educational program. In the case of a discrepancy among laws, the agreement shall 
follow whichever law is stricter.   
1. Definitions.  Due to the project’s affiliation with Laureate, a USA-based company, 
unless otherwise specified in this Agreement, all capitalized terms used in this 
Agreement not otherwise defined have the meaning established for purposes of 
the USA “HIPAA Regulations” and/or “FERPA Regulations” codified in the 
United States Code of Federal Regulations, as amended from time to time. 
2. Preparation of the LDS.  Data Provider shall prepare and furnish to Data Recipient a 
LDS in accord with any applicable laws and regulations of the governing bodies 




3. Data Fields in the LDS.  No direct identifiers such as names may be included in 
the Limited Data Set (LDS). In preparing the LDS, Data Provider shall include 
the data fields specified as follows, which are the minimum necessary to 
accomplish the project:  
a) The Terms of Reference of the Justice Wuaku Commission 
b) The Terms of reference of the Committee of Eminent Chiefs 
c) Minutes of community facilitated meetings held between 2002 and 
October 2016 
d) Judgements of the Supreme Court on the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict that 
WANEP might have 
4. Responsibilities of Data Recipient.  Data Recipient agrees to: 
a) Use or disclose the LDS only as permitted by this Agreement or as 
required by law; 
b) Use appropriate safeguards to prevent use or disclosure of the LDS other 
than as permitted by this Agreement or required by law; 
c) Report to Data Provider any use or disclosure of the LDS of which it 
becomes aware that is not permitted by this Agreement or required by law; 
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d) Require any of its subcontractors or agents that receive or have access to 
the LDS to agree to the same restrictions and conditions on the use and/or 
disclosure of the LDS that apply to Data Recipient under this Agreement; 
and 
a. Not use the information in the LDS to identify or contact the individuals 
who are data subjects.  
5. Permitted Uses and Disclosures of the LDS.  Data Recipient may use and/or disclose 
the LDS for the present project’s activities only.   
6. Term and Termination. 
a. Term.  The term of this Agreement shall commence as of the Effective 
Date and shall continue for so long as Data Recipient retains the LDS, 
unless sooner terminated as set forth in this Agreement. 
b. Termination by Data Recipient.  Data Recipient may terminate this 
agreement at any time by notifying the Data Provider and returning or 
destroying the LDS.   
c. Termination by Data Provider.  Data Provider may terminate this 
agreement at any time by providing thirty (30) days prior written notice to 
Data Recipient.   
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d. For Breach.  Data Provider shall provide written notice to Data Recipient 
within ten (10) days of any determination that Data Recipient has 
breached a material term of this Agreement.  Data Provider shall afford 
Data Recipient an opportunity to cure said alleged material breach upon 
mutually agreeable terms.  Failure to agree on mutually agreeable terms 
for cure within thirty (30) days shall be grounds for the immediate 
termination of this Agreement by Data Provider. 
e. Effect of Termination.  Sections 1, 4, 5, 6(e) and 7 of this Agreement shall 
survive any termination of this Agreement under subsections c or d.   
7. Miscellaneous. 
a. Change in Law.  The parties agree to negotiate in good faith to amend this 
Agreement to comport with changes in federal law that materially alter 
either or both parties’ obligations under this Agreement.  Provided 
however, that if the parties are unable to agree to mutually acceptable 
amendment(s) by the compliance date of the change in applicable law or 
regulations, either Party may terminate this Agreement as provided in 
section 6. 
b. Construction of Terms.  The terms of this Agreement shall be construed to 




c. No Third-Party Beneficiaries.  Nothing in this Agreement shall confer 
upon any person other than the parties and their respective successors or 
assigns, any rights, remedies, obligations, or liabilities whatsoever. 
d. Counterparts.  This Agreement may be executed in one or more 
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which 
together shall constitute one and the same instrument. 
e. Headings.  The headings and other captions in this Agreement are for 
convenience and reference only and shall not be used in interpreting, 
construing or enforcing any of the provisions of this Agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the undersigned has caused this Agreement to be duly 
executed in its name and on its behalf. 
DATA PROVIDER    DATA RECIPIENT 
Signed:                             Signed:       
Print Name:        Print Name:      









Appendix C: Letter of Cooperation for An Interpreter: 01-19-17-0466118 
 
November 6th, 2016 
Dear Interpreter,  
As we discussed earlier, our plan for your involvement in my study involves the 
following tasks: 
-Translate questions asked by the researcher to participants 
-Translate responses of the participants into English for the researcher 
If you agree to be part of this research project, my university requires that all interpreters 
maintain complete confidentiality. During your involvement in this study, you will have 
access to information that is confidential and should not be disclosed. By agreeing to 
serve as an interpreter, you are agreeing to the following confidentiality standards: 
1. The data yielded by participants must be kept confidential during the data 
collection process, which means that no one is permitted to see or overhear a 
participant’s data, including other participants and family/friends of the 
participant. 
2. Participant identities are confidential. You will not disclose to anyone who 
participated and who didn’t.  
3.  You will not disclose or discuss any confidential information with others, 
including your friends or family. 
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4. You will not in any way divulge, copy, release, sell, loan, alter or destroy any 
confidential information except as properly authorized by the researcher in this 
document. 
5. You will not discuss confidential information where others can overhear the 
conversation (such disclosures are inappropriate even if the participant’s name is 
not used). 
6. You will not make any unauthorized transmissions, inquiries, modification or 
purging of confidential information. 
7. You will store research data in a secure manner, under lock and key (or password 
protection, in the case of electronic files). 
8. You will keep data in a manner that protects the privacy of participants and 
ensures that individual participants are not identifiable by outside parties.  
9. You agree that any obligations under this agreement will continue after 
completion of the research tasks. 
My university also requires that you uphold the following ethical principles for research 
outlined: 
1. Informed consent must be obtained from all research participants. This means that 
they must be fully informed about the study before being asked to decide about 
participation. 
2.  For example, it is not appropriate for people to be recruited while they are waiting 
for a health provider appointment (afterward would be less coercive). Further, no 
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one who is an authority figure or service provider may be involved in participant 
recruitment because it would be difficult for a person to say no. 
3.  Potential harms to participants must be minimized. Any time that you suspect a 
person’s participation might result in psychological, physical, social, or 
professional harm, you should let me know right away so we can terminate their 
participation in the study in a non-stigmatizing manner. 
 
As the principal investigator in this research project, my responsibilities include the 
following: 
1.  I must train you in the ethical principles of informed consent, voluntary research 
participation, research confidentiality, and protection of human subjects prior to 
your interaction with research participants. 
2.  I must report any unexpected or adverse events that occur during data collection 
to my university’s ethics committee (Institutional Review Board) within 1 week. 
3.   I must coordinate a system that will allow you to report any unexpected or 
adverse events to me within 24 hours, if I am not physically present with you 
during participant recruitment or data collection. 
4. I must request my university ethics committee’s (IRB’s) approval before making 
any modification to the research procedures or forms (this means that you may 
not implement modifications until I have confirmation of approval). 
5. I must maintain complete and accurate records of all research activities (including 
consent forms and collected data).  
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6.  I am liable for your actions within the context of this research study. I must 
address any grievances or claims that are formally filed against you within the 
justice system or any other organization’s system. 
 
I will coordinate the exact dates and times of data collection with you later. 
If your circumstances change, please contact me via telephone on +233 244 989 372 or 
+233 266 154 676 or by email at joe.lambongang@waldenu.edu so we can amend this 
agreement. 
I am requesting your signature to document that we have mutually agreed upon our roles 
and responsibilities within this study. If you agree with these terms and conditions, please 





Date   
  
Interpreter’s Written Signature  
Researcher’s Written Signature  
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This study is being conducted by Joe Lambongang, a Doctoral Candidate at the Walden 
University. 
Inclusion criteria for this study 
Only people who fall in the following category can potentially participate in this study: 
1. Must be over 18 years old. 
2. Must belong to the Dagbon ethnic group 
3. Must have lived in the Dagbon area during the 2002 conflict and familiar with the 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding interventions that were implemented during 
and after the conflict 
4. Representatives of organizations who worked with those organizations during the 
2002 conflict and after and were involved in implementing some of the 
interventions to resolve the conflict and maintain peace. 
Your role in the Study 
You have been identified and selected as a potential participant in the study based on 
your knowledge and experience of the various types of responses from both government 
and civil society to resolve the conflict and restore peace in Dagbon after the peace 
You are invited to participate in this study which is titled: “The Impact of Transitional 
Justice on Conflict Resolution and the Maintenance of Peace in Ghana. A Case Study of 
the Dagbon Conflict in the Northern Region”. The main purpose of this study, which is 
purely an academic one, is to understand the conditions that might be more responsive to 
transitional justice processes and mechanisms to promote the achievement of lasting 
peace in Dagbon. The information from this study will not be used for any other purpose. 
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accord was signed in 2006. If you agree to be part of the study, you will be engaged in a 
face-to face interview.  
The Interview Procedure 
The interview process will be as follows: 
• Confirming the time, venue and mode for the interview (face-to face, telephone or 
Skype). 
• Introduction and re-statement of the purpose and signing of the consent form or 
opt out of the study. 
• Explanation of the documentation process and request for permission to audio-
record where necessary. Recording is purely to help to ensure that what is 
eventually written is exactly what was said. Emphasize the participant’s right to 
opt out anytime during the interview process. 
• Interviewing with the option for interpretation if necessary. If not understood, 
please ask for clarification.  
• Explanation of what will happen to the information gathered and re-assuring the 
participant of confidentiality 
• Making follow-up arrangements if necessary 
• Appreciation. 
• The process might take approximately one hour fifteen minutes. 
Nature of the Study 
Your participation in this study is purely voluntary. If you choose to participate, you are 
free to opt out or stop the interview at any time. Your name will not be linked to any 
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specific information in the final report. If you decide to participate or not to, this decision 
will not affect your relationship with any individual or organization, including the one 
you work for. 
Risks and Benefits of the study 
As some of the questions might require a recall of regrettable and/or bitter experience in 
the past, there is a likelihood of stress and anxiety among some people during the 
interview process. If this happens and you need help, you will be sent to the Department 
of Social Welfare for support. They have been alerted about this and are on stand-by to 
help. 
The potential benefit to your participation in the study is that the information you provide 
will contribute to improving knowledge about the conditions under which transitional 
justice mechanisms can be more effective. This can be a starting point from which 
administrators can build on in subsequent interventions. There is no form of 
compensation for your participation in this study. 
Confidentiality 
The information obtained from this study as well as the eventual report will not be linked 
to any individual and will be kept private. All hard copies of records will be kept in 
folders and locked up in a cabinet and only the researcher will have access to them. Soft 
copies will be stored in files which will be password protected and this will be known by 
only the researcher. All audiotapes used during the interview will be destroyed after 
completion of the study.  
Limits to Confidentiality 
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Whereas I pledge to protect the confidentiality of participants in this study, the exception 
to this might be where there are indications that the security of the nation or groups of 
people is at risk (for example discovery of arms and ammunition not belonging to the 
security forces of the state, evidence of a possible attack of another group etc.). In that 
case, I am duty bound to inform the security agencies of such a potential threat. 
Contacts and Queries 
The main researcher is Joe Lambongang, reachable by phone on +233 244 989 372 and 
by e-mail on joe.lambongang@waldenu.edu. The Chair of the research Committee is Dr. 
Gloria Billingsley and can be reached by e-mail on gloria.billingsley@waldenu.edu.  If 
you have any queries on this research, you can ask them now or send them to the Chair of 
the Research Committee. If you have questions about your rights as a participant, you can 
reach out to a Walden University representative at +1-612-312-1210. 
 
Statement of Consent 
I have read the information above/ or the information has been explained to me in the 
language that I understand. I am clear with the purpose and conditions under which the 
study will be conducted and I hereby consent to participate in the study. 







Signature/Right Thumb print………………………………… 
Date………………………………………………………. 
























This study is being conducted by Joe Lambongang, a Doctoral Candidate at the Walden 
University. 
Inclusion criteria for this study 
Only people who fall in the following category can potentially participate in this study: 
1. Must be over 18 years old. 
2. Must belong to the Dagbon ethnic group 
3. Must have lived in the Dagbon area during the 2002 conflict and familiar with 
the conflict resolution and peacebuilding interventions that were implemented 
during and after the conflict 
4. Representatives of organizations who worked with those organizations during 
the 2002 conflict and after and were involved in implementing some of the 
interventions to resolve the conflict and maintain peace. 
Your role in the Study 
You have been identified and selected as a potential participant in a focus group 
discussion involving 4-6 women based on your knowledge and experience of the several 
You are invited to participate in this study which is titled: “The Impact of Transitional 
Justice on Conflict Resolution and the Maintenance of Peace in Ghana. A Case Study of 
the Dagbon Conflict in the Northern Region”. The main purpose of this study, which is 
purely an academic one, is to understand the conditions that might be more responsive to 
transitional justice processes and mechanisms to promote the achievement of lasting 
peace in Dagbon. The information from this study will not be used for any other purpose. 
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types of responses from both government and civil society to resolve the conflict and 
restore peace in Dagbon after the peace accord was signed in 2006. If you agree to be part 
of the study, you will be engaged in a focus group discussion.  
 
Focus group Discussion Procedure 
The process for the focus group discussion will be as follows: 
• Confirming the time, venue for the interview. 
• Introduction and re-statement of the purpose and signing of the consent form or 
opt out of the study. 
• Explanation of the documentation process. Emphasize the participant’s right to 
opt out anytime during the interview process. 
• If questions are not understood, there will be room for clarifications. The need to 
respect other people’s opinion will be emphasized. 
• Explanation of what will happen to the information gathered and re-assuring the 
participants of confidentiality 
• Appreciation. 
• The process might take approximately one hour. 
Nature of the Study 
Your participation in this study is purely voluntary. If you choose to participate, you are 
free to opt out or stop the discussion at any time. Your name will not be linked to any 
specific information in the final report. If you decide to participate or not to, this decision 
181 
 
will not affect your relationship with any individual or organization, including the one 
you work for. 
Risks and Benefits of the study 
As some of the questions might require a recall of regrettable and/or bitter experience in 
the past, there is a likelihood of stress and anxiety among some people during the 
interview process. If this happens and you need help, you will be sent to the Department 
of Social Welfare for support. They have been alerted about this and are on stand-by to 
help. 
 
The potential benefit to your participation in the study is that the information you provide 
will contribute to improving knowledge about the conditions under which transitional 
justice mechanisms can be more effective. This can be a starting point from which 
administrators can build on in subsequent interventions. There is no form of 
compensation for your participation in this study. 
Confidentiality 
The information obtained from this study as well as the eventual report will not be linked 
to any individual and will be kept private. All hard copies of records will be kept in 
folders and locked up in a cabinet and only the researcher will have access to them. Soft 
copies will be stored in files which will be password protected and this will be known by 
only the researcher. All audiotapes used during the interview will be destroyed after 
completion of the study.  
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As a participant in this study, I acknowledge and agree that I might have access to 
confidential information. I agree that: 
• I will not disclose or discuss any confidential information with others, including 
friends or family 
• I will not discuss confidential information where others can overhear the 
conversation. I understand that it is not acceptable to discuss confidential 
information even if the participant’s name is not mentioned. By consenting to 
participate in this study, I agree to this privacy and confidentiality requirements. 
Limits to Confidentiality 
Whereas I pledge to protect the confidentiality of participants in this study, the exception 
to this might be where there are indications that the security of the nation or groups of 
people is at risk (for example discovery of arms and ammunition not belonging to the 
security forces of the state, evidence of a possible attack of another group etc.). In that 
case, I am duty bound to inform the security agencies of such a potential threat for further 
investigation. 
Contacts and Queries 
The main researcher is Joe Lambongang, reachable by phone on +233 244 989 372 and 
by e-mail on joe.lambongang@waldenu.edu. The Chair of the research Committee is Dr. 
Gloria Billingsley and can be reached by e-mail on gloria.billingsley@waldenu.edu.  If 
you have any queries on this research, you can ask them now or send them to the Chair of 
the Research Committee. If you have questions about your rights as a participant, you can 
reach out to a Walden University representative at +1-612-312-1210. 
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Statement of Consent 
I have read the information above/ or the information has been explained to me in the 
language that I understand. I am clear with the purpose and conditions under which the 
study will be conducted and I hereby consent to participate in the study. 




Signature/Right Thumb print………………………………… 
Date………………………………………………………. 





















This study is being conducted by Joe Lambongang, a Doctoral Candidate at the Walden 
University. 
Inclusion criteria for this study 
Only people who fall in the following category can potentially participate in this study: 
1. Must be over 18 years old. 
2. Must belong to the Dagbon ethnic group 
3. Must have lived in the Dagbon area during the 2002 conflict and familiar with 
the conflict resolution and peacebuilding interventions that were implemented 
during and after the conflict 
4. Representatives of organizations who worked with those organizations during 
the 2002 conflict and after and were involved in implementing some of the 
interventions to resolve the conflict and maintain peace. 
Your wife’s role in the Study 
Your spouse has been identified and selected as a potential participant in the study based 
on her knowledge and experience of the several types of responses from both government 
Your wife has been invited to participate in this study which is titled: “The Impact of 
Transitional Justice on Conflict Resolution and the Maintenance of Peace in Ghana. A 
Case Study of the Dagbon Conflict in the Northern Region”. The main purpose of this 
study, which is purely an academic one, is to understand the conditions that might be 
more responsive to transitional justice processes and mechanisms to promote the 
achievement of lasting peace in Dagbon. The information from this study will not be used 
for any other purpose. 
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and civil society to resolve the conflict and restore peace in Dagbon after the peace 
accord was signed in 2006. If you agree for your spouse to be part of the study, she will 
be engaged in a focus group discussion with other women who will be between 4 and 6 in 
number. 
The Focus Group Discussion Procedure 
The interview process will be as follows: 
• Confirming the time, venue for the interview. 
• Introduction and re-statement of the purpose and signing of the consent form or 
opt out of the study. 
• Explanation of the documentation process. Emphasize the participant’s right to 
opt out anytime during the interview process. 
• If questions are not understood, there will be room for clarifications. The need to 
respect other people’s opinion will be emphasized. 
• Explanation of what will happen to the information gathered and re-assuring the 
participants of confidentiality 
• Appreciation. 
• The process might take approximately one hour. 
Nature of the Study 
Your wife’s’ participation in this study is purely voluntary. If she chooses to participate, 
she will be free to opt out or stop the interview at any time. Her name will not be linked 
to any specific information in the final report. If she decides to participate or not to, this 
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decision will not affect her relationship with any individual or organization, including the 
one you work for.  
In the same way, your decision about your wife’s participation is equally voluntary and 
whatever your decision is about her participation, it will not affect your relationship with 
anyone directly or indirectly involved in this research process. 
Risks and Benefits of the study 
As some of the questions might require a recall of regrettable and/or bitter experience in 
the past, there is a likelihood of stress and anxiety among some people during the 
interview process. If this happens and you need help, you will be sent to the Department 
of Social Welfare for support. They have been alerted about this and are on stand-by to 
help. 
The potential benefit to your wife’s participation in the study is that the information she 
and other women will provide will contribute to improving knowledge about the 
conditions under which transitional justice mechanisms can be more effective. This can 
be a starting point from which administrators can build on in subsequent interventions. 
There is no form of compensation for your wife’s participation in this study. 
Confidentiality 
The information obtained from this study as well as the eventual report will not be linked 
to any individual and will be kept private. All hard copies of records will be kept in 
folders and locked up in a cabinet and only the researcher will have access to them. Soft 
copies will be stored in files which will be password protected and this will be known by 
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only the researcher. All audiotapes used during the interview will be destroyed after 
completion of the study.  
Limits to Confidentiality 
Whereas I pledge to protect the confidentiality of participants in this study, the exception 
to this might be where there are indications that the security of the nation or groups of 
people is at risk (for example discovery of arms and ammunition not belonging to the 
security forces of the state, evidence of a possible attack of another group etc.). In that 
case, I am duty bound to inform the security agencies of such a potential threat. 
Contacts and Queries 
The main researcher is Joe Lambongang, reachable by phone on +233 244 989 372 and 
by e-mail on joe.lambongang@waldenu.edu. The Chair of the Research Committee is Dr. 
Gloria Billingsley and can be reached by e-mail on gloria.billingsley@waldenu.edu.  If 
you have any queries on this research, you can ask them now or send them to the Chair of 
the Research Committee. If you have questions about your rights as a participant, you can 
reach out to a Walden University representative at +1-612-312-1210. 
Statement of Consent 
I have read the information above/ or the information has been explained to me in the 
language that I understand. I am clear with the purpose and conditions under which the 
study will be conducted and I hereby consent for my wife to participate in the study. 






Signature/Right Thumb print………………………………… 
Date………………………………………………………. 
























This study is being conducted by Joe Lambongang, a Doctoral Candidate at the Walden 
University. 
Inclusion criteria for this study 
Only people who fall in the following category can potentially participate in this study: 
1. Must be over 18 years old. 
2. Must belong to the Dagbon ethnic group 
3. Must have lived in the Dagbon area during the 2002 conflict and familiar with 
the conflict resolution and peacebuilding interventions that were implemented 
during and after the conflict 
4. Representatives of organizations who worked with those organizations during 
the 2002 conflict and after and were involved in implementing some of the 
interventions to resolve the conflict and maintain peace. 
Your wife’s role in the Study 
Your wife has been identified and selected as a potential participant in the study based on 
her knowledge and experience of the several types of responses from both government 
Your wife has been invited to participate in this study which is titled: “The Impact of 
Transitional Justice on Conflict Resolution and the Maintenance of Peace in Ghana. A 
Case Study of the Dagbon Conflict in the Northern Region”. The main purpose of this 
study, which is purely an academic one, is to understand the conditions that might be 
more responsive to transitional justice processes and mechanisms to promote the 
achievement of lasting peace in Dagbon. The information from this study will not be used 
for any other purpose. 
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and civil society to resolve the conflict and restore peace in Dagbon after the peace 
accord was signed in 2006. If you agree for your spouse to be part of the study, she will 
be engaged in a focus group discussion with other women who will be between 4 and 6 in 
number. 
The Interview Procedure 
The interview process will be as follows: 
• Confirming the time, venue and mode for the interview (face-to face, telephone or 
Skype). 
• Introduction and re-statement of the purpose and signing of the consent form or 
opt out of the study. 
• Explanation of the documentation process and request for permission to audio-
record where necessary. Recording is purely to help to ensure that what is 
eventually written is exactly what was said. Emphasize the participant’s right to 
opt out anytime during the interview process. 
• Interviewing with the option for interpretation if necessary. If not understood, 
please ask for clarification.  
• Explanation of what will happen to the information gathered and re-assuring the 
participant of confidentiality 
• Making follow-up arrangements if necessary 
• Appreciation. 
• The process might take approximately one hour fifteen minutes. 
Nature of the Study 
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Your wife’s participation in this study is purely voluntary. If she chooses to participate, 
she will be free to opt out or stop the interview at any time. Her name will not be linked 
to any specific information in the final report. If she decides to participate or not to, this 
decision will not affect her relationship with any individual or organization, including the 
one you work for.  
In the same way, your decision about your wife’s participation is equally voluntary and 
whatever your decision is about her participation, it will not affect your relationship with 
anyone directly or indirectly involved in this research process. 
Risks and Benefits of the study 
As some of the questions might require a recall of regrettable and/or bitter experience in 
the past, there is a likelihood of stress and anxiety among some people during the 
interview process. If this happens and you need help, you will be sent to the Department 
of Social Welfare for support. They have been alerted about this and are on stand-by to 
help. 
The potential benefit of your wife’s participation in the study is that the information she 
and other women will provide will contribute to improving knowledge about the 
conditions under which transitional justice mechanisms can be more effective. This can 
be a starting point from which administrators can build on in subsequent interventions. 
There is no form of compensation for your wife’s participation in this study. 
Confidentiality 
The information obtained from this study as well as the eventual report will not be linked 
to any individual and will be kept private. All hard copies of records will be kept in 
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folders and locked up in a cabinet and only the researcher will have access to them. Soft 
copies will be stored in files which will be password protected and this will be known by 
only the researcher. All audiotapes used during the interview will be destroyed after 
completion of the study.  
Limits to Confidentiality 
Whereas I pledge to protect the confidentiality of participants in this study, the exception 
to this might be where there are indications that the security of the nation or groups of 
people is at risk (for example discovery of arms and ammunition not belonging to the 
security forces of the state, evidence of a possible attack of another group etc.). In that 
case, I am duty bound to inform the security agencies of such a potential threat. 
Contacts and Queries 
The main researcher is Joe Lambongang, reachable by phone on +233 244 989 372 and 
by e-mail on joe.lambongang@waldenu.edu. The Chair of the Research Committee is Dr. 
Gloria Billingsley and can be reached by e-mail on gloria.billingsley@waldenu.edu.  If 
you have any queries on this research, you can ask them now or send them to the Chair of 
the Research Committee. If you have questions about your rights as a participant, you can 
reach out to a Walden University representative at +1-612-312-1210. 
Statement of Consent 
I have read the information above/ or the information has been explained to me in the 
language that I understand. I am clear with the purpose and conditions under which the 
study will be conducted and I hereby consent for my wife to participate in the study. 
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Signature/Right Thumb print………………………………… 
Date………………………………………………………. 













Appendix H: Confidentiality Agreement for Member-Checker: 01-19-17-0466118 
 
Name of Signer:     
During my activity in collecting data for this research Titled: “The Impact of 
Transitional Justice on Conflict Resolution and the Maintenance of Peace in Ghana. A 
Case Study of the Dagbon Conflict in the Northern Region”.  I will have access to 
information, which is confidential and should not be disclosed. I acknowledge that the 
information must remain confidential, and that improper disclosure of confidential 
information can be damaging to the participant.  
By signing this Confidentiality Agreement, I acknowledge and agree that: 
1. I will not disclose or discuss any confidential information with others, including 
friends or family. 
2. I will not in any way divulge, copy, release, sell, loan, alter or destroy any 
confidential information except as properly authorized. 
3. I will not discuss confidential information where others can overhear the 
conversation. I understand that it is not acceptable to discuss confidential information 
even if the participant’s name is not used. 
4. I will not make any unauthorized transmissions, inquiries, modification or purging of 
confidential information. 
5. I agree that my obligations under this agreement will continue after termination of 
the job that I will perform. 
6. I understand that violation of this agreement will have legal implications. 
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7. I will only access or use systems or devices I’m officially authorized to access and I 
will not demonstrate the operation or function of systems or devices to unauthorized 
individuals. 
 
Signing this document, I acknowledge that I have read the agreement and I agree to 
comply with all the terms and conditions stated above. 















Appendix I: Spousal Confidentiality Agreement for Individual Interviews: 01-19-17-
0466118 
Name of Signer:     
During my activity in collecting data for this research Titled: “The Impact of 
Transitional Justice on Conflict Resolution and the Maintenance of Peace in Ghana. A 
Case Study of the Dagbon Conflict in the Northern Region”.  I will have access to 
information, which is confidential and should not be disclosed. I acknowledge that the 
information must remain confidential, and that improper disclosure of confidential 
information can be damaging to the participant.  
By signing this Confidentiality Agreement, I acknowledge and agree that: 
1. I will not disclose or discuss any confidential information with others, including 
friends or family. 
2. I will not in any way divulge any confidential information except as properly 
authorized. 
3. I will not discuss confidential information where others can overhear the 
conversation. I understand that it is not acceptable to discuss confidential 
information even if the participant’s name is not used. 
4. I understand that violation of this agreement will have legal implications. 
Signing this document, I acknowledge that I have read the agreement and I agree to 
comply with all the terms and conditions stated above. 
 
Signature:      Date: 
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Appendix J: Spousal Confidentiality Agreement for Focus Group Discussions with 
Women: 01-19-17-0466118 
Name of Signer:     
During my activity in collecting data for this research Titled: “The Impact of 
Transitional Justice on Conflict Resolution and the Maintenance of Peace in Ghana. A 
Case Study of the Dagbon Conflict in the Northern Region”.  I will have access to 
information, which is confidential and should not be disclosed. I acknowledge that the 
information must remain confidential, and that improper disclosure of confidential 
information can be damaging to the participant.  
By signing this Confidentiality Agreement, I acknowledge and agree that: 
1. I will not disclose or discuss any confidential information with others, including 
friends or family. 
2. I will not in any way divulge any confidential information except as properly 
authorized. 
3. I will not discuss confidential information where others can overhear the 
conversation. I understand that it is not acceptable to discuss confidential 
information even if the participant’s name is not used. 
4. I understand that violation of this agreement will have legal implications. 
Signing this document, I acknowledge that I have read the agreement and I agree to 
comply with all the terms and conditions stated above. 




Appendix K: Interview Protocol for Individual Interviews. 01-19-17-0466118 
Date…………………………………………… 
Location…………………………………………. 
Name of Interviewer……………………………………………… 
Name of Interviewee………………………………………………. 
Thanks again for agreeing to participate in this study. The interview will take 
approximately one hour. If any question is unclear, kindly let me know. 
Section A. Retributive Justice 
1. Since March 2006 when the peace accord was signed, has anything been done to 
compensate victims of human rights abuses? If yes, can you please describe these 
actions as much as you can? 
2. Specifically, have there been any trials and/or punishments for human rights 
abuses since March 2006 when the peace accord was signed?  
3. If yes to the question 2, can you please describe the process of identification and 
trial of these suspects? 
4.  Are you satisfied with this? Please explain your answer. 
5. Have there been any other form of punishment or sanctions of suspects? If yes, 
kindly describe them. 
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6. How effective have these been in terms of:  
a. Deterrence? Please explain your answer. 
b. Restoring confidence and societal balance? Please explain your answer. 
Section B. Restorative Justice 
7. Since March 2006, has anything been done to: 
a. Restore the dignity of victims? 
b. Address their needs and/or create space for perpetrators to make 
confessions and seek forgiveness? 
c. Build confidence in the chieftaincy and state institutions in Dagbon? 
8.  What in your opinion are the challenges associated with the processes and 
mechanisms for justice and peacebuilding in Dagbon?  
9. What can be done differently to ensure lasting peace in the area? 









Appendix L: Interview Protocol for Focus Group Discussions.  01-19-17-0466118 
Date…………………………………………… 
Location…………………………………………. 
Name of Interviewer……………………………………………… 
Name of Focus Group………………………………………………. 
Thanks again for agreeing to participate in this study. The interview will take 
approximately one hour. If any question is unclear, kindly let me know. Also, if at any 
point someone feels, for any reason, that they do not wish to continue, kindly let me 
know and I will stop the interview.  
1. Looking back, can you mention the strategies that were put in place in Dagbon 
after the peace accord was signed in March 2006 to: 
a. Restore peace in Dagbon?  
b. Resolve the conflict?  
c. Build peace?  
2. How effective were these in terms of: 
a. Deterrence? Please explain your answer. 
b. Restoring confidence and societal balance? Please explain your answer. 
3. In your opinion, were these successful in resolving the Dagbon conflict and 
restoring peace? Please explain your answer 
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4.   If these were not successful, what might help to make the strategies more 
responsive to peacebuilding? Please explain your answer.  
5. What can be done differently to ensure that lasting peace returns to Dagbon? 
Please explain your answer 














Appendix M: Observation Protocol. 01-19-17-0466118 
The purpose of this observation protocol is to provide a checklist that will help to focus 
on the data and other details that emerge from the observation session. The focus of the 
observation is to find/confirm physical evidence of the effects of the war and any 
physical evidence of restorative peace 
Directions: Before you begin, take a few minutes to describe the setting. Using the table 
on the next page, note the approximate time durations within which specific observations 
are made (may provide vital information later), along with notes on what you observe, 
and any other details that you consider to be important. After the observation, review 
your notes and begin to document possible codes for each observation. You will group 
the codes into themes at a later point.  
Date:  
(a) The Background:  
Description of the physical setting (Describe in thick rich detail what it looks like, sounds 
like, and any other details. Record what you see about the environment—the nature of the 
palace (both old and new), streets names, names/evidence of statues, memorials, about 
the participants and their roles, if known).  
(b) The People: 
How do they interact?  
What are they wearing?  
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What are they saying?  
What does their body language tell you?  
 
The environment 
What is the nature of houses? 
Any physical evidence of the war? 
Any physical evidence of security/peacekeeping? 
Streets—any names?  





(c) Time: (d) Observation: (e) Code:  
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(c) Time: (d) Observation: (e) Code:  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   















Appendix N: ŋun yan pahi vihigu ŋo puni fooro tibu (saᴕti) gbaŋ zaŋ kpa ninvuᴕu 




Baŋsim vihigu maa 
Joe Lambongang, ŋun nye booku Dokte karɔŋ bia Walden Yunivesiti karɔŋzoŋ puni la n 
nye ŋun vihiri vihigu ŋo. 
Sosheŋa din wuhiri nivuᴕu shab ban tu ni be vihigu ŋoŋ puni 
Ninvuᴕu shab ban be pubu din be gbini ŋo n nye ban ni tooi pahi vihigu ŋo puni: 
1. Di tuya ni o Yuma nye yuun piiya ni anii (yuunpinaanii) (18). 
2. Di tuya ni o nyela Dagbana 
3. Di tuya ni o nyela ŋun daa be Dagbaŋ 2002 zabili la saha, ka nyela ŋun mi zabili 
goobu soya (nirbi sunsuni Malibu soya) ni suhidoo bobo sosheŋa bini daa kpiᴕi 
zabilimaa ni daa na zabira ni zabilimaa bahigu (nyaaŋa). 
4. Ban daa zani laᴕingunim zaani ka bi mini laᴕingunim maa tum tuma 2002 
zabilimaa saha ni di nyaanga; ka daa nyela ban pahi zaŋ suhudoo soya maa sheŋa 
tum ni bi bo maligu zaŋ chaŋ zabilimaa polo ka suhudoo kana.  
A tuma ni nye sheli baŋsim vihigu maa puni. 
Ti gahiri nuu bolinda (boonda) ni a ti pahi baŋsim vihigu ŋo puni, din vihigu yuli nye: “Adalchi maligu 
sosheŋa din jandi barina din paai niriba soŋsim ni nye sheli zaŋ kpa zabili goobu ni suhdoo dawama 
niŋbu Gaana(Ghana) puni. Tudu bobili polo Dagboŋ zabili la n nye baŋsim vihigu ŋo ni yan sabi daliŋ (bee 
n jandi)”. Vihigu ŋo nye la baŋsim ko vihigu; ka di nufi (niya) nyela ni di baŋ behsheŋa (conditions) din yan 
tooi soŋ vieŋyalinga zaŋ kpa adalichi maligu soya din yan kpiᴕi bo faako na ni sosheŋa din tu zaŋ chaŋ 
suhidoo dawama niŋbu Dagboŋ puli ni. Lahabali din yan yi baŋsim vihigo ŋo nina pala din yan zaŋ ku 
anfaani sheli paha la ti ni kuli wuhi nufi (niya) shelimaa.  
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Ti vihiya nya ka piiga pahi vihigu ŋo puni, doomini a baŋsim ni a milinsi zaŋ kpa bohsi 
labisibu balibu balibu din nyina gomdanti (Governmant) ni salo sani na ni di ku zabili 
maa, ka bo suhudoo kana Dagbaŋ puli ni baayan suhudoo alikawli maa ni daa lo 2006 
yuuni maa puni. A yi saᴕti ni a ni pahi baŋsim vihigu ŋo puni, din ŋuna, ti mina ni zaŋ ti 
nina kpa taba ka ti boha bohisi. 
 
Bohisi maa ni yan chaŋ shem 
Bohisi maa ni ya n chaŋ shem n nye din kana ŋo: 
• Di tuya ni di dihitabili saha sheli Bohisi maa ni yan bohi, ni luᴕu sheli di ni yan 
bohi n ti tabili  di ni yan bohi shem  ( nina zaŋ kpa taba tohisi, ni taŋgali mii zuᴕu 
bohisi n ti tabili bini boolindi sheli Sikaipu la {kompita zuᴕu video fiila}-skype) 
• Tabzaŋbaŋsitaba (introduction) bee (milinsi ni taba) ni niŋ. Daliri din che ka 
baŋsim vihigu ŋo maa yan niŋ maa     nilan lab wuhi; yaha, saᴕti gbaŋ maa ni dihi 
(saani), bee ka a pii ni a ni yi baŋsim vihigu maa puni. 
• Neesim (bayaani) ni niŋ zaŋ kpa sabibu maa soya ni yaŋ chaŋ shem. Di yi niŋ 
talahi, soli (yiko) ni bo zaŋ kpa yetɔᴕa teepubu zaŋ niŋ kaseeti ni. Teepubu maa 
pala she pahala di yan sɔŋ mi dihtabili ni bi ni sabi sheli maa nyala din zantuhi a 
ni yeli shem maa dedee. Dini kpaŋsi, ni ŋun saᴕti vihigu ŋo puni behigu mali yiko 
ni o yi di puni sahansheli kam o ni bora, di yi ti niŋ ka hohisi maa chana. 
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• Di yi niŋ talahi, bohisi ni bohi zaŋ chaŋ a ni pii bohisi maa puni yibu maa, din 
kuya n che ka di baŋ daliri sheli din tahi lala na. di yi niŋ ka a bi niŋ fahimta (bee 
ka a bi baŋ sheli), ŋ kpamda jaandi, kpaŋmi a maŋa ka bohi ka di nee n taa. 
• Neesim (bee bayaani) ni niŋ zaŋ kpa lahabali sheŋa din laᴕim maa; ti lahi tiri nyin 
ŋun be vihigu ŋo puni alikawli zaŋ kpa gbinliribo polo. 
• Di yi niŋ talahi shili ni mali zaŋ kpa ti labibu na. 
• Paᴕbu (nbonbo) ni niŋ. 
• Saha sheli Bohisi maa ni yan di nyela kamani awa yini ni minti pia ni anu( 
pinaanu) 
Vihigu maa behigu ni nye shem 
A vihigu ŋo puni bebu nyela suhuyurilim ko. A yi pii ni a ni pahi di puni, a lan mali yiko 
ni a yi di puni bee ka a che bohisimaa labisibu sahan sheli kam ani bora. Diyi ti yan sabi 
bahigu sabu maa, a yuli pala din yan boli zaŋ chaŋ lahabali sheli a ni ti. A yi pii ni a ni 
pahi vihigu maa puni bee a yi pii  ni a ku pahi di puni  pala din yan saᴕim a mini niŋvuᴕu 
so sunsuni bee laᴕingu sheli kam sunsuni; zaŋ ti tabili a ni tumti so maa.   
 
Vihigu maa barinanima ni di anfaaninima 
Bohisi maa yi ti bohira, di ni tooi niŋ ka di sheŋa bori ni di tee yoltem, bee yeltoᴕu 
(yelbiɛrili) din daa paai niribi la; din zuᴕu, di zooya ka teha ni suhgarigu paai niŋvuᴕu 
sheba. Di yi ti niŋ ka lala maa paaga, ka a bori soŋsim, din a zaŋa chaŋ salo bɛrizuŋ tuma 
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shee la ka a ti nya soŋsim. Di pun baŋsiba zaŋ kpa di polo; di zuᴕu, bi mali la sheli zaŋ 
chaŋ di polo. Anfaani sheli din yan yina a vihigu ŋo puni benibu nyemi, ni lahabali sheli 
kam a ni ya nti nyela din yan sɔŋ kpaŋsi baŋsim( bee di yan che ka baŋsim ti too ni) zaŋ 
kpa behi sheŋa puni adalichi sosuma din na beni ni yan tooi tum viԑŋyalinga pam shem. 
Ŋo nyela din ni tooi niŋ piligibu shee tuma zuᴕlaanim ni yan tooi mentam (bee ntuᴕi) 
sohbɛᴕu, soŋsim(faako) tibu yi ti lan bora. A vihigu ŋo puni benibu ka samyogahindili. 
 
Ashili liribu (Ashiliribo)- confidentiality 
Di yi ti yan sabi vihigu ŋo kpaliŋkpaa sabibu, lahabali sheŋa din yina vihigu maa puni 
pala din yan zaŋ tabili  so yuli ka mani ni ŋuni ndaa yeli. Di nyela din yan be  amini 
bohbohri maa sunsuni ko. Gbaŋ sheŋa kam din sabi, nti pahi yetɔᴕ sheŋa zaa din teepi, 
yan pumpumi jillijilli n kpari niŋ adaka puni. Baŋsim vihirovihiro maa ko n nye ŋun mali 
yiko di zuᴕu. Lahabali din sabi be kompita zuᴕu nyela din yan be faali (files)  sheŋa din 
mali namba sɔᴕrili (password). Namba sɔᴕrili ŋo nyela din yan be vihirovihiro maa ko 
sani (researcher). Lahabali sheŋa zaa din teepi niŋ kaseetinimni nyela  bi ni ya nsaᴕim 
labi vihigu maa nyaanga. 
 
Ashil-liribo maa Tarisi 
 Di mini ŋkuli kpaai alikawli nin ni liri ŋunkam be vihigiŋo puni Ashili (gbini) maa, di bi 
yan pahi ti yi niŋ ka ti nya ni tingbaŋ, bee ninsalinim suhdoo be barina puni (di ŋmahanli 
nyela kamani ti yi ti nya bidibi nema (tobnema) ni malfanima ka di pala tingbaŋ 
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linjimanim n suli; yaha, ti yi ti nya daliri ni shab  bori ni bi liri bi taba. Ŋo yi ti niŋ, di niŋ 
talahi n zuᴕu ni n ti suhdoo fukumsinim tibli zaŋ kpa barina ŋo polo. 
 
Adireesinima ni lahabali baŋbu bohsi 
Vihigu maa janda(di fukunsilana) yuli n nye: Joe Lambongang. O nyela a ni yan tooi poli 
taŋgalimii ŋͻ zuᴕu:+233 244989 372 bee ka a sabi too iimiili (Email) ŋͻ zuᴕu: 
joe.lambogang@waldenu.edu. Bansim vihigu maa komitii daanbulo n nye: Dokte (Dr) 
Gloria Billingsley; o nyela a ni yan tooi nya so iimiili (Email) ŋͻ zuᴕu: 
Gloria.billingsley@waldenu.edu .  A yi mali bohigu zaŋ kpa vihigu ŋo polo, a ni tooi 
bohiba punpoŋo bee ka a sabi li ti Bansim vihigu maa komitii daanbulo maa. A yi mali 
pohsi zaŋ kpa a hachi ni nye sheli zaŋ chaŋ vihigu ŋo puni bebu, a ni tooi sabi ti ninvuᴕu 
so ŋun za Walden Yunivesiti zaani tangalimii ŋo zuᴕu:+-612-312-1210  
 
Fooro tibu yetɔᴕli(zilinli) 
N nyela ŋun karim lahabali sheli din sabi be zuᴕsaa ŋo; bee di nye la din lebigi ti ma 
yetͻᴕsheli puni (bee bali sheli puni) ni mi. N nyela ŋun niŋ fahimta zaŋ kpa nufi ni mara 
sheŋa puni vihigu maa ni yan niŋ. Din zuᴕu n saᴕti nin ni pahi bansim vihigu ŋo puni. 
Di nye la talahi ni fooro tibu gbaŋ ŋo dihi ( saani) buyi zuᴕu. Gbaŋyini yan kpalinla nyin 
ŋun be baŋsim vihigu ŋo puni sani. 




























Appendix O: Ban yan pahi vihigu ŋo puni fooro tibu (saᴕti) gbaŋ zaŋ kpa salo (bobgu) 





Baŋsim vihigu maa 
Joe Lambongang, ŋun nye booku Dokte karɔŋ bia Walden Yunivesiti karɔŋzoŋ puni la n 
nye ŋun vihiri vihigu ŋo. 
Sosheŋa din wuhiri nivuᴕu shab ban tu ni be vihigu ŋoŋ puni 
Ninvuᴕu shab ban be pubu din be gbini ŋo n nye ban ni tooi pahi vihigu ŋo puni: 
5. Di tuya ni o Yuma nye yuun piiya ni anii (yuunpinaanii) (18). 
6. Di tuya ni o nyela Dagbana 
7. Di tuya ni o nyela ŋun daa be Dagbaŋ 2002 zabili la saha, ka nyela ŋun mi zabili 
goobu soya (nirbi sunsuni Malibu soya) ni suhidoo bobo sosheŋa bini daa kpiᴕi 
zabilimaa ni daa na zabira ni zabilimaa bahigu (nyaaŋa). 
8. Ban daa zani laᴕingunim zaani ka bi mini laᴕingunim maa tum tuma 2002 
zabilimaa saha ni di nyaanga; ka daa nyela ban pahi zaŋ suhudoo soya maa sheŋa 
tum ni bi bo maligu zaŋ chaŋ zabilimaa polo ka suhudoo kana.  
A tuma ni nye sheli baŋsim vihigu maa puni. 
Ti gahiri nuu bolinda (boonda) ni a ti pahi baŋsim vihigu ŋo puni, din vihigu yuli nye: “Adalchi maligu 
sosheŋa din jandi barina din paai niriba soŋsim ni nye sheli zaŋ kpa zabili goobu ni suhdoo dawama 
niŋbu Gaana(Ghana) puni. Tudu bobili polo Dagboŋ zabili la n nye baŋsim vihigu ŋo ni yan sabi daliŋ (bee 
n jandi)”. Vihigu ŋo nye la baŋsim ko vihigu; ka di nufi (niya) nyela ni di baŋ behsheŋa (conditions) din yan 
tooi soŋ vieŋyalinga zaŋ kpa adalichi maligu soya din yan kpiᴕi bo faako na ni sosheŋa din tu zaŋ chaŋ 
suhidoo dawama niŋbu Dagboŋ puli ni. Lahabali din yan yi baŋsim vihigo ŋo nina pala din yan zaŋ ku 
anfaani sheli paha la ti ni kuli wuhi nufi (niya) shelimaa.  
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Ti vihiya nya ka piiga pahi vihigu ŋo puni, doomini a baŋsim ni a milinsi zaŋ kpa bohsi 
labisibu balibu balibu din nyina gomdanti (Governmant) ni salo sani na ni di ku zabili 
maa, ka bo suhudoo kana Dagbaŋ puli ni baayan suhudoo alikawli maa ni daa lo 2006 
yuuni maa puni. A yi saᴕti ni a ni pahi baŋsim vihigu ŋo puni, din ŋuna, ti mina ni zaŋ ti 
nina kpa taba ka ti boha bohisi. 
 
Bohisi maa ni yan chaŋ shem 
Bohisi maa ni ya n chaŋ shem n nye din kana ŋo: 
• Di tuya ni di dihitabili saha sheli Bohisi maa ni yan bohi, ni luᴕu sheli di ni yan 
bohi n ti tabili  di ni yan bohi shem  ( nina zaŋ kpa taba tohisi, ni taŋgali mii zuᴕu 
bohisi n ti tabili bini boolindi sheli Sikaipu la {kompita zuᴕu video fiila}-skype) 
• Tabzaŋbaŋsitaba (introduction) bee (milinsi ni taba) ni niŋ. Daliri din che ka 
baŋsim vihigu ŋo maa yan niŋ maa     nilan lab wuhi; yaha, saᴕti gbaŋ maa ni dihi 
(saani), bee ka a pii ni a ni yi baŋsim vihigu maa puni. 
• Neesim (bayaani) ni niŋ zaŋ kpa sabibu maa soya ni yaŋ chaŋ shem. Di yi niŋ 
talahi, soli (yiko) ni bo zaŋ kpa yetɔᴕa teepubu zaŋ niŋ kaseeti ni. Teepubu maa 
pala she pahala di yan sɔŋ mi dihtabili ni bi ni sabi sheli maa nyala din zantuhi a 
ni yeli shem maa dedee. Dini kpaŋsi, ni ŋun saᴕti vihigu ŋo puni behigu mali yiko 
ni o yi di puni sahansheli kam o ni bora, di yi ti niŋ ka  hohisi maa chana. 
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• Di yi niŋ talahi, bohisi ni bohi zaŋ chaŋ a ni pii bohisi maa puni yibu maa, din 
kuya n che ka di baŋ daliri sheli din tahi lala na. di yi niŋ ka a bi niŋ fahimta (bee 
ka a bi baŋ sheli), ŋ kpamda jaandi, kpaŋmi a maŋa ka bohi ka di nee n taa. 
• Neesim (bee bayaani) ni niŋ zaŋ kpa lahabali sheŋa din laᴕim maa; ti lahi tiri nyin 
ŋun be vihigu ŋo puni alikawli zaŋ kpa gbinliribo polo. 
• Di yi niŋ talahi shili ni mali zaŋ kpa ti labibu na. 
• Paᴕbu (nbonbo) ni niŋ. 
• Saha sheli Bohisi maa ni yan di nyela kamani awa  yini ni minti pia ni anu( 
pinaanu) 
Vihigu maa behigu ni nye shem 
A vihigu ŋo puni bebu nyela suhuyurilim ko. A yi pii ni a ni pahi di puni, a lan mali yiko 
ni a yi di puni bee ka a che bohisimaa labisibu sahan sheli kam ani bora. Diyi ti yan sabi 
bahigu sabu maa, a yuli pala din yan boli zaŋ chaŋ lahabali sheli a ni ti. A yi pii ni a ni 
pahi vihigu maa puni bee a yi pii  ni a ku pahi di puni  pala din yan saᴕim a mini niŋvuᴕu 
so sunsuni bee laᴕingu sheli kam sunsuni; zaŋ ti tabili a ni tumti so maa.   
Vihigu maa barinanima ni di anfaaninima 
Bohisi maa yi ti bohira, di ni tooi niŋ ka di sheŋa bori ni di tee yoltem, bee yeltoᴕu 
(yelbiɛrili) din daa paai niribi la; din zuᴕu, di zooya ka teha ni suhgarigu paai niŋvuᴕu 
sheba. Di yi ti niŋ ka lala maa paaga, ka a bori soŋsim, din a zaŋa chaŋ salo bɛrizuŋ tuma 
shee la ka a ti nya soŋsim. Di pun baŋsiba zaŋ kpa di polo; di zuᴕu, bi mali la sheli zaŋ 
214 
 
chaŋ di polo. Anfaani sheli din yan yina a vihigu ŋo puni benibu nyemi, ni lahabali sheli 
kam a ni ya nti nyela din yan sɔŋ kpaŋsi baŋsim( bee di yan che ka baŋsim ti too ni) zaŋ 
kpa behi sheŋa puni adalichi sosuma din na beni ni yan tooi tum viԑŋyalinga pam shem. 
Ŋo nyela din ni tooi niŋ piligibu shee tuma zuᴕlaanim ni yan tooi mentam (bee ntuᴕi) 
sohbɛᴕu, soŋsim(faako) tibu yi ti lan bora. A vihigu ŋo puni benibu ka samyogahindili. 
 
Ashili liribu (Ashiliribo)- confidentiality 
Di yi ti yan sabi vihigu ŋo kpaliŋkpaa sabibu, lahabali sheŋa din yina vihigu maa puni 
pala din yan zaŋ tabili  so yuli ka mani ni ŋuni ndaa yeli. Di nyela din yan be  amini 
bohbohri maa sunsuni ko. Gbaŋ sheŋa kam din sabi, nti pahi yetɔᴕ sheŋa zaa din teepi, 
yan pumpumi jillijilli n kpari niŋ adaka puni. Baŋsim vihirovihiro maa ko n nye ŋun mali 
yiko di zuᴕu. Lahabali din sabi be kompita zuᴕu nyela din yan be faali (files)  sheŋa din 
mali namba sɔᴕrili (password). Namba sɔᴕrili ŋo nyela din yan be vihirovihiro maa ko 
sani (researcher). Lahabali sheŋa zaa din teepi niŋ kaseetinimni nyela  bi ni ya nsaᴕim 
labi vihigu maa nyaanga. 
 
Ashil-liribo maa Tarisi 
 Di mini ŋkuli kpaai alikawli nin ni liri ŋunkam be vihigiŋo puni Ashili (gbini) maa, di bi 
yan pahi ti yi niŋ ka ti nya ni tingbaŋ, bee ninsalinim suhdoo be barina puni (di ŋmahanli 
nyela kamani ti yi ti nya bidibi nema (tobnema) ni malfanima ka di pala tingbaŋ 
linjimanim n suli; yaha, ti yi ti nya daliri ni shab  bori ni bi liri bi taba. Ŋo yi ti niŋ, di niŋ 




Adireesinima ni lahabali baŋbu bohsi 
Vihigu maa janda(di fukunsilana) yuli n nye: Joe Lambongang. O nyela a ni yan tooi poli 
taŋgalimii ŋͻ zuᴕu:+233 244989 372 bee ka a sabi too iimiili (Email) ŋͻ zuᴕu: 
joe.lambogang@waldenu.edu. Bansim vihigu maa komitii daanbulo n nye: Dokte (Dr) 
Gloria Billingsley; o nyela a ni yan tooi nya so iimiili (Email) ŋͻ zuᴕu: 
Gloria.billingsley@waldenu.edu .  A yi mali bohigu zaŋ kpa vihigu ŋo polo, a ni tooi 
bohiba punpoŋo bee ka a sabi li ti Bansim vihigu maa komitii daanbulo maa. A yi mali 
pohsi zaŋ kpa a hachi ni nye sheli zaŋ chaŋ vihigu ŋo puni bebu, a ni tooi sabi ti ninvuᴕu 
so ŋun za Walden Yunivesiti zaani tangalimii ŋo zuᴕu:+-612-312-1210  
 
Fooro tibu yetɔᴕli(zilinli) 
N nyela ŋun karim lahabali sheli din sabi be zuᴕsaa ŋo; bee di nye la din lebigi ti ma 
yetͻᴕsheli puni (bee bali sheli puni) ni mi. N nyela ŋun niŋ fahimta zaŋ kpa nufi ni mara 
sheŋa puni vihigu maa ni yan niŋ. Din zuᴕu n saᴕti nin ni pahi bansim vihigu ŋo puni. 
Di nye la talahi ni fooro tibu gbaŋ ŋo dihi ( saani) buyi zuᴕu. Gbaŋyini yan kpalinla nyin 
ŋun be baŋsim vihigu ŋo puni sani. 
Ninvuᴕu so  ŋun be vihigu ŋo puni 
yuli:………………………………………………………………… 




























Baŋsim vihigu maa 
Joe Lambongang, ŋun nye booku Dokte karɔŋ bia Walden Yunivesiti karɔŋzoŋ puni la n 
nye ŋun vihiri vihigu ŋo. 
Sosheŋa din wuhiri nivuᴕu shab ban tu ni be vihigu ŋoŋ puni 
Ninvuᴕu shab ban be pubu din be gbini ŋo n nye ban ni tooi pahi vihigu ŋo puni: 
1. Di tuya ni o Yuma nye yuun piiya ni anii (yuunpinaanii) (18). 
2. Di tuya ni o nyela Dagbana 
3. Di tuya ni o nyela ŋun daa be Dagbaŋ 2002 zabili la saha, ka nyela ŋun mi zabili 
goobu soya (nirbi sunsuni Malibu soya) ni suhidoo bobo sosheŋa bini daa kpiᴕi 
zabilimaa ni daa na zabira ni zabilimaa bahigu (nyaaŋa). 
4. Ban daa zani laᴕingunim zaani ka bi mini laᴕingunim maa tum tuma 2002 
zabilimaa saha ni di nyaanga; ka daa nyela ban pahi zaŋ suhudoo soya maa sheŋa 
tum ni bi bo maligu zaŋ chaŋ zabilimaa polo ka suhudoo kana.  
A paᴕa tuma ni nye sheli baŋsim vihigu maa puni. 
Ti gahiri nuu bolinda (boonda) a paᴕa ni o ti pahi baŋsim vihigu ŋo puni, din vihigu yuli nye: “Adalchi 
maligu sosheŋa din jandi barina din paai niriba soŋsim ni nye sheli zaŋ kpa zabili goobu ni suhdoo 
dawama niŋbu Gaana(Ghana) puni. Tudu bobili polo Dagboŋ zabili la n nye baŋsim vihigu ŋo ni yan sabi 
daliŋ (bee n jandi)”. Vihigu ŋo nye la baŋsim ko vihigu; ka di nufi (niya) nyela ni di baŋ behsheŋa 
(conditions) din yan tooi soŋ vieŋyalinga zaŋ kpa adalichi maligu soya din yan kpiᴕi bo faako na ni 
sosheŋa din tu zaŋ chaŋ suhidoo dawama niŋbu Dagboŋ puli ni. Lahabali din yan yi baŋsim vihigo ŋo 
nina pala din yan zaŋ ku anfaani sheli paha la ti ni kuli wuhi nufi (niya) shelimaa.  
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Ti vihiya nya ka piiga pahi vihigu ŋo puni, doomini a baŋsim ni a milinsi zaŋ kpa bohsi 
labisibu balibu balibu din nyina gomdanti (Governmant) ni salo sani na ni di ku zabili 
maa, ka bo suhudoo kana Dagbaŋ puli ni baayan suhudoo alikawli maa ni daa lo 2006 
yuuni maa puni. A yi saᴕti ni a ni pahi baŋsim vihigu ŋo puni, din ŋuna, ti mina ni zaŋ ti 
nina kpa taba ka ti boha bohisi. 
Bohisi maa ni yan chaŋ shem 
Bohisi maa ni ya n chaŋ shem n nye din kana ŋo: 
• Di tuya ni di dihitabili saha sheli Bohisi maa ni yan bohi, ni luᴕu sheli di ni yan 
bohi n ti tabili  di ni yan bohi shem  ( nina zaŋ kpa taba tohisi, ni taŋgali mii zuᴕu 
bohisi n ti tabili bini boolindi sheli Sikaipu la {kompita zuᴕu video fiila}-skype) 
• Tabzaŋbaŋsitaba (introduction) bee (milinsi ni taba) ni niŋ. Daliri din che ka 
baŋsim vihigu ŋo maa yan niŋ maa     nilan lab wuhi; yaha, saᴕti gbaŋ maa ni dihi 
(saani), bee ka a pii ni a ni yi baŋsim vihigu maa puni. 
• Neesim (bayaani) ni niŋ zaŋ kpa sabibu maa soya ni yaŋ chaŋ shem. Di yi niŋ 
talahi, soli (yiko) ni bo zaŋ kpa yetɔᴕa teepubu zaŋ niŋ kaseeti ni. Teepubu maa 
pala she pahala di yan sɔŋ mi dihtabili ni bi ni sabi sheli maa nyala din zantuhi a 
ni yeli shem maa dedee. Dini kpaŋsi, ni ŋun saᴕti vihigu ŋo puni behigu mali yiko 
ni o yi di puni sahansheli kam o ni bora, di yi ti niŋ ka  hohisi maa chana. 
• Di yi niŋ talahi, bohisi ni bohi zaŋ chaŋ a ni pii bohisi maa puni yibu maa, din 
kuya n che ka di baŋ daliri sheli din tahi lala na. di yi niŋ ka a bi niŋ fahimta (bee 
ka a bi baŋ sheli), ŋ kpamda jaandi, kpaŋmi a maŋa ka bohi ka di nee n taa. 
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• Neesim (bee bayaani) ni niŋ zaŋ kpa lahabali sheŋa din laᴕim maa; ti lahi tiri nyin 
ŋun be vihigu ŋo puni alikawli zaŋ kpa gbinliribo polo. 
• Di yi niŋ talahi shili ni mali zaŋ kpa ti labibu na. 
• Paᴕbu (nbonbo) ni niŋ. 
• Saha sheli Bohisi maa ni yan di nyela kamani awa yini ni minti pia ni anu( 
pinaanu) 
 
Vihigu maa behigu ni nye shem 
A vihigu ŋo puni bebu nyela suhuyurilim ko. A yi pii ni a ni pahi di puni, a lan mali yiko 
ni a yi di puni bee ka a che bohisimaa labisibu sahan sheli kam ani bora. Diyi ti yan sabi 
bahigu sabu maa, a yuli pala din yan boli zaŋ chaŋ lahabali sheli a ni ti. A yi pii ni a ni 
pahi vihigu maa puni bee a yi pii  ni a ku pahi di puni  pala din yan saᴕim a mini niŋvuᴕu 
so sunsuni bee laᴕingu sheli kam sunsuni; zaŋ ti tabili a ni tumti so maa.   
 
Vihigu maa barinanima ni di anfaaninima 
Bohisi maa yi ti bohira, di ni tooi niŋ ka di sheŋa bori ni di tee yoltem, bee yeltoᴕu 
(yelbiɛrili) din daa paai niribi la; din zuᴕu, di zooya ka teha ni suhgarigu paai niŋvuᴕu 
sheba. Di yi ti niŋ ka lala maa paaga, ka a bori soŋsim, din a zaŋa chaŋ salo bɛrizuŋ tuma 
shee la ka a ti nya soŋsim. Di pun baŋsiba zaŋ kpa di polo; di zuᴕu, bi mali la sheli zaŋ 
chaŋ di polo. Anfaani sheli din yan yina a vihigu ŋo puni benibu nyemi, ni lahabali sheli 
kam a ni ya nti nyela din yan sɔŋ kpaŋsi baŋsim( bee di yan che ka baŋsim ti too ni) zaŋ 
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kpa behi sheŋa puni adalichi sosuma din na beni ni yan tooi tum viԑŋyalinga pam shem. 
Ŋo nyela din ni tooi niŋ piligibu shee tuma zuᴕlaanim ni yan tooi mentam (bee ntuᴕi) 
sohbɛᴕu, soŋsim (faako) tibu yi ti lan bora. A vihigu ŋo puni benibu ka samyogahindili. 
 
Ashili liribu (Ashiliribo)- confidentiality 
Di yi ti yan sabi vihigu ŋo kpaliŋkpaa sabibu, lahabali sheŋa din yina vihigu maa puni 
pala din yan zaŋ tabili  so yuli ka mani ni ŋuni ndaa yeli. Di nyela din yan be  amini 
bohbohri maa sunsuni ko. Gbaŋ sheŋa kam din sabi, nti pahi yetɔᴕ sheŋa zaa din teepi, 
yan pumpumi jillijilli n kpari niŋ adaka puni. Baŋsim vihirovihiro maa ko n nye ŋun mali 
yiko di zuᴕu. Lahabali din sabi be kompita zuᴕu nyela din yan be faali (files)  sheŋa din 
mali namba sɔᴕrili (password). Namba sɔᴕrili ŋo nyela din yan be vihirovihiro maa ko 
sani (researcher). Lahabali sheŋa zaa din teepi niŋ kaseetinimni nyela  bi ni ya nsaᴕim 
labi vihigu maa nyaanga. 
Ashil-liribo maa Tarisi 
 Di mini ŋkuli kpaai alikawli nin ni liri ŋunkam be vihigiŋo puni Ashili (gbini) maa, di bi 
yan pahi ti yi niŋ ka ti nya ni tingbaŋ, bee ninsalinim suhdoo be barina puni (di ŋmahanli 
nyela kamani ti yi ti nya bidibi nema (tobnema) ni malfanima ka di pala tingbaŋ 
linjimanim n suli; yaha, ti yi ti nya daliri ni shab  bori ni bi liri bi taba. Ŋo yi ti niŋ, di niŋ 
talahi n zuᴕu ni n ti suhdoo fukumsinim tibli zaŋ kpa barina ŋo polo. 
Adireesinima ni lahabali baŋbu bohsi 
Vihigu maa janda(di fukunsilana) yuli n nye: Joe Lambongang. O nyela a ni yan tooi poli 
taŋgalimii ŋͻ zuᴕu:+233 244989 372 bee ka a sabi too iimiili (Email) ŋͻ zuᴕu: 
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joe.lambogang@waldenu.edu. Bansim vihigu maa komitii daanbulo n nye: Dokte (Dr) 
Gloria Billingsley; o nyela a ni yan tooi nya so iimiili (Email) ŋͻ zuᴕu: 
Gloria.billingsley@waldenu.edu .  A yi mali bohigu zaŋ kpa vihigu ŋo polo, a ni tooi 
bohiba punpoŋo bee ka a sabi li ti Bansim vihigu maa komitii daanbulo maa. A yi mali 
pohsi zaŋ kpa a hachi ni nye sheli zaŋ chaŋ vihigu ŋo puni bebu, a ni tooi sabi ti ninvuᴕu 
so ŋun za Walden Yunivesiti zaani tangalimii ŋo zuᴕu:+-612-312-1210  
Fooro tibu yetɔᴕli(zilinli) 
N nyela ŋun karim lahabali sheli din sabi be zuᴕsaa ŋo; bee di nye la din lebigi ti ma 
yetͻᴕsheli puni (bee bali sheli puni) ni mi. N nyela ŋun niŋ fahimta zaŋ kpa nufi ni mara 
sheŋa puni vihigu maa ni yan niŋ. Din zuᴕu n saᴕti nin ni pahi bansim vihigu ŋo puni. 
Di nye la talahi ni fooro tibu gbaŋ ŋo dihi (saani) buyi zuᴕu. Gbaŋyini yan kpalinla nyin 
ŋun be baŋsim vihigu ŋo puni sani. 
Ninvuᴕu so  ŋun be vihigu ŋo puni 
yuli:………………………………………………………………… 














Baŋsim vihigu maa 
Joe Lambongang, ŋun nye booku Dokte karɔŋ bia Walden Yunivesiti karɔŋzoŋ puni la n 
nye ŋun vihiri vihigu ŋo. 
Sosheŋa din wuhiri nivuᴕu shab ban tu ni be vihigu ŋoŋ puni 
Ninvuᴕu shab ban be pubu din be gbini ŋo n nye ban ni tooi pahi vihigu ŋo puni: 
5. Di tuya ni o Yuma nye yuun piiya ni anii (yuunpinaanii) (18). 
6. Di tuya ni o nyela Dagbana 
7. Di tuya ni o nyela ŋun daa be Dagbaŋ 2002 zabili la saha, ka nyela ŋun mi zabili 
goobu soya (nirbi sunsuni Malibu soya) ni suhidoo bobo sosheŋa bini daa kpiᴕi 
zabilimaa ni daa na zabira ni zabilimaa bahigu (nyaaŋa). 
8. Ban daa zani laᴕingunim zaani ka bi mini laᴕingunim maa tum tuma 2002 
zabilimaa saha ni di nyaanga; ka daa nyela ban pahi zaŋ suhudoo soya maa sheŋa 
tum ni bi bo maligu zaŋ chaŋ zabilimaa polo ka suhudoo kana.  
A paᴕa tuma ni nye sheli baŋsim vihigu maa puni. 
Ti gahiri nuu bolinda (boonda) a paᴕa ni o ti pahi baŋsim vihigu ŋo puni, din vihigu yuli nye: “Adalchi 
maligu sosheŋa din jandi barina din paai niriba soŋsim ni nye sheli zaŋ kpa zabili goobu ni suhdoo 
dawama niŋbu Gaana (Ghana) puni. Tudu bobili polo Dagboŋ zabili la n nye baŋsim vihigu ŋo ni yan sabi 
daliŋ (bee n jandi)”. Vihigu ŋo nye la baŋsim ko vihigu; ka di nufi (niya) nyela ni di baŋ behsheŋa 
(conditions) din yan tooi soŋ vieŋyalinga zaŋ kpa adalichi maligu soya din yan kpiᴕi bo faako na ni 
sosheŋa din tu zaŋ chaŋ suhidoo dawama niŋbu Dagboŋ puli ni. Lahabali din yan yi baŋsim vihigo ŋo 
nina pala din yan zaŋ ku anfaani sheli paha la ti ni kuli wuhi nufi (niya) shelimaa.  
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Ti vihiya nya ka piiga pahi vihigu ŋo puni, doomini a baŋsim ni a milinsi zaŋ kpa bohsi 
labisibu balibu balibu din nyina gomdanti (Governmant) ni salo sani na ni di ku zabili 
maa, ka bo suhudoo kana Dagbaŋ puli ni baayan suhudoo alikawli maa ni daa lo 2006 
yuuni maa puni. A yi saᴕti ni a ni pahi baŋsim vihigu ŋo puni, din ŋuna, ti mina ni zaŋ ti 
nina kpa taba ka ti boha bohisi. 
Bohisi maa ni yan chaŋ shem 
Bohisi maa ni ya n chaŋ shem n nye din kana ŋo: 
• Di tuya ni di dihitabili saha sheli Bohisi maa ni yan bohi, ni luᴕu sheli di ni yan 
bohi n ti tabili di ni yan bohi shem  ( nina zaŋ kpa taba tohisi, ni taŋgali mii zuᴕu 
bohisi n ti tabili bini boolindi sheli Sikaipu la {kompita zuᴕu video fiila}-skype) 
• Tabzaŋbaŋsitaba (introduction) bee (milinsi ni taba) ni niŋ. Daliri din che ka 
baŋsim vihigu ŋo maa yan niŋ maa     nilan lab wuhi; yaha, saᴕti gbaŋ maa ni dihi 
(saani), bee ka a pii ni a ni yi baŋsim vihigu maa puni. 
• Neesim (bayaani) ni niŋ zaŋ kpa sabibu maa soya ni yaŋ chaŋ shem. Di yi niŋ 
talahi, soli (yiko) ni bo zaŋ kpa yetɔᴕa teepubu zaŋ niŋ kaseeti ni. Teepubu maa 
pala she pahala di yan sɔŋ mi dihtabili ni bi ni sabi sheli maa nyala din zantuhi a 
ni yeli shem maa dedee. Dini kpaŋsi, ni ŋun saᴕti vihigu ŋo puni behigu mali yiko 
ni o yi di puni sahansheli kam o ni bora, di yi ti niŋ ka  hohisi maa chana. 
• Di yi niŋ talahi, bohisi ni bohi zaŋ chaŋ a ni pii bohisi maa puni yibu maa, din 
kuya n che ka di baŋ daliri sheli din tahi lala na. di yi niŋ ka a bi niŋ fahimta (bee 
ka a bi baŋ sheli), ŋ kpamda jaandi, kpaŋmi a maŋa ka bohi ka di nee n taa. 
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• Neesim (bee bayaani) ni niŋ zaŋ kpa lahabali sheŋa din laᴕim maa; ti lahi tiri nyin 
ŋun be vihigu ŋo puni alikawli zaŋ kpa gbinliribo polo. 
• Di yi niŋ talahi shili ni mali zaŋ kpa ti labibu na. 
• Paᴕbu (nbonbo) ni niŋ. 
• Saha sheli Bohisi maa ni yan di nyela kamani awa  yini ni minti pia ni anu( 
pinaanu) 
Vihigu maa behigu ni nye shem 
A vihigu ŋo puni bebu nyela suhuyurilim ko. A yi pii ni a ni pahi di puni, a lan mali yiko 
ni a yi di puni bee ka a che bohisimaa labisibu sahan sheli kam ani bora. Diyi ti yan sabi 
bahigu sabu maa, a yuli pala din yan boli zaŋ chaŋ lahabali sheli a ni ti. A yi pii ni a ni 
pahi vihigu maa puni bee a yi pii  ni a ku pahi di puni  pala din yan saᴕim a mini niŋvuᴕu 
so sunsuni bee laᴕingu sheli kam sunsuni; zaŋ ti tabili a ni tumti so maa.   
Vihigu maa barinanima ni di anfaaninima 
Bohisi maa yi ti bohira, di ni tooi niŋ ka di sheŋa bori ni di tee yoltem, bee yeltoᴕu 
(yelbiɛrili) din daa paai niribi la; din zuᴕu, di zooya ka teha ni suhgarigu paai niŋvuᴕu 
sheba. Di yi ti niŋ ka lala maa paaga, ka a bori soŋsim, din a zaŋa chaŋ salo bɛrizuŋ tuma 
shee la ka a ti nya soŋsim. Di pun baŋsiba zaŋ kpa di polo; di zuᴕu, bi mali la sheli zaŋ 
chaŋ di polo. Anfaani sheli din yan yina a vihigu ŋo puni benibu nyemi, ni lahabali sheli 
kam a ni ya nti nyela din yan sɔŋ kpaŋsi baŋsim( bee di yan che ka baŋsim ti too ni) zaŋ 
kpa behi sheŋa puni adalichi sosuma din na beni ni yan tooi tum viԑŋyalinga pam shem. 
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Ŋo nyela din ni tooi niŋ piligibu shee tuma zuᴕlaanim ni yan tooi mentam (bee ntuᴕi) 
sohbɛᴕu, soŋsim(faako) tibu yi ti lan bora. A vihigu ŋo puni benibu ka samyogahindili. 
Ashili liribu (Ashiliribo)- confidentiality 
Di yi ti yan sabi vihigu ŋo kpaliŋkpaa sabibu, lahabali sheŋa din yina vihigu maa puni 
pala din yan zaŋ tabili  so yuli ka mani ni ŋuni ndaa yeli. Di nyela din yan be  amini 
bohbohri maa sunsuni ko. Gbaŋ sheŋa kam din sabi, nti pahi yetɔᴕ sheŋa zaa din teepi, 
yan pumpumi jillijilli n kpari niŋ adaka puni. Baŋsim vihirovihiro maa ko n nye ŋun mali 
yiko di zuᴕu. Lahabali din sabi be kompita zuᴕu nyela din yan be faali (files)  sheŋa din 
mali namba sɔᴕrili (password). Namba sɔᴕrili ŋo nyela din yan be vihirovihiro maa ko 
sani (researcher). Lahabali sheŋa zaa din teepi niŋ kaseetinimni nyela  bi ni ya nsaᴕim 
labi vihigu maa nyaanga. 
Ashil-liribo maa Tarisi 
 Di mini ŋkuli kpaai alikawli nin ni liri ŋunkam be vihigiŋo puni Ashili (gbini) maa, di bi 
yan pahi ti yi niŋ ka ti nya ni tingbaŋ, bee ninsalinim suhdoo be barina puni (di ŋmahanli 
nyela kamani ti yi ti nya bidibi nema (tobnema) ni malfanima ka di pala tingbaŋ 
linjimanim n suli; yaha, ti yi ti nya daliri ni shab  bori ni bi liri bi taba. Ŋo yi ti niŋ, di niŋ 
talahi n zuᴕu ni n ti suhdoo fukumsinim tibli zaŋ kpa barina ŋo polo. 
Adireesinima ni lahabali baŋbu bohsi 
Vihigu maa janda(di fukunsilana) yuli n nye: Joe Lambongang. O nyela a ni yan tooi poli 
taŋgalimii ŋͻ zuᴕu:+233 244989 372 bee ka a sabi too iimiili (Email) ŋͻ zuᴕu: 
joe.lambogang@waldenu.edu. Bansim vihigu maa komitii daanbulo n nye: Dokte (Dr) 
Gloria Billingsley; o nyela a ni yan tooi nya so iimiili (Email) ŋͻ zuᴕu: 
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Gloria.billingsley@waldenu.edu .  A yi mali bohigu zaŋ kpa vihigu ŋo polo, a ni tooi 
bohiba punpoŋo bee ka a sabi li ti Bansim vihigu maa komitii daanbulo maa. A yi mali 
pohsi zaŋ kpa a hachi ni nye sheli zaŋ chaŋ vihigu ŋo puni bebu, a ni tooi sabi ti ninvuᴕu 
so ŋun za Walden Yunivesiti zaani tangalimii ŋo zuᴕu:+-612-312-1210  
 
Fooro tibu yetɔᴕli(zilinli) 
N nyela ŋun karim lahabali sheli din sabi be zuᴕsaa ŋo; bee di nye la din lebigi ti ma 
yetͻᴕsheli puni (bee bali sheli puni) ni mi. N nyela ŋun niŋ fahimta zaŋ kpa nufi ni mara 
sheŋa puni vihigu maa ni yan niŋ. Din zuᴕu n saᴕti nin ni pahi bansim vihigu ŋo puni. 
Di nye la talahi ni fooro tibu gbaŋ ŋo dihi ( saani) buyi zuᴕu. Gbaŋyini yan kpalinla nyin 
ŋun be baŋsim vihigu ŋo puni sani. 
Ninvuᴕu so  ŋun be vihigu ŋo puni 
yuli:………………………………………………………………… 











Appendix R: Paᴕlaanba Ni Ban Mali Yidaanim Ashili Alikawli ( Ashili Saᴕti): 
Ninvuᴕyinoyino Boshisi. 01-19-17-0466118 
Ŋun yan saani maa yuli: 
Vihigu ŋo yuli n booni: Adalchi sosheŋa bini kpiᴕi ni bi bo maligu zaŋ chaŋ barina 
(suhgarigu) shaŋa din paai  nirba. Soya ŋo sonsim ni nye sheli zan chaŋ zabili goobu polo 
ni suhdoo dawama ninbu gana (Ghana) puni. Vihigu ŋo kpala Dagbaŋ din be Tudu bobli 
la zabili la (Tudu pobili Dagbaŋ zabili la). Lahbaya ŋo laᴕimbu yi ti pili, n nyela ŋun yan 
nya lahabali sheŋa din nye ashili dini, kan pala ŋun yan viili wuhi so.  N saᴕti ni lahabaya 
maa yan kpalinla ashili puni; ka lahi dihi tabili nin yi zaŋ so sheŋa dinŋ bi tu yihi  
lahabaya maa polo nyela din yan tum nivuᴕu so ŋun be vihigu maa puni barina ( bee 
chuuta). 
N yi saani (n dihi) ashili alikawli saᴕti gbaŋ ŋo, di wuhiri mi nin saᴕti ka gbaagi alikawli 
ni: 
1. N ku viili wuhi so bee n di di fiila ni so zaŋ kpa ashili lahabali ŋo polo. Hali n 
pala ŋun yan viili wuhi n zonima bee n daŋ. 
2. N ku vii ashili lahabaya ŋo naᴕla n deela fooro din niŋ kamaata. 
3. N ku di ashili lahabali alizama luᴕsheli polo nirbi ni ni tooi wum di fiila maa. N 
mi ni bi tu bee n saᴕti ni ndi ashili lahabali, hali di yi kuli nyela  ŋun paha vihigu 
ŋo puni maa yuli bi boli. 
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4. N dihi datili ni birigimsim zaŋ chaŋ alikawli gbaabu ŋo, nyela din mali fukumsi ( 
bee zalikpana ) mara 
Gbaŋ ŋo saanibu (bee di hibu) wuhirimi, nin saᴕiya nin karimi alikawli maa ka lan saᴕti 
nin ni doli di mara maa ni di zalkpana maa zaa Kaman di ni sabi do zuᴕsaa ŋo shem maa. 















Appendix S: PaᴕLaanba Aanba Ni Ban Mali Yidaanim Ashili AlikawliLIKAWLI ( 
Ashilisaᴕti): Paᴕba Laᴕimᴣini Alizama. 01-19-17-0466118 
 
Ŋun yan saani maa yuli: 
Vihigu ŋo yuli n booni: Adalchi sosheŋa bini kpiᴕi ni bi bo maligu zaŋ chaŋ 
barina(suhgarigu) shaŋa din paai  nirba. Soya ŋo sonsim ni nye sheli zan chaŋ zabili 
goobu polo ni suhdoo dawama ninbu gana (Ghana) puni. Vihigu ŋo kpala Dagbaŋ din be 
Tudu bobli la zabili la ( Tudu pobili Dagbaŋ zabili la). Lahbaya ŋo laᴕimbu yi ti pili, n 
nyela ŋun yan nya lahabalsheŋa din nye ashili dini, kan pala ŋun yan viili wuhi so.  N 
saᴕti ni lahabaya maa yan kpalinla ashili puni; ka lahi dihi tabili nin yi zaŋ so sheŋa diŋ bi 
tu yihi lahabaya maa polo nyela din yan tum nivuᴕu so ŋun be vihigu maa ni barina ( bee 
chuuta). 
N yi saani (n dihi) ashili alikawli saᴕti gbaŋ ŋo, di wuhiri mi nin saᴕti ka gbaagi alikawli 
ni: 
1. N ku viili wuhi so bee n di di fiila ni so zaŋ kpa ashili lahabali ŋo polo. Hali n 
pala ŋun yan viili wuhi n zonima bee n daŋ. 
2. N ku vii ashili lahabaya ŋo, naᴕla n deela fooro din niŋ kamaata. 
3. N ku di ashili lahabali alizama luᴕsheli polo nirbi ni ni tooi wum di fiila maa. N 
mi ni bi tu, nin di ashili lahabali, hali di yi kuli nyela ŋun pahi vihigu ŋo puni maa 
yuli bi boli. 
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4. N dihi datili ni birigimsim zaŋ chaŋ alikawli gbaabu ŋo polo, nyela din mali 
fukumsi ( bee zalikpana ) mara 
Gbaŋ ŋo saanibu (bee dihibu) wuhirim, nin saᴕiya ni n karimi alikawli maa ka lan saᴕti 
nin ni doli di mara maa ni di zalkpana maa zaa Kaman di ni sabi do zuᴕsaa ŋo shem maa. 
















Appendix T: Vinvuᴕyiniyini  Boshisi Ni Yan Chaŋ Sham (Boshisi Maa Ni Yan Chaŋ 
Shem  Zaŋ Kpa Vinvuᴕyiniyini Bshisi Plo). 01-19-17-0466118 
 
Dabsili (Taariihi):…………………………………………………………….………… 
Di behigu shee (di ni yan n niŋ luᴕsheli):…………………………………………….….. 
Bohbohiri maa yuli:…………………………………………………………….………… 
Bohlabirisi maa yuli:……………………………………………………………………… 
Ŋ lan gmeri nupuᴕu zaŋ chaŋ a ni saᴕti ni a ni pahi baŋsim vihigu ŋo puni maa. Bohisi 
maa ku yan dila Kaman awa yini laasabu. Di yi niŋ ka bohsheli bi nee taa, dim suᴕro ka 
che kan baŋ.  
Prigubu din nye A (Section A): Kootu ni di Sariya sheli 
1. Maachi goli, 2006 sohdoo alikawli maa ni da gbaai naai maa, di tooi niŋ ka bi bo 
samyoo ti ninvuᴕsheb ban daa nya barina zaŋ chaŋ bi ninsali tali hachi poloo? 
Bohigu ŋo labisibu yi nye ieei, bi  daa bonti; a nyela ŋun ni tooi boᴕsi li ( bee n 
niŋ bayaani) zaŋ chaŋ di polo a kpiɛŋ tatarigaa?  
2. Maachi goli,2006 sohdoo alikawli maa ni da gbaai naai maa, kootu daa di sheb 
sariya ka niŋ ba fukumsi zaŋ chaŋ ninsalinim hachi chuuta ninbu polo? 
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3. Di yi nye la bohigu din pahiri ayi ŋͻ (2) labsibu nya ieei, sariya daa diya, a ni tooi 
di  suᴕro ka buᴕsi ( bee n niŋ bayaani) zaŋ chaŋ sosheŋa bi ni daa zaŋ baŋ 
nivuᴕsheb bi ni zilisi ni bani n tum barina maa ka diba sariya? 
4. A nye la ŋun saᴕti lii? Dim suᴕro ( jaandi) niŋmi bayaani zaŋ kpa abohigu ŋo 
alabisibu maa polo. 
5. Fukumsi sheli bee tibdarigibo sheli dabam daa lan niŋ zaŋ chaŋ nivuᴕsheb bi ni 
zilisi ni bani n tum barina maa? Bohigu maa labsibu nya ieei, dim  suᴕro ka buᴕsi 















6. Di viɛŋyela nye la dini zaŋ kpa: 
a. Nirba barina mɔŋbu ( bee nirba zokache barina niŋbu)? Dim  suᴕro  ka niŋ 
bayaani zaŋ kpa a bohigu maa alabisibu maa polo. 
b. Tab yada tibu ni adalichi ᴣii puni labsibu na? Dim  suᴕro  ka niŋ bayaani zaŋ 
kpa a bohigu maa labisibu maa polo. 
Prigubu din nye B (Section B): Adalichi sheli din labsiri behigu na kamani di ni daa 
be shem 
                                     (Restorative Justice) 
7. Zaŋ kuli chaŋ Maachi goli, 2006; sosheli kpuᴕya zaŋ chaŋ: 
a. Barina maa bee chuuta maa ni daa paai sheb maa jilima( bilchiinsi) labisibu 
na? 
b. Bi binbora soya baliginsim ni/bee ban daa tum barina maa nya soli ni bi saᴕti 
ni bani n daa tumli ka bo gaafari ( chaŋpaŋ)? 
c. Tab yada tibu ni Nam polo nimi tingbaŋ tuma duzuᴕuri (state Instititions) 




8. A teha puni, din nlee nye yelmuᴕsirsheŋa di goli adalichi maa chandi ni soya din 
yan kpiᴕi bo adalichi ni suhidoo kpansibu Dagboŋ puli ni? 
9. Bo nlee tu ni di niŋ ka di be di ko zaŋ chaŋ suhdoo dawama dihtabli tiŋgbaŋ ŋo 
polo? 




















Appendix U: Salo Alizama Dibu Bshisi Ni Yan Chaŋ Shem (Boshisi Maa Ni Yan N 
Chaŋ Shem Zaŋ Kpa Salo (laᴕingu) Boshisi). 01-19-17-0466118 
 
(Date) Dabsili (Taariihi):…………………………………………..…………………….. 
Di behigu shee (di ni yan niŋ luᴕsheli) polo:………………………….…………………… 
Bohbohiri maa yuli:…………………………………….………………………………… 
SALO (laᴕingu) maa 
yuli:……………………………………………………………………..………………… 
Ŋ lan gmeri nupuᴕu zaŋ chaŋ a ni saᴕti ni a ni pahi baŋsim vihigu ŋo puni maa. Bohisi 
maa ku yan dila Kaman awa yini laasabu. Di yi niŋ ka bohsheli bi nee taa, dim suᴕro ka 
che kan baŋ. Yaha, di yi ti niŋ sahansheli kam, ka daliri sheli che ka shab bori ni bi che 
bohisi maa labisibu; dim suᴕro ka che ka n baŋ ka che bohisi maa bohibu. 
1. A yi tehi lab nyaaaga, a ni tooi tee poli sochibsheŋa( strategies) bini daa zaŋ zali 
Dagbaŋ puni Maachi goli 2006 suhdoo alikawli maa kpuᴕbu maa nyaanga ni bi: 
a. Bo suhdoo labina Dagbaŋ? 
b. Mali zabili maa? 
c. Bo soya sheŋa din yan gu ka zabili ku lan kana( peace building)? 
2. Di viɛŋyaling daa nye la dini zaŋ kpa: 
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a. Nirba barina mɔŋbu ( bee nirba zokache barina niŋbu)? Dim  suᴕro  ka niŋ 
bayaani zaŋ kpa a bohigu maa labisibu polo. 
b. Tab yada tibu ni adalichi ᴣii puni labsibu na? Dim  suᴕro  ka niŋ bayaani zaŋ 
kpa a bohigu maa labisibu polo. 
3. A teha puni, sochibsi ŋo daa nye la din daa tooi bo maligu ti Dagbaŋ zalibi maa ka 
lan labisi suhdoo naa? Dim suᴕro ka niŋ bayaani zaŋ kpa a bohigu maa labisibu 
polo. 
4. Di yi daa bi tooi bo maligu na, bo n lee yan tooi che ka sochibsi maa zaᴕa be 
sosheŋa di yan gu ka zabili ku lan kana.   Dim suᴕro ka niŋ bayaani zaŋ kpa a 
bohigu maa labisibu polo. 
5. Bo nlee tu ni di niŋ ka di be di ko zaŋ chaŋ suhdoo dawama labibu na Dagbaŋ? 
Dim suᴕro  ka niŋ bayaani zaŋ kpa a bohigu maa labisibu polo. 
 
N paᴕya pam ni asahsheli a ni ku maa. 
 
 
 
